The Ice Melts, But Slowly

It is now clear in Islamabad that the peace plan was set in motion when US President Bill Clinton visited the subcontinent last spring. After holding talks in New Delhi, Clinton had tightened the screws on Islamabad. Minutes after Clinton's departure, a profusely sweating Pervez Musharraf told a press briefing he was prepared to restrain the mujahideen on Pakistan's side of the LoC, if there was easing of pressure on Kashmiris by Indian security forces. It was the second time since Kargil that Islamabad publicly admitted its control over the mujahideen.

There is a difference, though. Today, General Headquarters has no one to blame for supporting the peace initiative. This perhaps explains the silence in the establishment. "Normally, peace initiatives do not have a problem of parentage: they get owned up easily. The present situation in Kashmir is unique: despite significant developments towards breaking the stalemate between India and Kashmiri fighters, no one is claiming the credit. Since the Hizbul Mujahideen's ceasefire offer last week, there has been a string of statements from different quarters distancing themselves from the whole issue. This confounds the existing confusion about the purposes, goals and anticipated results of the opening provided by the Hizbul Mujahideen move. It also threatens to scuttle the initiative prematurely," comments the English daily, The News.

For now at least, there has been incredible support to the Hizb's ceasefire call from the quarters that matter in Pakistan. There is no hiding the fact that without the support of the Pakistani army and more so the ISI, the Hizbul Mujahideen would not have made its dramatic announcement.

Right noises, in fact, are being made. Warns Javed Jabbar, security advisor to Musharraf, "Pakistan has been actively promoting a dialogue to resolve the Kashmir dispute. But the ceasefire decision was made by the Hizbul and if a group decides on ceasefire as the world has been asking, the political pressure for a peaceful Kashmir solution would grow. Patience on the part of Pakistan should not be seen as a sign of weakness."

The thaw, in hindsight, was evident over the last one month. For one, there was no exchange of fire across the LoC since June 25. Then, in the first week of July, a clutch of visiting Indian journalists were taken to the LoC. It was soon thereafter that the Hizbul dropped its peace bomb.

A month earlier, when US undersecretary of state Thomas Pickering came to Islamabad, Pakistan was accused of not matching Musharraf's peace rhetoric with action. Pickering told the Pakistani generals that this was in contrast to Delhi's initiatives - it had then released jailed Kashmiri leaders and hinted at a dialogue with the Hurriyat Conference. One news report quoted Pickering as telling Islamabad that Washington was anxious over the lack of "detectable change in Pakistan's Kashmir policy".

It was in June that Musharraf sent his foreign minister Abdus Sattar to Washington. Reports suggest that the peace policy was given the green signal then and the US intelligence agencies played a key role in brokering the deal.

Earlier, Tokyo, the other important player besides Washington and Beijing, invited the Jamaat-e-Islami chief Qazi Hussain to Japan. Besides Kashmir, the signing of the ctbt was also focused upon. No Jamaat chief has spent so much time in Tokyo. The gameplan, involving a coordinated effort by Tokyo, Washington, Islamabad and New Delhi, was a deliberate attempt to get the 'hawks' of the mujahideen freedom struggle on board. (Former ISI chief Gen Hamid Gul is still in Washington.)

From Tokyo, Hussain went to Washington, where he was given full access to everyone who is anyone on Capitol Hill and the State Department. The timing of the Hizbul Mujahideen's announcement was perfect. Hussain was still in Washington when the ceasefire plan was made public. "It is a conspiracy hatched by the US and India with the connivance of Pakistani officials," insists Hussain. But no one is convinced: he and the establishment will face a difficult task mollifying their constituencies.

"The uproar among Pakistani opinion leaders has subsided. No one is now calling the Hizb initiative a betrayal or a sell-out. The initial reaction of shock and annoyance to a move which was largely termed hasty and ill-conceived has given way to some concern, more curiosity," explains Prof Khalid Mehmud, senior researcher at the Institute of Regional Studies.

However, there are still apprehensions of how despite the large numbers of actors in the Kashmiri theatre for peace, Pakistan might be tempted to make a wrong move. "As for Pakistan, its enthusiasm on Kashmir has in the past been surpassed by its fickleness and vulnerabilities. Hopefully, this time it will not be shooting for another victory of the Kargil kind," notes political analyst Anwar Ahmed.

He is right. Shootings of another kind in the Valley threatened the peace process even before the first meeting between representative of New Delhi and the Hizbul Mujahideen could take place. This had been condemned by not only the Pakistani government but all the militant groups and political parties in the country.

"Much ground has to be covered before there is any real cause to celebrate the possibility of peace in Kashmir. If at this primary stage, when the guns are still smoking, the Indian government is resurrecting its old 'talks under the Indian Constitution' precondition, the Kashmiri mujahideen have reason for concern. One hopes, however, for the sake of peace in Kashmir that these apprehensions do not prove to be true," warns the English daily, The Nation.

The follow-up to these dramatic developments is a possible meeting between Musharraf and Atal Behari Vajpayee in New York this September. No one is expecting anything beyond those frozen smiles and limp handshakes. Yet, says columnist M.H. Askari, "The Kashmir developments and the pressure from Washington may lead to a softening of India's stance on resuming talks with Pakistan, perhaps even facilitating a meeting between Vajpayee and Musharraf. But far too many tricky corners remain to be negotiated and far too many bridges to be crossed before a fair and acceptable solution begins to take shape."

These views are to some extent also being echoed in New York where recently US diplomats said, "Things have changed dramatically and India would be hard pressed to give valid reasons for not engaging Pakistan. Without engaging Pakistan, there can be no viable solution to the Kashmir dispute."

In Islamabad, meanwhile, one question that the military regime is not willing to answer is, "If the agenda is still the same, that is to improve relations with New Delhi and find an answer to the Kashmir dispute, then what was Nawaz Sharif's crime?"