In this context, Karuna's disclosures regarding the views of the LTTE leader on whattranspired at Oslo assumes crucial significance and, in fact, corresponds closely to a clarificationsfurnished by Anton Balasingham, the principal spokesmen for the LTTE outside Sri Lanka, on his leader'sstance, according to which the form of self-determination being pursued includes the right to secede and forman independent state (extracted from a widely reported statement by Balasingham at a press interview in Osloon December 5, 2003). The fact that Karuna's disclosures have not been refuted by the LTTE leadership has thusafforded an opportunity for future Government negotiators to abandon the prevailing illusion on the LTTEstandpoint, and to redefine their own negotiation stances in the light of the continuing adherence of the LTTEleader to the goal of secession.
Karuna's revolt could be seen as having had a mixed impact on the LTTE. It has exposed certain fallacies inthe basic beliefs which Tiger propagandists have been publicising the world over throughout the past fewdecades: first, that there is a single, indivisible homeland exclusive to Sri Lanka Tamils extending over theentire area covered by the Northern and Eastern provinces; and second, that the LTTE has a right to act as thesole political spokesman and representative of the Tamils of Sri Lanka. The revolt, while highlighting theweaknesses of the 'homeland' claim (which has, in fact, been thoroughly exposed in existing works ofresearch), has also demonstrated the superficiality of the assertion that the LTTE leadership in Vanni has apower monopoly over the entire Tamil community of Sri Lanka.
Yet another negative impact of the revolt on the LTTE is the loss of trained fighters, weaponry and militaryinstallations that accompanied Karuna's departure from his command area. According to journalist Iqbal Athas,the large caches of arms and ammunition destroyed on Karuna's orders during his retreat included mortarlaunchers and heavy artillery procured by the LTTE after the declaration of the December 2001 ceasefire.Likewise, according to press estimates, the number of deserters from the LTTE ranks following the collapse ofthe revolt could be as high as 2,000. Athas also notes that there is, in addition, the resonance of the revolton the Tamil diaspora, observed among the Tamil communities especially in France, Switzerland and Canada,which could result in an erosion of external support for the LTTE.
Substantial gains have, however, also accrued to the LTTE as a result of the collapse of the revolt. Therehas, for instance, been a definite enhancement of Prabhakaran's image as an invincible leader. Manyjournalists, including those opposed to the Tigers, have been ecstatic in their outpourings on the allegedbrilliance of Prabhakaran as military strategist in conducting his offensive against Karuna, ignoring thepathetic mismatch of overall strength represented by the revolt.