An Intelligence Failure?

The performance of the intelligence and security agencies with regard to the terrorist strike at the Akshardham temple in Gandhinagar in Gujarat on Sept. 24, 2002, was one of the topics touched upon by Shri L.K.Advani, Deputy Prime Minister and Home Minister, while inaugurating the two-day annual conference of the Directors-General of Police at New Delhi on September 29, 2002.

The media has reported as follows on his reference to the agencies: " He complimented the security agencies for providing an early breakthrough in the case which clearly pointed to the attack being not merely an act of terrorism, but of cross-border terrorism.  Pointing out that the oft-quoted charge of intelligence failure against the intelligence agencies had become too cliched, he said their sources were doing reasonably well.  But the absence of specific intelligence input made it difficult for the Government to take any action."

This is not the first time that the Indian intelligence community had solved within hours a terrorist crime, identified those responsible for it and brought them to book.  They had done so on innumerable occasions in the past.  The most notable examples are their action against the LTTE squad which assassinated Rajiv Gandhi in May,1991, and their success in solving the case relating to the Mumbai blasts in March,1993.

Brilliant in investigation and detection after a terrorist act had been committed, but wanting in prevention has been a common complaint against the agencies in all countries confronted with the scourge of terrorism.  The agencies in the US  are presently facing a Congressional investigation into similar charges in connection with 9/11.

It would be unfair to the agencies to say that they are not able to prevent acts of terrorism through timely intelligence.  For every successful act of terrorism, there are at least half a dozen which are thwarted by the  agencies, either through timely intelligence or effective physical security.  Details of many of these are often kept outside public knowledge in order not to compromise the sources or reveal the modus operandi followed by the agencies.

Despite this, it is natural that public opinion would judge the agencies not by their unannounced successes, but by their well-known failures.  And failures there have been in plenty in India.  Such failures were due to either lack of precise intelligence or of follow-up action when such intelligence was available.  

Lack of precise intelligence contributed to the assassination of Rajiv Gandhi by the LTTE in 1991, the Mumbai blasts of March,1993, the Coimbatore blasts of February,1998,  and many other similar incidents in Jammu & Kashmir and elsewhere.  Amongst notable examples of failures despite the availability of preventive intelligence, one could cite the abortive attempt to kill Rajiv Gandhi at Rajghat in 1987, the Purulia arms drop of December,1995, and the attack on the Parliament House at New Delhi on December 13, 2001.

Indian intelligence analysts are excellent in their evaluation of likely threats from terrorists.  In 1989, long before the LTTE mounted its attack on Rajiv Gandhi, the agencies had assessed that there was a likely threat to his life from the LTTE during his travels to the South.  Similarly, after the widespread anti-Muslim disturbances in Gujarat earlier this year, many analysts, serving as well as retired, including this writer, had warned of the possibility of a major act of punishment terrorism in Gujarat.

In an article on Punishment Terrorism published in April 2,2002, this writer had assessed as follows: 

"Past anger amongst Indian Muslims over the demolition of the Babri Musjid has been aggravated by the recent massacres in Ahmedabad.  There had been massacres of the members of the minority communities (Sikhs and Muslims) during communal riots in the past too, but what, in the perception of the Muslims,  distinguishes the recent happenings in Ahmedabad from those of the past is the total insensitivity of the local administration to the feelings of the Muslims and what they regard as its conscious inactivism and the absence of even a modicum of effort by the Government towards a healing touch.  There is, therefore, a strong possibility of a major act of retributive punishment terrorism in Gujarat in the coming months.  It need not necessarily come from bin Laden's outfit.  There is a greater possibility that it would come from enraged sections of the local Muslims.  An encore of Mumbai--March 1993 is on the cards." 

One is given to understand that similar warnings had been issued by our agencies, indicating the likely targets of the terrorists if they undertook an act of punishment terrorism and underlining the security precautions to be taken.  Most of the likely targets identified by them were reportedly associated either with the Government of Gujarat or India and sensitive sectors of the economy.  The possibility of a terrorist strike against innocent members of the Hindu community, who had nothing to do with the Government, in a temple was probably not foreseen.

Even if such a possibility had been foreseen, it would not have enabled the security agencies to prevent the strike unless they had precise intelligence as to when, where and how the terrorists would strike.  The fact that the terrorists managed to strike would indicate that no such intelligence was available.

Precise preventive intelligence comes from communication intercepts, moles planted in  or recruited from inside terrorist organisations and members of the public, particularly from the community to which the terrorists belong.  Communication intercepts would be available only if the terrorists use modern means of communications.  

Penetration of terrorist organisations is an extremely difficult task. It is easier to penetrate the sensitive establishments of an adversary such as Pakistan than a terrorist organisation.  It poses ethical problems, which are not appreciated by public opinion.  If an agency plants a mole in a terrorist organisation, its leadership would first ask him to carry out a killiing or some other similar act to test his  motivation. If the source comes back and asks his handling intelligence officer whether he should kill in order to establish his credibility in the eyes of the organisation's leaders, the handling officer would be faced with a dilemma.  He can't tell his source: "Go and kill so that we can prevent other killings in future."

Hence, there cannot be a regular flow of preventive intelligence without the co-operation of the community to which the terrorists belong.  Is it reasonable to expect the agencies to get such co-operation if political leaders go around hurting the feelings of the community through their words and action, rubbing salt into their wounds and causing further alienation? If no such co-operation is forthcoming from the members of the community, the political leadership is as much responsible as the agencies for the failure of intelligence in internal security matters.

In other countries, every instance of perceived intelligence failure is followed by an exhaustive enquiry to establish how the failure occurred so that corrective steps could be taken.  There is presently a Congressional investigation into allegations of intelligence failure with reference to 9/11 and President Bush has indicated his intention to order a similar enquiry by an independent body.

Before 1999, there was hardly any instance of an enquiry into specific acts of intelligence failure after the Mizo revolt of 1966.  The Kargil Review Committee (KRC) enquired into the specific instance of intelligence failure which made the Pakistani intrusions possible.  The Special Task Force on the revamping of the Intelligence Apparatus, which followed the KRC, went into the need for follow-up action warranted by the recommendations of the KRC.  But, it did not specifically go into the equally, if not more, important question of perceived intelligence failures in terrorism-related matters.

Unless and until we build up the tradition of an enquiry into each instance of a major intelligence/security failure in counter-terrorism, we will never be able to identify our deficiencies and correct them.

Every country gets the intelligence agencies it deserves. How many of our political leaders and Members of Parliament have genuine expertise in counter-terrorism related intelligence matters? How many hours do they devote in Parliament to an objective and professional discussion of the capabilities of our agencies in this matter? Zilch.

Is it any wonder we keep tottering from one disaster to another?

(The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, and, presently,Director, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai.)