In fact, it was in ’65 that Pakistan was feeling that sense of confidence; its economy had done well for the last few years and it had had a relatively stable government since General Ayub Khan’s ’58 coup. India was facing economic problems, and Nehru, one of the giants of the independence movement, had recently died. Pakistan felt confident that, thanks to a decade of US military and economic aid, they could succeed against India in a short local war in Kashmir. Following India’s defeat by China in ’62, they had begun a major rearmament programme which would have meant that by ’70 the military gap between India and Pakistan would have been hugely in India’s favour. Hawks in the Pakistani establishment argued that if no war was fought soon, any military solution would become impossible. Pakistani foreign minister Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto was a leading advocate of early military action and a hugely influential figure in Ayub’s cabinet.