An account of the journey in the murky world of Track-II diplomacy that went into the clinching of the US-India Nuclear Deal on July 20, 2007 in Washington -- two years and two days after the initial breakthrough in the same city.
The DCM came to the point quickly, "Vijay I understand you are meeting with a member of the AEC. We are in tough negotiations with India on the Separation Plan, and I want you to convey our concerns to him in an unofficial way." It so happened that the Indian gentleman that I was planning to meet was a member of India’s nuclear security advisory team and I was meeting with him specifically to discuss the uncertain fate ofa few thousand Kashmiri Pandits (KPs) still living in the valley. Indeed, my motivation was driven by the desire to know how the proposed India-Pakistan peace deal on Kashmir would impact remaining Pandits who lived under trying conditionson Ground Zero. Much like in the US, the Indian national security and nuclear establishments also share a common fraternity and it is not unusual for experts to be involved in matters affecting both domains.
Thus began my journey in the murky world of Track-II diplomacy, brought about by rapidly improving bilateral relationship between the US and India. To put the events in the correct perspective, it should be recalled that President Clinton and Prime MinisterVajpayee set the new tone of the bilateral relationship that was further nurtured by successor governments in both countries, leading the way to a momentous meeting in the White House on July 18, 2005.
India had been isolated internationally in regards to the nuclear commercesince its Pokharan tests, and while its success with its weapons program was a source of great pride within India, the progress on power generation side was less than exemplary. The Prime Minister, to his credit, did not wish to sweep such anomalies under the rug--as an economist he knew that a robust civilian nuclear program is essential to India’s growth as a global economic powerhouse. The US, for its part, wanted to build a strategic partnership with India, and those who know how the American security establishment works will tell you that a meaningful strategic relationship is impossible as long as India is on the "Entities List" identifying countries deemed hostile under the US law for specific improprieties (in case of India for not signing theNPT). US Presidents can grant case-by-case waivers in some exceptional cases to circumvent the US law, but changing the law for good was the only way to secure a strong and stable relationship between the two countries.
Lack of adequate uranium, poor quality of uranium, and technical challenges of the thorium fuel cycle have contributed to India’s slow progress in the civil nuclear power development. I am tempted here to recall a statement made by Admiral Rickover, the father of US nuclear submarine fleet, who once said, "The best and safest reactors are the one designed on paper. Show me the performance of that reactor after construction and then I will tell you if it is the best or safe." Lots of Indian nuclear power plans for the future are still on paper or in a demonstration phase. That does not mean such projects can not be successful, but to a prudent executive running the country or its nuclear establishment, it simply means that one better have a Plan B on stand by.
Needless to say, the report caused great angst among the policy makers but none could challenge my analysis. So the effort was redirected at convincing India to buy more reactors from the US since it was the US--not the French or Russians--that were helping them out of their nuclear isolation.
The American Embassy did an excellent job of educating visiting American legislators about the issue and the Prime Minister solved the problem in India’s own unique way, the 20 GWe 2020 Plan was replaced by the 40 GWe 2030 Plan. The present plans were left intact and simply augmented by additional purchases. A declaration was made that India’s booming economy will require more than 8 foreign reactors in the next two decades and some of these reactors will be supplied by America. I still personally believe the first reactor purchases by India after the NSG lifts its embargo will be French and Russian reactors, but only time will tell.
On March 2, 2006, President Bush during his historic visit to India signed a joint statement with the Indian Prime Minister advancing the goal of civil nuclear cooperation between the two countries by identifying specific actions that each country will take. The President, during the press conference, specifically spoke about advantages of the "closed fuel cycle" involving reprocessing that India was pursuing.
In our March 8th meeting with Dr. Kakodkar, Chairman of the AEC, he made a point of telling us that India was willing to put the reprocessing facility, that would handle foreign origin fuel, under IAEA safeguards. But when that message was conveyed to a White House specialist on nuclear matters, the response was that our (U.S.) teamwas not authorized to talk about reprocessing rights with India and we had received no formal proposal from India. In response to the inquiry, "Why don’t you ask for such a proposal?" her response was, "Our negotiating team does not have the authority to seek such a proposal." In other words, the outlook for a closure looked very bleak.
Following the US industry team’s return from India, I was asked by the USIBC to assess how the main irritants between the two sides would impact the US industry in pursuing nuclear commerce if somehow the dealwas finalized. In my summary report I listed three major items (there were many lower tier issues as well). These were: fuel supply assurances, reprocessing rights and future nuclear testing. I also concluded that among the three, only reprocessing rights put American companies at a commercial disadvantage over our competitors from France and Russia, and hence it should be the one that the US industry must strongly recommend for consideration in order to provide a "level playing field". Subsequently, the USIBC team met with Under Secretary Nicholas Burns on April 17 (ahead of his negotiating trip to India) and while he confirmed the three major issues being the same as stated in my report, he was not encouraging vis-à-vis the industry position on reprocessing rights. He asked us for new ideas that would help the US industry compete successfully.
Dr. Sazawal is a nuclear policy specialist by profession, having workedfor over three decades in the U.S. nuclear industry. He is also theInternational Coordinator of the Indo-American Kashmir Forum.