As war clouds loom large on the South Asian horizon, onceagain the spectre of a nuclear confrontation between India and Pakistan hasbecome a matter of concern. It is indeed a coincidence that this also happens tobe the fourth anniversary of the Indian nuclear explosions at Pokharan in May1998.
Predictably, questions are being raised about the value ofIndia going nuclear, threatening as it has made the security environment ofSouth Asia. Proponents of nuclear disarmament and arms control in South Asia areonce again seeing this as a vindication of their long-stated positions.
Even after four years of India’s nuclear tests, thediscourse on this issue in India has remained remarkably uni-dimensional,focusing primarily on India’s gains and losses after Pokharan II. Importantthough this debate is, it ignores the far-reaching changes that have taken placeand still continue to shake the global security environment. It is time toexamine some of the larger ramifications of India’s attempt to challenge theglobal nuclear status quo in 1998.
India's nuclear tests changed the contours of the securityarchitecture that was constructed during the Cold War. No doubt, with the end ofthe Cold Wwar itself this security environment was under stress. But the Indiannuclear tests were the first open challenge, by a "responsible" asopposed to a "rogue" member of international community, to thissystem. This was the beginning of the end of the non-proliferation regime, thebedrock of Cold War international security. And the consequences for globalsecurity have been nothing less than revolutionary.
India’s open challenge to the global arms control anddisarmament framework led to its re-evaluation by the other major powers in theinternational system. As a consequence, international arms control today seemsto be heading for a slow but inevitable demise.
The first major blow came in the form of the rejection of theComprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) by the US Senate in 1999. The Russian Dumaratified the long delayed START II only after Putin made it clear that Russiawould pull out of all arms control and disarmament measures if the US went aheadwith its missile defense programme. And now there are indications that Russiamight be planning new nuclear tests.
But the most significant move in this direction has been madeby the US. It has given a six-month notice to Russia, enabling it to withdraw inJune 2002 from the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) treaty of 1972. It is beingargued that the new kinds of threats in the post-Cold War period, especially theballistic missile threats from the "rogue" states and terroristgroups, has made this treaty irrelevant to the new security needs of the US. Itshould be noted that the ABM treaty is cited as a high point of arms-controlsuccess in maintaining international stability during the Cold War.
India and Pakistan continue with their nuclear weaponsprogramme, without adhering to any agreement that would deny them this option.The Clinton administration did try to bring the two countries into the fold ofthe non-proliferation regime. But since the Bush administration is itself notinterested in maintaining the arms control framework, it is not clear whereSouth Asia is headed for the moment. As India contemplates what action to takein response to the terrorist strikes from across the border, it is very clearthat nuclear weapons have completely changed the dynamic of Indo-Pak relations.
Compliance with the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR)by some US allies is questionable. The Wassenaar agreement that succeeded theearlier Coordinating Committee for Multilateral Export Controls Agreement,directed at depriving Communist countries of Western military technology, hasproven more difficult to enforce because it is aimed not only at the formerSoviet states but also at states about whose threatening nature theindustrialized signatories of Wassenaar disagree.
Finally, China, an emerging military power, is a participantin few arms control agreements and its record of adhering to its promises in therealm of arms control is not terribly impressive.
But is the failure of arms control something that should besurprising? Or is it that all arms control must fail. If arms control isneeded in a strategic relationship because the states in question might go towar, it will be impractical for that very reason of need, whereas, if armscontrol should prove to be available, it will be irrelevant. This has beencalled the arms control paradox. The record of Cold war shows that both theso-called status quo and revisionist powers, the US and the Soviet Unionrespectively, have been more or less equally responsible for reneging on theirarms control promises.
Not only did both of them attempt to gain nuclear superiorityduring the Cold War, despite a plethora of arms control agreements, but alsothey were also equally responsible for encouraging proliferation. As the greatpowers try to maximize their share of world power, their interests inevitablycome into conflict with the arms control agreements, making arms controlagreements unravel.
While one can give some credit to arms control formaintaining strategic stability and creating norms of behaviour, the factremains that even one of the most in-depth agreements in terms of details ofprovisions, verification measures, and leading to regime strengthening, the CTBT,was rejected by the US even when it faced no great power as a rival in the nearterm. This is significant because if even one of the strongest of arms controlmeasures is not deemed worthy of acceptance, then there is some problem with thevery idea of arms control rather than its specific provisions.
Indeed, disenchantment with arms control has been growingsince 1980s. After a brief period of détente in 1970s, the two superpowersagain started treating each other as antagonists and this affected all the armscontrol measures agreed to during détente.
The signing of a plethora of arms control agreements duringdétente was seen as the success of arms control rather than a reflection of therelaxation of tensions during détente. And so when after détente thesuperpowers gave arms control a short shrift, there was a lot of disappointment.
In the post-Cold War this tendency has been more prominent.There have been numerous proposals for universal disarmament without any realevaluation of its impact on international security. There are significantstrategic, political and technical obstacles to nuclear disarmament.
Countries that face formidable obstacles to national securitywill be disinclined to give up their nuclear weapons so long as theinternational system retains its anarchic nature. Also, there is a perception insome countries that nuclear weapons enhance their status in the internationalsystem. This might not be the case but so long as the nuclear weapon states keepon holding their obscenely huge nuclear arsenals, it would be difficult toconvince other states.
Then there is the problem of how to convince states that thehuge amounts of weapons-grade fissile material in the world since 1945 would notbe used by any state if and when disarmament takes place. No internationalagency can make states hedge their bets against future uncertainty ininternational politics.
However, even if these obstacles can be overcome, the largerquestion remains: is universal disarmament desirable? It may seem ironic but thehuge stockpiles of nuclear weapons that the two superpowers possessed during theCold War was a major factor in maintaining international stability. Indeed, itwas also important in the rather slow rate of nuclear proliferation as theirhuge arsenals allowed the two superpowers to provide extended deterrence totheir client states, thus reducing the value of nuclear weapons for them.
In the post-Cold War international system, universal nucleardisarmament can be highly destabilizing, as the nuclear threat would gettransformed. The probability of the use of nuclear weapons may increase manifoldas conventional wars may be transformed into nuclear wars by the losing side.And with no third power having the capability to force the two sides intorestraint, situation might deteriorate further. Therefore, any arms control ordisarmament measure needs to be evaluated on the basis of its impact oninternational stability as opposed to the emergence of some utopianinternational society of states.
This is not to justify the current status quo. Obsolete ideasabout the value of massive nuclear arsenals need to be discarded by thepolicymakers in the US and Russia and a heightened awareness about the dangersof unauthorized attacks and nuclear proliferation needs to be developed.
Bold steps to reduce nuclear inventories to much lower levelswould enhance American and Russian national security along with internationalpeace. In fact, it has been recommended that the US and Russia should adoptminimum deterrence strategies and force structures containing 200-500 weaponseach.
In this context, it is interesting to note that the US andRussia will be signing a treaty next week, agreeing thereby to reduce theirnuclear arsenals from around 6000 to around 1700-2200 by the end of 2012. Thesenegotiations have proceeded together with the US decision to pursue its NationalMissile Defense (NMD) programme.
The US sees this arms control measure as a by-product, ratherthan a driving force in US-Russian relations. This treaty is also a face-savinggesture for Putin, who is desperate to integrate the struggling Russian economywith the West and to give Russians a sense of national dignity that comes with aformal treaty with the US.
Though this represents a step in the right direction, someissues remain to be finessed. There is a possibility that the US pursuit of NMDtogether with the reductions in the Russian nuclear arsenal might be a recipefor nuclear instability. This will be because Russia will be forced to adopt amore offensive nuclear posture in order to neutralize the advantages that NMDwill confer on the US.
Also, there is the issue of China's reaction which stillremains clouded in mystery. The only thing that is clear is that it is seriouslygoing ahead with its military modernization programme. How this affects theUS-China relationship and China's immediate neighborhood will also determine thefuture of international stability.
The evidence, overwhelmingly, suggests that great powerattempts at arms control have at best been useless and at worst can be highlydestabilizing. However, great powers have deftly used various arms controlprovisions to constrain the strategic autonomy of other states in theinternational system. Indian nuclear tests were a direct challenge to the greatpowers and the result has been a complete overhaul of the international securityenvironment. The demise of international arms control is a small part of thatoverhaul.
As India and Pakistan once again make the world jittery, itis no use crying for nuclear disarmament, as nuclear weapons are not the causeof Indo-Pak tensions. South Asia needs a political solution to the Kashmirproblem and it will not come about with nuclear disarmament or arms control.
Indeed, nuclear weapons might be acting as a stabilizingforce by preventing an all-out war between India and Pakistan. Let us hope thatthe leadership in the two countries has the sagacity of comprehending theresponsibility of being "nuclear weapon states".
The writer is a Phd candidate in the Dept of Political Science, Univ ofNotre Dame, Notre Dame, Indiana (USA)
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