Contrary to what most observers predicted about the October1 election, the Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP) led by Begum KhaledaZia (Khaleda)has won 179 (according to the Daily Ittefaq 185) of the unofficiallyannounced seats of the 300-seat Jatiya Sangshad.
With theJamaat-e-Islami (16), the Jatiya Party-Naziur (4)and the Islamic Oikya(2) Khaleda's opposition alliance is claiming to win 200 plus seats inthe new parliament. (D/Star October 3). (*All these numbers are subjectto official validation).
With 62 known victories, so far, Sheikh Hasina's (Hasina) Awami League(AL) has suffered a stunning defeat but she has already fired a volleyofaccusation blaming her rivals, the election authority and the CaretakerGovernmentthat supervised the entire election under the constitutionalamendment of 1996. "The poll was free, but not fair," runs her andotherAL leaders'rhetoric. The AL's categorical rejection of the poll and her threatto boycott the parliament and launch a non-cooperation movement arecausing some concernin Bangladesh although the BNP is expected to form the next governmentin the next few days.
Pundits often go wrong about election, but they went wrong in more ways thanone in predicting this Bangladesh election. Most politicalleaders,media, civic leaders, diplomats, the law and order personnel fearedwidespreadviolence during the voting. But political killings were modest comparedto what Bangladesh suffered in the last couple of years, and even weeksand days before the election. Sadly, at least six persons were killed ontheElection Day, and 135 polling centers suspended their votingbecause of violence. Thousands of soldiers and security personnelfanned out to stop any massive lawlessness. As a further precaution, thegovernmentshut off country's half a million cell-phones. Much of the credit forstaving off catastrophic violence on the election daygoes to the non-partisan interim government, and those who worked withit although the pre-election clashesbetween the two parties were pretty high.
Once Khaleda joined hands with the Islamists in an electoral alliance,the India-bashing was expected to figure prominently in the electionas it happened in 1991 and 1996. Except for some anti-Indian hyperbole hereand there, the BNP leaders did not blame India for the ills ofBangladesh. Hasinawas friendlier to New Delhi and the opposition frequently criticizedher for the "uneven" peace treaty that she signed with India, but noneof those figured prominently in the election campaign. The BNP had made cleartheir wishes against renewing the Indo-Bangladeshfriendship treaty, and Khaleda had opposed the idea of such a treaty onnumerous occasions--once during her press interview shortly before the poll. Few Indianleaders openlysided with the AL or Hasina. The post-election reactionsfrom India have been mature -- the official circle did not indicate anyregret in the AL's defeat; some of the newspapers expressed concernabout Hasina's apparent rejection of the poll results.
The border remained quiet but for a few incidents not long before theelection. The minority votes did not exclusively go for the Awami Leaguein 2001. The BNP-led alliance fielded a few minority candidates, andKhaleda appealed to the Hindu community for its support in the election.Scattered violence took place against the Hindus, but they were notmassive. It is widely believed that the AL government sought to preventthe Pakistani ISI from using Bangladesh soil to feed the Indianseparatists with arms and funding. The impending BNP government wouldface pressure from New Delhi notto renew such logistics to the Pakistani intelligence and theseparatists. Much would depend on the future bilateral relations betweenNew Delhi and Dhaka, and it's too early to predict the chemistry betweenKhaleda and the Prime Minister of India.
I have seen at least two commentaries characterizing the electionresult as a massive shift towards the right of the ideological spectrumin Bangladesh -- I disagree with such a view. The BNP is a conglomerate ofdifferent political views and divergent personalities -- from the right tothe left; its yet-to-be-fully-defined Bangladesh nationalism blendsMuslim identity with the Bengali (and non-Bengali) inclinations. It'sconvincing success is a victory of the politicalmiddle in Bangladesh, and the electoral numbers support claim.
With its179 (or even more) seats, the BNP very much stands on its own, while theJamaat bagged only 16 seats. Considering the earlier election results,the Islamists have a vote bank of about 10-12% that can help a centristcoalition -- that's what drove the BNP to coalesce with theright wing parties. If the election produced a hung parliament, both the major parties--the BNP and AL would have courted the Islamists alongwith the other smaller parties and Independents. The Jamaat sufferedbadly in 1996, but in 1991, the Jamaat's performance was comparable towhat they have achieved in 2001.
Arguably, Khaleda could form a cabinetwithout the Islamists, and according to one newspaper report, the Jamaatmay stay out of the cabinet positions. Even if the right wingrepresentatives are represented in the government, the BNP would not bedependent on the parliamentary support of the Islamists. In her firstpress conference, Khaleda has already distanced herself from the Jamaat's manifestoof turning Bangladesh into an Islamic Republic. With or without theIslamists in her cabinet, I don't see Khaleda rolling out any bigideological map for the coming five years.
Let there be no doubt that the AL lost mainly because of theanti-incumbency wave that eventually engulfed the nation once theopposition was able to make it a campaignbanner. As long as the AL was in power, the ruling party's goons and thepolice-inflicted harassment and terror contained the BNP-led opposition.Once the non-partisan government came to power, the political scene changed --the police restrained itself, and the ruling-party-nourishedMastans did not have a free hand. The BNP produced a documentaryrecording the failure in law and order during the Awami League rule ofthe last five years, and when it was broadcast from a non-government TVstation in Calcutta, it reportedly had a stunning effect on theelectorate.
However, the AL accuses that the non-partisan authority looked theother way when the opposition unleashed its own "terrorists" againstHasina'ssupporters. While she was still in office, Hasina refused to listento any accusation of her failed governance, and when she realized thatitwas gaining a momentum against her, she could not swim against the tide.The ALbrought out an impressive AL manifesto, but not many beyond its own footsoldiers believed in whatever she offered. I wrote on this before -- theAL suffered from an image problem; Hasina was unable to shake off-the"corrupt and terrorist party" perception. About 20 prominent MPs,ministersand state ministers were defeated in the election. When Hasina led herparty to victory in 1996, people expected more from her.
Indeed, she promised to strike new ground for the party and the countryat large. But it did not happen. The party remained mired in factional andpersonality conflict; worst of all, it became a personality cult. There was hardly any sharing of decision making with otherimportant leaders of the AL who served the party since her father's(Sheikh Mujibur Rahman) time. Hasina's close relatives were accused ofinfluencing key decisions.
Her pro-liberation stance did not always appeal to the generation thatwas born and brought up after 1971. Nearly one-fourth of the voters inthis electionwere young and first time voters. By dramatizing the differencesbetweenthe perceived pro-liberation and anti-liberation forces, Hasina not onlydivided the country, but her political platform became exclusionary. Atleastin some ways, it reminds me of the Muslim League in the early 1950'swhenpeople called it the "pocket League." Unless its leaders respond tothenew dynamics, the AL's future standing would erode. No doubt, Hasinaplayed a greatrole in restoring the AL to power in 1996, but a growing perceptionagainst hermay force her to resign as the party leader.
It was not only an encounter between the AL and the BNP-led coalition,but it was also a contest between Hasina and Khaleda, the two mostimportant personalities in Bangladesh politics now. Between them,Khaledaenjoys a reputation for her likeability, a political resource in anyelection.Khaleda ran for 5 seats, and won in all of them -- in one constituency shereceived an all time record number of votes. Hasina won in 4 out of the 5 constituenciesshe contested, but lost in one. The popular verdict in favor ofKhaleda'sleadership is clear, and people expect her to be generous in victory.
But it is very important that Hasina respects the democratic process,theAL's initial stirring against the election results is ominous -- the nationmay plunge into another bout of irreconcilable hostility. People aretired of uncompromising standoff and prolonged hartal that they saw invarying degrees from 1991 to 2001. Beyond the AL, few would agree thatKhaleda stole such a landslide victory by "crude rigging" with apreconceived "blueprint."
The AL had seen it's worst in the past, but it bouncedback more than once; it may win again. In many constituencies, the ALlost by a small margin; the same was the case in 1996 when the AL hadwon by the skin of its teeth, and formed gthe overnment with support fromthe smaller groups. The BNP has also shown its mettle -- it lost and came back --that's the way democratic process works.
People have given anundeniable victory to the BNP, but Khaleda needs a healthy opposition towork with her. She appealed to her party followers not to seek vengeanceagainst the former ruling party, but there were reports of sporadicattacks on the AL workers and members of the Hindu community; there wereAL-BNP clashes in Dhaka. After she is sworn in as the new PrimeMinister, Khaleda's highest priority will be to save Bangladesh from anypost-election backlash.
M. Rashiduzzaman, from Bangladesh, teaches Political Science at RowanUniversity,Glassboro,New Jersey, USA
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