For an insurgent organisation, territorial control isan advantage, but not necessary. Territory lost today, can be re-gainedtomorrow. But, trained and motivated cadres lost today cannot be easilyreplaced tomorrow. That is the logic, which dictates the conventional tactics ofall insurgent organisations. One saw it during the Algerian war of independence.One has been seeing it in Afghanistan since the US military intervention-- sinceupgraded into a NATO intervention-- started on October 7, 2001. Faced with theoverwhelming superiority of the US forces, the Taliban decided to cedeterritorial control and withdraw its men from Kabul, Kandahar and other placesinstead of getting involved in a frontal confrontation with the better armed,but not better motivated American forces. Its priority was the preservation ofthe hard core of its trained fighters in order to be able to strike back at aplace and time of its choice. That is what it has been doing since the beginningof last year-- with a mix of suicide terrorism and set-piece conventionalbattles. The Taliban knows that its lack of an anti-aircraft capability wouldrule out spectacular victories against the NATO and Afghan government forces andthe capture and occupation of territory. Its aim is, therefore, to keep the NATOforces bleeding, disrupt the economy and bring about battle fatigue in the ranksof the NATO forces. It is calculating that time and ground realities are on itsside and that ultimately the NATO forces would realise that theircounter-insurgency operations are faced with the law of diminishing returns.