My co-columnist at Daily Times, Farhat Taj, has already written a detailed piece last week, deconstructing Mr Sethi’s assertion. Many Afghans also took serious umbrage to his proclamation that equated Taliban with Pashtuns. Perhaps a serious disconnect exists between even the seemingly well-meaning people and the ground realities in Afghanistan. And talking of polls, it is imperative to share a few salient findings of the broadest and most comprehensive poll yet conducted in Afghanistan.
On November 15, 2011, the California-based Asia Foundation (AF) announced the results of its Afghanistan poll, conducted in all 34 provinces and including 6348 respondents (funding support provided by USAID). Incidentally, one of the venues where the results were announced was the United States Institute of Peace (USIP), which was JI's partner in producing the controversial report on endgame in Afghanistan. I will discuss it in a future column but suffice it to say that the Asia Foundation poll shatters the myth of the Taliban being a 'popular resistance movement' or 'representatives' of the Pashtun Afghans.
A key finding of the AF survey was that the support for the Taliban inside Afghanistan is at an all time low. A mere 29% people sympathize (not support) with the Taliban compared with a 64% population that has no sympathy for the militants. Another 11% had some level of sympathy for the Taliban. In urban centers, 74 % of the respondents reported no such sympathy while 61% of the rural Afghanistan disowned the Taliban. The majority of all ethnic groups have no sympathy for the Taliban. The proportion of those with some sympathy for militancy was 37% Pashtuns, 30% Uzbeks and 32% other ethnicities. The presence of foreign troops was not a major reason for sympathizing with the Taliban.
The most promising finding was that nearly half of the respondents (46%) said that Afghanistan was moving in the right direction, while 35% (a higher proportion than before) did not share this optimism. The poll recorded the highest level of satisfaction with basic services like health, education and water, since 2004. Some 43% people saw improvement in the financial wellbeing of their households. The most important findings relevant to the so-called endgame were that 38% people saw insecurity and terrorism as the biggest threat to these gains while 82% people approved efforts for reconciliation.
After getting rid of Ambassador Husain Haqqani through media lynching and coercing the civilian government, the Pakistani establishment and its media allies feel that in the post-Mohmand phase they have gained leverage on the US. But by cutting off the NATO supply lines and boycotting the Bonn conference, Pakistan has actually exposed the extent of its leverage while effectively turning its back on the world. And in this isolation, the Taliban joins it, of course. The only options left, after diplomatic leverage is maxed out, are escalating proxy war or scaling back the rhetoric.
As the dust settles on the Pakistan-NATO tiff and the Bonn conference, the only thing that will emerge conclusively is that the Pakistani and the US interests in Afghanistan remain critically divergent and potential for reconciliation slim. But even more important is the fact that in its perception of the endgame in Afghanistan the so-called Pakistani elite, which the country’s new ambassador represents, is at loggerheads with the Afghans and rest of the world.