Making A Difference

Confused World Order

Foreign policy has not been high on India's list of priorities

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Confused World Order
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THE post-Cold War world is a new world. The old linkages have disappeared and new linkages are still being forged. Reforms, liberalisation and economic progress are now the dominant currency of diplomatic exchanges. Indian diplomacy is also adjusting to a new vocabulary. Having made a slow start, New Delhi is straggling, weighed down by old baggage like the Non-aligned Movement (NAM), G-77 and G-15. It has long seen itself as leader of NAM and Third World countries. But these countries are now breaking ranks, under economic pressures from the developed countries. With shrinking investment budgets, they are going for the best option; and India tends to be second best. At the recent APEC meet, Vietnam was preferred for admission as the next Asian member over India.

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The change of government in New Delhi wasn't expected to result in any significant change of direction in Indian foreign policy. And it didn't. Barring some differences, foreign policy has by and large become a bipartisan issue in India. This bipartisan posture was evident in India's stand on the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT). New Delhi withstood relentless international pressure to sign the treaty. It ended up blocking the treaty though the world community used the UN route to get it through and open it for signatures. Really speaking, South Block hardly did itself proud on the CTBT. While refusing to be browbeaten, how did India get pushed into a corner? The Indian policy on CTBT had taken numerous twists and turns over the years. New Delhi had co-sponsored the Canadian resolutions on the CTBT and Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty (FMCT) at the UN in 1993 and 1994, after having abstained from these resolutions since 1979. In 1995, it changed tack again and decided not to cosponsor it. And this July it blocked the treaty to protect its legitimate interests.

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The CTBT strained Indo-US ties too, though the issue wasn't really a bilateral one. India was effectively pitted against the five nuclear powers though Indian public opinion saw the US as leading the charge against India. While the US was flexible over India's demand for altering the entry into force clause, China (along with the UK and Pakistan), which has violated the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty by aiding Pakistan, was determined that India should not be let off. Those who get very euphoric over steadily improving Sino-Indian ties—especially because the two countries have agreed on Confidence Building Measures (CBMs) during President Jiang Zemin's recent visit—should ponder over this. Beijing is concentrating on South-east Asia, Taiwan and Japan and would want as little trouble as possible on this side of its border. While signing CBMs with India, China continues to give military and nuclear aid to Pakistan. Besides, on the same leg of his tour here, Jiang visited Pakistan and Nepal, thereby sending a clear message: India is in the same league as Pakistan.

I.K. Gujral's appointment as external affairs minister brought about a change in tactics in the conduct of foreign policy. He displayed a certain flexibility in India's foreign policy postures, especially towards its neighbours. With Pakistan this made little difference with relations stuck in the limbo called Kashmir. In any case, there was little hope of any advance, not after the successful parliamentary and assembly polls in Kashmir. In the case of Sri Lanka also it made little difference. Colombo continued to suffer from India's unfortunate indifference.

The concrete result of Gujral's flexibility, or magnanimity, was the 30-year Ganga water treaty with Bangladesh. But what diplomatic gain has India made from it? It will certainly help improve ties with Dhaka. But is Sheikh Hasina in a position to address Indian concerns and needs? I think not. Her domestic compulsions will prevent that. Hopefully India will get something in the future. But diplomatic relations can't be conducted on the basis of hope.

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India proved amateurish in its bid to win a non-permanent seat in the UN Security Council. All predictions were ignored and calculations went awfully wrong in South Block. Confusion over whether India is a regional power with global interests or a global power with regional interests continues to dog the practitioners of our foreign policy.

The region we live in continued to make news. Kabul fell to the fundamentalist Taliban. The speed of their success stunned the world. New Delhi was no exception. But it skillfully emerged as a legitimate player in the 'Great Game'.

Benazir Bhutto's hubris once again resulted in her downfall. The contempt she displayed for the nascent national institutions, the confrontation with the judiciary, the corruption of her government, pitted her against President Farooq Leghari, who sacked her. The killing of Murtaza Bhutto in September was perhaps the last nail in her government's coffin. Who killed him, or who got him killed, is a question which is yet to be answered. In the conspiratorial polity of Pakistan, this conundrum is unlikely to be ever answered clearly.

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The US foreign office too suffered from a lack of clarity. The attacks on Iraq and attempts to contain both Iraq and Iran at the same time weren't terribly successful. The US ran head-on into opposition from its NATO allies in Europe over attempts to isolate Iran and Cuba. Which just went to prove that confusion in foreign policy was not just an Indian prerogative.

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