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Pulling Punches

Says nothing new on the malaise in Indian strategic and defence planning

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Pulling Punches
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Even with a scintillating title and a striking cover depicting “lifting an elephant single-handed”, Arming Without Aiming says nothing new on the malaise in Indian strategic and defence planning. Indian defence analysts have repeatedly called for defence reforms, white papers, and policy and political guidelines without any outcome. Will the political and bureaucratic class heed the damning critique of Stephen Cohen and Sunil Dasgupta? Unlikely. But they should read the book, as it recaps what they already know but do nothing to set right.

It is difficult to disagree with the central issue of India’s strategic restraint which has inhibited the use of force to alter the strategic balance in its favour. This deficiency is due to the bias, the authors say, towards development rather than defence, stemming from an ideological rejection of the armed forces as an instrument of state policy. They argue that strategic restraint leads to an astounding lack of political direction in India’s military modernisation, haphazard defence planning, lack of strategic thinking and dissipated decision-making.

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They maintain that strategic restraint and caution derive less from a shortage of resources than from a political culture stressing avoidance of confrontation. But India’s track record right from the start of independence does not really reflect restraint. Military and police actions in Hyderabad, Goa and Junagadh and the dispatch of expeditionary forces to J&K showed a determination to use force in national interest. The Himalayan disaster in 1962 was due to excessive political interference more than to any kind of restraint. Then again, in 1965, PM Lal Bahadur Shastri warned Pakistan that any provocation in J&K would lead to ‘consequences’. He went to war in retaliation for Pakistan’s armed action in J&K.

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The 1971 war of liberation in East Pakistan was a perfect illustration of politico-military synchronisation in use of force. The assimilation of Sikkim was direct army action. In the ’80s, power projection in Sri Lanka and Maldives (and discreet military planning for assistance to Mauritius, Seychelles and Fiji) was a rejection of restraint.

Strategic restraint came to the fore in the 1990s, after India and Pakistan went overtly nuclear. Ironically, the trajectory of Indian restraint has risen since Operation Parakram in the wake of the Parliament attack in 2001. Given the operational limitations of a nuclearised battlefield, neither of the two doctrines of limited war and cold start was a realistic response to Pakistan’s cross-border terrorism. Lack of a decisive military edge, absence of an appropriate doctrine and missing political will have combined to make a virtue of a strategic restraint; a necessity rather than from any cultural inhibition in using force.

The political leadership’s ignorance in strategic and military thought has diminished the utility of military power as an assertion of state policy. Tight bureaucratic control of the military has enfeebled the fighting spirit. Soon to be the third largest armed force in the world, India remains helpless against cross-border terror attacks. All this and much more will be found in the book.

Arming without Aiming makes a valuable contribution towards understanding India’s strategic shortcomings and enquires why the country is so lethargic about developing its military prowess.

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