LoC As Border: The Secret Deal

A secret deal between India and Pakistan possibly involving turning the LoC into an international border with minor adjustments by both sides was scuttled by the Pakistani army. Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif was not informed of the magnitude of the Kargil operation until it blew up in his face. The army, on its part, was unaware of the secret parleys between New Delhi and Islamabad. That, in a gist, is what former Pakistani foreign secretary Niaz A. Naik sprung on a subcontinent still flush with conspiracy theories about the war. His crux, and the point that startled most, was this: If Kargil hadn’t surfaced, an agreement on Kashmir would have taken place in the month of September or October.

Expectedly, the statement was read in many ways. To the extent of Naik a key figure in the back-channel talks between Pakistan and India during the Kargil crisis being lampooned at home as ‘nayika’, out to do a good turn to the BJP during elections, even while as rehabilitating Nawaz Sharif.

The media went wild with the statement, but the dove of the Neemrana dialogue remained unruffled and initially refused to come out with a public denial. Angry army officials tried their best to initiate damage-control measures, putting pressure on both Naik and the prime minister to deny the statement.

As tensions increase between the army and the Sharif government, Naik appears to be pushed into the background. But of interest is the deal on Kashmir that both Atal Behari Vajpayee and Sharif had come close to. That the LoC should be turned into an international border was of paramount importance, with perhaps three drafts being exchanged on the matter. This meant that, according to one report, there would be mutually acceptable adjustments on Jammu, Ladakh and the Valley. The internationalising of the LoC, an old American formula, was something even Opposition leader Benazir Bhutto had often talked about. Naturally, the back-channel diplomacy post-Kargil changed the direction of these secret negotiations and talks turned to respecting the existing LoC.

When Pakistan’s Chief of Army Staff, Gen Pervez Musharraf, rang up Naik to inquire about his statement, Naik reportedly denied he had ever said such a thing, claiming he had been misquoted by the media. This was not all. He had also said if the BJP was returned to power, the talks would resume from the point that it got derailed by Kargil, but if it lost, Pakistan would oppose such a process. But the director general of the Inter-services Public Relation (ispr), Brig. Rashid Qureishi, reacted by telling a journalist, We hope some responsible government functionary would remove the impression created by the former secretary that the army did not want the resolution of the Kashmir dispute. Finally, Naik made a written retraction. But it was partial. At no time did he deny that Sharif was not fully briefed on the Kargil operation and that he only came to know about it on April 26. Neither did the foreign office nor the foreign minister deny Naik’s statement on a time-frame for the resolution of the Kashmir conflict. Embarrassed beyond words, all that the babus at the foreign ministry could say was, It is a very loosely worded statement.

But no one was ready to buy the government’s explanation. Naik had been very sure of himself when he blamed the army for putting in speedbreakers in the peace process between the neighbours, and he carefully chose the time to do it. He’s no one’s fool and the ensuing weeks explained the gameplan being enacted in Islamabad, where moves were being made to embarrass the military high command, which surprised even the senior leadership of the armed forces who were biting the dust from Kargil.

The plot became even more absurd with Naik’s revelation that the military leadership did not know everything about the ‘back-channel’ diplomacy (it, in fact, seemed to negate the sabotage theory) and it was only known to the prime minister, foreign minister, foreign secretary and Naik himself. The army chief wasn’t fully briefed about it. What Naik was saying was that the political government was not privy to all that was happening on the heights of Kargil, and that in turn the army didn’t know everything about the ‘back-channel’ diplomacy. But a brigadier rebutted this, pointing out that Kargil took months to plan and we couldn’t have done it overnight when we learnt about the back-channel diplomacy to stall a peaceful solution to Kashmir.

Pressed by the Opposition in the Senate, foreign minister Sartaj Aziz didn’t deny the back-channel diplomacy; rather, he furnished more details, something uncommon about the Sharif government, which is known to keep everything under wraps. Aziz revealed there were two phases to the back-channel diplomacy, pre- and post-Kargil. The only point that he and New Delhi now disagree upon is the time-frame. New Delhi went back on its commitment for a time-wrapped solution to Kashmir, he said. And in a very unconvincing manner, he said the army had not put a stumbling block in the way of the peace process.

But the armed forces were worried enough to take up Naik’s statement in its commanders’ meeting on September 18. This is an irresponsible and sponsored propaganda against a disciplined and highly professional Pakistan army and its command, said a report after the meeting. But before the Naik controversy could die down, Sharif’s younger brother and Punjab chief minister Shahbaz Sharif dashed to Washington amidst great secrecy where the only official word from Pakistan’s embassy was that among other matters, he would take up some meetings related to agriculture. It became the biggest joke in town.

In fact, Shahbaz’s visit to Washington appeared to be a sequel to Naik’s statement and before he could return home, an unnamed US State Department official in an interview sent a clear message to the General Headquarters (ghq) in Rawalpindi. The US expects that the Pakistan army would not try any extra-constitutional method to remove Sharif’s government. This warning is based on what we can see what’s going on and we thought it would be appropriate to issue this warning, the statement said. As Shahbaz returned home, secure in the knowledge that the mightiest of the mighty had given a certificate to the Sharif government, the army wasn’t amused. Who’s this unnamed State Department official? We don’t know what has prompted this as there is nothing that the army is doing. Ask the government what we are doing, ispr’s Qureishi told Outlook, totally taken aback by Washington’s attack. On his return, Shahbaz dashed to Islamabad where he had a pow-wow with the president and the prime minister. There was no meeting with the army top brass to apprise them of what had transpired in Washington. Understandably so. Shahbaz’s US visit came under attack from the smaller provinces as well, on the role that Sharif had given to his kid brother. The Punjab chief minister is overshooting his mark. Is he the only smart ruling politician that has the ability to perform all manner of chores? Just because he is the prime minister’s brother does not give him the right or privilege to trespass in the garden that lies beyond his jurisdiction, wrote the English daily The Frontier Post, while Opposition parties condemned the prime minister for trying to get a certificate against his own army. It was one thing the Indians calling our army a rogue army, but the Sharif brothers have done even worse, said an Opposition leader.

The army top brass called a meeting on September 23, a day after Shahbaz briefed the political leadership. It was attended by the bigwigs of the armed forces. Although everyone remained tight-lipped, word went around that the ctbt, along with many other issues, were discussed. It was the first time that the uniformed leaders were meeting after being rapped on the knuckles by the State Department. One guess why the army was being cut to size could be Islamabad’s getting ready to conditionally sign the ctbt before India did, and Sharif knew the strongest opposition to the policy would come from ghq. By trying to appease the US, the Sharifs were also trying to ensure that the latest tranche of loans from the imf and related multilateral donor agencies would sail through.

Second, it’s no secret that after the manner in which Sharif wrapped up the Kargil operation, no love was lost between the PM’s house and ghq. Reports talked of ghq ‘winking’ at the Opposition leaders to start putting their act together and launch an agitation against the government. It’s a well-known fact in Pakistan that mere street agitations alone do not remove governments. Consents from Washington and ghq are prime requisites. Also of importance is the fact that Aziz’s statement that the back-channel diplomacy was stalled after Vajpayee was removed is not wholly true. Vajpayee was still PM, albeit in a caretaker capacity, and the diplomacy continued. What remains of the episode are the moves Washington had seen in Pakistan where extra-constitutional steps were being taken to remove Sharif. Just the right time for another revelation a la Niaz Naik.