Reinventing The Jihad

Finding the truth about Jammu and Kashmir (J&K) is an exceptionally easybusiness: facts to substantiate just about any prediction one might wish to makelitter its landscape.

Is peace, as optimists claim, around the corner? Easily proved. Violence hasbeen in steady decline since 2002; tourist traffic to Srinagar is at recordlevels; marriages are once again being held, as tradition mandates, late atnight; power supplies and the road network have improved; some in Kashmir's tinyPandit minority, which was forced out of the state when the jihadgathered momentum in 1990, are considering returning to their long-abandonedhomes.

But evidence that the jihad in J&K could be on the verge ofreinventing itself, rather than dying a slow, unlamented death, is every bit aseasy to come by. In just the past eight weeks, Indian soldiers have recovered3,000 kilograms of explosive material in the Kashmir Valley, a record haul thatexceeds the entire quantity discovered between January and end-September 2004.Terrorist groups have also demonstrated considerable inventiveness in bypassingIndian counter-measures, rendering at least some well-established defensivepostures redundant. New tactics for penetrating the fence along the Line ofControl (LoC) have also been adopted. All of these are signs that theseverely-degraded leadership of terrorist groups, notably the Hizb ul-Mujahideen(HM), is starting to get its house in order once again.

Most of the new explosives recoveries have consisted of freely-availablechemicals like potassium permanganate and aluminium powder. While thesechemicals have a wide variety of legitimate applications, notably in theconstruction and mining industries, skilled bomb-makers can use them tofabricate improvised explosive devices. Although devices made with thesesubstances are, kilogram for kilogram, less effective than conventional militaryexplosives, their effectiveness has been demonstrated around the world -presently and notably in Iraq, where they have been used with considerableeffect. Interdicting the movement of such chemicals into J&K, given India'snotoriously poor controls on the production and sale of hazardous materials, isnear-impossible. Officials worry that that the shift away from militaryexplosives like RDX is designed to lend credibility to Pakistan's claims that itis not giving military support to terrorists in J&K.

Indian officials also have reason to be worried by the creativity displayedin the use of improvised explosive devices. For the past several years, allmovement along major roads in J&K has been preceded by what are calledRoad-Opening Parties (ROPs), which check routes for mines and improvisedexplosive devices. Typically, such checks are carried out early in the morning.While anti-sabotage checks carried out by ROPs have by no means always beeneffective, they did for the most part help protect Indian military movements.Now, however, terrorist groups have found a way to evade the checks. In tworecent bombings of military convoys, terrorists drove cars fitted withexplosives along with regular traffic once the ROP had completed its work. Theythen overtook the targeted military convoy, and parked the vehicle some distanceahead. The explosives-rigged car was detonated as the convoy passed. No realsolution has been found for this tactic, since stopping civilian traffic whenroads are put to military use is not a workable option.

India's defence establishment is also discovering that the new fence alongthe LoC is not quite the infiltration-proof barrier it was advertised to be. AsPrime Minister Manmohan Singh recently noted, cross-border infiltration hasdeclined in recent weeks. However, this was preceded by unusually high levels ofinfiltration this spring when terrorists took advantage of weather damage to theLoC fence. Yet, the problem goes deeper. In a remarkably candid interview to Frontlinemagazine, the XV Corps commander, Lieutenant-General SS Dhillon, noted thatinfiltrating terrorist cadre were now equipped with barrier-penetration tools,and had received training on mock versions of the fence in camps in Pakistan.One common expedient, for example, was to clip a bypass on to the electrictrip-wires laid through the fence's concertina rolls, and then cut a waythrough. As a consequence of the high early-summer infiltration, violence hasrisen this summer - relative, that is, to the quiet of spring - a fact PrimeMinister Singh also expressed concern over.

To some in the security establishment, the message is clear: J&K'slargest terrorist group, the HM, is slowly recovering from the decimation of itsfield leadership in 2003 and 2004 . Ibrahim Dar, who handles the HM's currentSrinagar-area operations, and who recently returned to J&K from Pakistan, isbelieved to be working to insulate his organisation from Indian communicationsintelligence penetration, notably by using couriers to send messages rather thanrely on wireless or cellphone traffic. Sohail Faisal, an HM operative with overa decade of field experience, who was recently appointed its south Kashmir'divisional commander', has made similar efforts to revive the HM's shatteredorganisational apparatus.

How serious, though, is the threat? Indian intelligence and defence analystsare divided, along predictable lines. Some believe that the intense westernpressure on Pakistan, coupled with its internal ethnic, political and economiccrises, make it unlikely that it will allow a significant escalation of the jihadto take place. Others, however, believe that Pakistan wishes to continue to usethe jihad as a source of leverage within J&K, and is in the processof finding means through which its secret war against India can be madeself-sustaining. History, certainly, suggests that the second proposition is notas strange as it might at first seem. Contrary to popular perception, the jihadin J&K did not begin in 1990; only one phase did. Pakistan-backed covertgroups operated with some success in the state through the 1950s, with minimalexternal support. So, from mid-1960 to 1972, did the Master Cell and al-Fatah,which had considerable political impact, despite the limited scale of theirmilitary operations. It is worth noting that many of those who became seniorleaders in the ongoing jihad, cut their political teeth - and learnedtheir operational skills - in these earlier ventures.

It is, of course, entirely possible that what we are witnessing in J&Kmight just be the death throes of a war that history has already passed by. Itcosts nothing, however, to at least consider the possibility that the lull nowbeing experienced is just the eye of the storm.

Praveen Swami is Chief of Bureau in New Delhi and Deputy Editor, Frontline.Courtesy, the South Asia Intelligence Review of the South AsiaTerrorism Portal