These worrying reports have only fanned the existing divisions in New Delhi over the sagacity of accepting a US request and sending in Indian troops to Iraq. Worse, a Pentagon team, down here last week, couldn't convince the government to immediately despatch troops, in August or September. Also, the Americans claim the troops would be needed for "up to a year", there are doubts whether this is a feasible timeframe.
Said a senior Indian diplomat, "Certain clarifications we have sought are simply not there, in terms of time-lines, political process...there are no clear answers. The law and order situation is worrisome. What happens if we have to shoot Iraqis? What repercussion will it have on public opinion in the Gulf? How will it affect Islamic feelings here?" Such sentiments offer a glimpse to the raging debate within the establishment. It will move towards a solution, say sources, only after the PM returns from China on June 27.
The UN secretary general being quoted to neither encourage nor discourage the possible deployment of Indian troops has also fuelled the debate. The issue of troops funding and the civic action they may undertake also remains unresolved. And who would the Indian troops report to? Though the Pentagon team said it was hopeful of getting an "interim Iraqi authority in place in five weeks", sections of the senior establishment are sceptical of its legitimacy and durability.
The situation has been complicated as New Delhi doesn't have an authoritative Indian input on the situation in Iraq. Indian representative B.S. Tyagi, who reached Baghdad last weekend, will have to travel to north Iraq to get a better sense of the situation. Iraq's neighbours, too, haven't clarified on how they read the situation.
Those who favour accepting Washington's request say the north has been stable in comparison to, say, central Iraq; only two Americans have been killed here, in sharp contrast to more than 50 deaths over 45 days in central Iraq. North Iraq is dominated by Kurds who back the US and, more importantly, have an affinity for Indians because of the common Aryan heritage. They will appreciate India's contributions, it is argued.
Others say the situation in north Iraq is complex. For one, under Saddam Hussein's Arabisation programme, Arabs were settled in the area on Kurd properties. The Kurds want their land and houses back. Second, no one, not even the Americans, want the Kurds to realise their decades-old dream of an independent homeland. Willing to play ball at the moment, the Kurds may rebel if they feel they can't cash in on the most favourable opportunity to create a homeland.
The potentially incendiary situation is complicated since the Kurds are riven with factionalism. What happens if one faction rises in rebellion and Turkey sends its troops across, as it had threatened during Gulf War II. Will Indian troops have to engage in battle? The Indians, though, were assured by Americans that they would manage Turkey and the Kurds. Such assurances don't inspire confidence because the Americans have failed to manage many aspects of simmering Iraq.
Diplomatic sources say the Americans are better at war, worse at managing the peace. The British are doing a much better job of post-Saddam pacification. So there is no reason why India can't do an even better job of winning the peace. A senior Indian diplomat, however, counters, "Why should we help the Americans to stabilise Iraq? Their role is tainted. We don't want to end up legitimising their military action." But others say that if "we go in now, and help stabilise the situation, then the gains would be immense".
Yet, deep down it's also a question of principles. As an ex-diplomat points out, "If the inception is illegitimate, then the child can't become legitimate."
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