While this could be seen as India’s attempt to buy time till it develops infrastructure and connectivity within the country—particularly in the under-developed Northeast—it also shows lack of political courage on part of the new government in Delhi. The Indian Prime Minister could well have told the Chinese that India will take a bit of time to join the proposed BCIM corridor while welcoming it in principle. However, his remarks indicate that despite his public image for reaching out to neighbours, the Modi government continues to adopt the cautious approach that his predecessors had shown in this area. In addition, his lack of comments on the silk route through the sea connectivity shows that Delhi, despite its pubic bravado, has not yet been able to come out with a well-thought out plan to deal with the connectivity in Indian Ocean that will keep its neighbours in South Asia like Sri Lanka, Maldives and Bangladesh from enthusiastically accepting the Chinese offer.
The third and the most telling comment came from the Prime Minister in his attempt at outlining India’s approach to the unsettled border with China. The suggestion to revive the process of ‘clarification of the LAC’ clearly indicates that he has not been well briefed on the subject or he has decided to accept the views offered by advisors who look at the subject purely through the security prism.
The clarification process was discontinued by India—obviously at the suggestion of the Chinese—during the Atal Behari Vajpayee government, which finally opted for the “Special Representative” talks to deal with the contentious issue to show its political commitment to resolve the boundary issue.
Many experts feel the “clarification process of the LAC” is nothing but an attempt at “time-buying” without addressing the real question of dealing directly with the boundary question. It should be kept in mind that unlike in the case of Pakistan, where Line of Control is an agreed boundary between the two sides, the Line of Actual Control (LAC) with China only indicates areas under control of Indian and Chinese troops. More precisely it shows where the Chinese troops stood when it unilaterally decided to withdraw after the 1962 winter war with India. In subsequent negotiations the two sides have a fair idea of the differing perspective of their position in the LAC—or areas which they think are under their control.
The series of intrusions by Chinese and Indian soldiers into each other’s ‘territory’ is precisely because of this unsettled border.
From the Chinese perspective, President’s Xi’s visit was to ensure that India remains interested in China without taking steps and offers from other countries in Asia and beyond to get into an alliance that can create distractions for Beijing and come in the way of its ”rise” and development. President Xi could well have been disappointed with the lack of any major breakthrough during his visit to India. But the series of agreements he signed with Prime Minister Modi shows that he is keen in keeping Delhi interested in China, especially as a potential source of big investment in future as well as seeking its cooperation and support on areas at the global stage that affect both countries.