In earlier incidents too, the Chinese military patrols have tailed Indian border police parties in gross violation of the Border Defence Co-operation Agreement (BCDA) signed by the two countries as recently as October 2013.
While patrol party face-offs between the two sides are consequences of an undemarcated boundary, the spurts of border aggressive posturing by China, timed just around the visits and meetings of high profile Chinese leaders needs to be underlined. In this case, it was the Chinese President Xi Jinping visiting India. Last year, intensive Chinese intrusions had occurred in Ladakh with PLA soldiers setting up tents on the India side of the LAC just before Chinese premier, Li Keqiang’s visit to India. In 2006, just before Hu Jintao's impending visit, the resident Chinese ambassador to India claimed in New Delhi that the “whole of what you call the state of Arunachal Pradesh is Chinese territory”.
Certain analysts theorise that Chinese intrusions and incidents are the actions of rogue local military commanders acting in isolation. However, it sounds far-fetched when in this case in point, the head of the Chinese military (read Jinping) is himself calling on India. It is reasonable then to conclude that these seem to be well planned and orchestrated tactics to perhaps exert pressure and garner bargaining points at the table, a fact which speaks volumes of China’s intentions to honour earlier good conduct border agreements.
China insists on linking economic ties and security issues, while India wants to delink the two areas of co-operation. President Xi Jinping has pledged investments worth US $20 billion in the next five years in India. It would be interesting to watch how China’s economic investment flow in India plays out in the future, given the ongoing security issues between the two countries. China’s aggressive posturing to pursue its ‘expansionist’ goals at the disputed border is a prime example among other strategic theatres, which is certainly not promoting regional security let alone working towards striking a strategic partnership with India. Several potential areas of co-operation may fall prey to such an adversarial environment, such as China’s proposals to India for the Maritime Silk Road and the Bangladesh, China, India and Myanmar (BCIM) economic corridor.
As a result, India may be motivated to respond vigorously in kind to protect its national sovereignty and territorial integrity, both militarily and geopolitically. Some indications of these policies can be inferred from President Pranab Mukherjee’s visit to Vietnam and signing agreements in defence co-operation and off-shore oil exploration in the South China Sea (SCS), disputed and claimed by China as its territory. China is in a regional ‘power’ contest with the US in the East China Sea, SCS and beyond the first island chain of the Pacific Ocean in the aftermath of the US’s ‘Asia pivot’ push.