Accordingly, policies continue without essential change after the disappearance of the Russians from thescene, under new pretexts, and with some tactical modification. That is, incidentally, true of policies aroundthe world, a fact that provides some insight into realities of the Cold War. In the crucial Middle Eastregion, US policy since 1967 follows the logic outlined by US intelligence in 1958: a "logicalcorollary" of US opposition to Arab nationalism is support for Israel as the only reliable base for USpower in the region (along with Turkey, and at the time, Iran, then under the Shah). In 1967, by destroyingNasser's armies, Israel substantiated that thesis, and the alliance was solidified. It has persisted since foressentially the same reasons, becoming even stronger when the Shah fell and Israel's role became moreimportant as a "local gendarme" (as it was called by the Nixon administration). By then Israel wasalso providing a range of other services around the world as a proxy, and its military-industrial relationswith the US had also become much more intimate.