Column | Adapt And Manufacture: India’s Next Defence Advantage May Not Be Measured In Numbers

Military history has often been interpreted through the arithmetic of power. Larger armies, greater industrial output and superior military expenditure have traditionally shaped the balance between nations. Yet history also offers a recurring paradox: material superiority does not always translate into strategic advantage. As warfare enters an era of autonomous systems, artificial intelligence and increasingly affordable precision-technologies, that paradox is acquiring renewed significance.

China’s expansion of its defence-industrial capabilities illustrates the strategic value of manufacturing scale. Its established ecosystem in electronics, semiconductors, batteries, sensors and advanced engineering supports the development of increasingly sophisticated military technologies. For India, the significance of this development is not necessarily the need to reproduce an equivalent industrial structure, but to understand whether techno­logical depth, adaptability and indigenous innovation can provide an alternative means of strengthening strategic balance.

Adaptable Technologies

The Russia-Ukraine conflict has made this question particularly relevant. The extensive employment of aerial drones, loitering munitions, electronic warfare and unmanned maritime platforms has demonstrated how relatively affordable technologies can influence operations traditionally dominated by expensive military assets. Smaller forces, supported by adaptable technologies, can increasingly generate operational effects disproportionate to their conventional resources.

What is emerging is not the disappearance of traditional military power, but a different relationship between technological sophistication, industrial capacity and operational effectiveness. A conventional platform may remain in service for decades, while an unmanned system can undergo several generations of technological improvement within a comparatively short period. The ability to adapt is consequently becoming as important as the ability to manufacture.

For India, this transformation has implications across its land borders and maritime domain. In the Himalayas, unmanned aerial vehicles can support surveillance, reconnaissance, logistics and situational awareness in environments where terrain and altitude place considerable demands upon conventional operations. Counter-drone technologies, incorporating radar, radio-frequency sensing, electro-optical detection and electronic countermeasures, are becoming equally important as unmanned systems proliferate.

At sea, the implications are potentially more profound. India’s strategic position in the Indian Ocean, its extensive coastline and its responsibilities towards commercial shipping and critical maritime infrastructure require persistent awareness across vast areas. Unmanned surface vessels can support coastal surveillance, hydrographic surveys and specialised naval missions, while autonomous underwater vehicles offer applications in seabed mapping, underwater inspection, mine countermeasures and maritime domain awareness.

These platforms are not substitutes for conventional naval assets. Their importance lies in complementing existing capabilities, extending operational reach and enabling distributed maritime presence. Maritime autonomy also presents distinct engineering challenges involving navigation, propulsion, communication limitations, environmental conditions and operational safety, making it a field where specialised technological expertise is indispensable.

A nation may demonstrate an advanced autonomous platform under controlled conditions without necessarily having the capacity to manufacture it in meaningful quantities. In periods of heightened security requirements, the decisive challenge may be less about producing a technologically sophisticated prototype and more about sustaining production, securing components, supporting maintenance and replenishing capabilities at the pace required.

Industrial surge capacity cannot be improvised at the moment of necessity. It depends upon production lines, skilled personnel, reliable suppliers, established quality systems and continuity of demand. An enterprise receiving one development contract and subsequently facing years of procurement uncertainty cannot reasonably be expected to maintain substantial manufacturing capacity indefinitely.

This exposes a structural challenge within defence innovation. India has made considerable progress in supporting early-stage development through Innovations for Defence Excellence (iDEX), the Technology Development Fund (TDF) and the ADITI scheme. However, the value of these initiatives must ultimately be measured not simply through prototypes and demonstrations, but through their contribution to deployable and sustainable national capabilities.

The missing institutional connection is often the transition from innovation to assured procurement.

Technologies successfully developed through iDEX and TDF, once they demonstrate operational suitability and technological maturity, should be considered for inclusion in the Positive Indigenisation Lists. This would create a more deliberate relationship between government-supported research, identified domestic requirements and indigenous manufacturing.

Such inclusion should be supported by credible procurement planning. Indi­genisation cannot be reduced to identifying products that may eventually be manufactured domestically; it must also create conditions under which an enterprise can invest in production facilities, retain skilled engineers and maintain the supply chains necessary for delivery.

Repeat contracts are particularly significant. A single procurement order may establish technical credibility, but successive orders help create an industry. They provide the demand visibility required to finance manufacturing infrastructure, improve quality, develop domestic vendors and sustain production readiness. Without continuity, technological capabilities risk remaining concentrated in isolated development projects rather than maturing into enduring industrial capacity.

Procurement reform must also go beyond periodic modifications to Preliminary Services Qualitative Requirements. Revising technical specifications may address immediate limitations, but it does not necessarily resolve the institutional difficulties associated with emerging technologies.

The more fundamental question is whether acquisition frameworks can accommodate operational suitability and continuous technological development. For drones, autonomous platforms and electronic-warfare systems, specifications established at the beginning of a procurement cycle may require refinement as technology evolves.

Spiral development offers a more appropriate framework in suitable cases. An operationally acceptable initial capability can enter limited service and undergo successive improvements based upon structured user feedback. This approach preserves essential performance and safety standards while recognising that technological maturity is frequently an evolutionary process rather than a single development milestone.

The draft Defence Acquisition Procedure 2026 acknowledges several of these issues through proposals concerning spiral development, faster acquisition of short-cycle technologies and long-term procurement visibility. Their importance lies in the possibility of aligning acquisition practices more closely with the realities of modern defence engineering.

Reducing the Barriers

Government support must consequently extend beyond financial grants. Shared testing infrastructure, high-altitude trial environments, maritime testing facilities, certification support, timely payments and access to patient capital are necessary to reduce the barriers faced by emerging manufacturers. Equally important is the development of indigenous components, including propulsion systems, sensors, communications equipment and electronic controllers, without which domestic assembly cannot mature into genuine technological sovereignty.

China has demonstrated the strategic advantage of industrial scale. India’s opportunity lies in developing a complementary model built upon specialised engineering, institutional responsiveness, domestic supply-chain depth and the capacity to improve technologies continuously.

The experience of contemporary warfare suggests that smaller military forces can offset certain conventional disadvantages through innovation, but technological asymmetry becomes strategically meaningful only when supported by industrial endurance. A drone may be developed by a small team of engineers; sustaining its operational relevance demands an ecosystem far larger than the enterprise that created it.

For India, the central challenge is therefore not merely to produce increasingly capable drones, but to ensure that the country can manufacture, replenish and improve them consistently when required. The relationship between government, the armed forces and private industry must evolve accordingly, connecting technological development with procurement certainty and industrial preparedness.

The future balance of military power will continue to depend upon conventional capabilities and national resources. Increasingly, however, it will also reflect the ability of nations to translate innovation into reliable, repeatable and sustainable military capability. India’s progress in autonomous systems offers an important foundation, but its enduring strategic value will depend upon the institutions and the industrial capacity built around it.

(Views expressed are personal)

Capt Nikunj Parashar (Retd) is the founder of Sagar Defence Engineering