How Does Multichain Address Impersonation Reinforce Trust In Address Poisoning Schemes?

As the crypto ecosystems scale across different blockchains, threat actors are starting to exploit an unexpected weakness: users’ reliance on visual similarity and, by extension, their familiarity with wallet addresses. One new attack vector involves multichain address impersonation, where scammers spoof wallet identities across different blockchains to gain a user’s trust. This phenomenon plays an important part in building the credibility of so-called address poisoning schemes—fraudulent schemes in which attackers insert lookalike wallet addresses into a user’s transaction history with the intent of tricking the user into sending funds to the wrong destination.

This article looks at how multichain impersonation amplifies trust, why users fall for such schemes, common risk indicators, and practical defense strategies.

Understanding Multichain Address Impersonation

What is multichain address impersonation?

Impersonation of multichain addresses involves the creation of identical or near-identical wallet addresses on different blockchains to pose as legitimate. Since most chains make use of similar address formats, for example, EVM-compatible chains, scammers are able to easily reproduce the first and last characters of a target address in order to make the impostor look authentic.

Why It Works

Users often do not verify the full address, but depend on patterns they are familiar with:

• The first 4–6 characters

• The last 4–6 characters

• Addresses appearing previously in transaction history

• Familiarity from multi-network usage

• What is assumed is that identical prefixes mean identical owners.

It's this psychological familiarity that becomes hazardous when mixed with address poisoning.

How Multichain Impersonation Strengthens Trust in Address Poisoning

1. Exposure Across Multiple Chains Creates Credibility

If a user sees the same lookalike address on Ethereum, BNB Chain, Polygon, and Base, they naturally assume it belongs to a legitimate contact or the same counterparty. This cross-chain visibility increases confidence, even though it may be a malicious replica.

Psychological impact:

"Repeated exposure" creates perceived authenticity.

2. Multichain Presence Mimics Professional User Behavior

Large businesses, investors, and protocols often maintain wallets across a multitude of networks.

By impersonating this behaviour, an attacker's impersonated identity will appear more trustworthy.

Users may be misled to think that:

• This address belongs to a verified exchange

• A partner they recently transacted with

• A platform performing cross-chain operations

• A liquidity provider or DApp contract

3. It makes address poisoning look like a real transaction

This is how it usually happens in an address poisoning scheme: scammers send small token transfers to get their impersonated address into your wallet history. And if that same lookalike address also appears on other blockchains you use, well, the user feels even more assured that it is familiar.

This is precisely the reinforcement loop scammers use:

1. Impersonation across chains creates recognition

2. Recognition minimizes doubt.

3. Reduced doubt increases the likelihood to copy the poisoned address

4. The user's actual transaction is received by the attackers.

4. Users tend to reuse contacts across chains

The tendency of users to send funds with the same counterparties across networks is another big driver of trust. Attackers know this and hence place their impersonated addresses where the user operates.

Example:

If you just paid a freelancer on Polygon, such a scammer could contrive a similar address on Ethereum to deceive you during your next payout.

5.  Multichain Transaction Aggregators Multiply the Deception

Wallets and portfolio trackers displaying cross-chain data within one user interface are inadvertently contributing to impersonation tactics. When the same fake address is showing up more than once across different chains, this suggests to the user:

• A multi-network wallet that is verified

• A contact that is used often

• A trustworthy record

This UI-driven trust is precisely what scammers try to hijack.

Comparison Table: Multichain vs. Single-Chain Address Impersonation

Common Signs of Multichain Address Impersonation

• Identical prefix and suffix to a known address

• Numerous new entries in your wallet history of very small amounts known as dust transfers

• Unexpected cross-chain notifications

• Multiple unknown addresses with comparable appearances

• Contact addresses on networks you never used with them

How Attackers Execute the Multichain Address Impersonation + Poisoning Combo

Such attackers typically follow a three-step workflow:

Step 1: Generate Lookalike Addresses on Multiple Chains

• Generate similar-looking wallet addresses

• Match prefix and suffix

• Deploy them across networks users frequently use

Step 2: Poison the Victim’s Transaction History

Attackers then:

• Send tiny transfers of 0 tokens or dust

• Use tokens with similar names to valid ones

• Make sure the poisoned address is on top

Step 3: Wait for Victim to Initiate a Transaction

When users:

• Copy from history

• Use recent contacts

• Visual familiarity

They transfer funds in error to the attacker’s address.

Why Users Fall for It

Human behavior plays a consistent role:

1. Cognitive Ease – Familiar addresses feel safe

2. Time Pressure – Rushed transactions increase mistakes

3. UI Design: Wallets highlight “recent addresses” by default.

4. Blind Trust in Multichain Consistency – More chains = more credibility

Scammers depend on this very psychological bias.

Defense Techniques for Users

Always check full addresses

Never depend on just the first and last few characters.

Use a trusted contact list

Manually label addresses that you trust.

Disable auto-copy from recent history

Avoid copying delegates from transaction lists.

Verify on official platforms

Verify addresses from valid announcements or direct communication.

Use ENS, UD, or other domain services

Human-readable domains drastically reduce impersonation risk.

Audit cross-chain behavior

If you see a familiar address on a chain that you never interacted with, treat it as suspicious.

Advanced Mitigation for Developers & Platforms

• Add warnings for repeated small dust transactions

• Mark suspicious cross-chain duplicates

• Allow address tagging & private notes

• Display full addresses by default

• Introduce address reputation layers

• Limit display of unsolicited tiny transfers

These measures significantly reduce the exposure of poisoned addresses to users.

Conclusion

Impersonation of addresses via multi-chain addresses is a more sophisticated, new generation of traditional crypto scamming. The attack surfaces across a multi-blockchain basis; attackers know how to use user familiarity and cross-chain trust to make address poisoning look legitimate. The combination amplifies psychological cues, UI habits, and behavioral shortcuts that cause users to send funds unwittingly to malicious addresses. Understanding how these tactics work-and recognizing the signs early-can prevent costly mistakes. As the crypto ecosystem becomes more multichain, a better security design and user education will be important in the defense against manipulative impersonation schemes.

FAQs

1. Can scammers impersonate any address across chains?

They cannot replicate the exact same private key, but they can generate similar-looking addresses with ease.

2. Does using multiple chains increase my risk?

Yes. More chains mean more chances for impersonated addresses to appear familiar.

3. What should I do if I see a suspicious recurring address?

Tag it, block it if the wallet allows, and avoid copying from transaction history.

4. Are dusting and address poisoning the same?

Dusting spreads tiny transactions for tracking; poisoning uses tiny transactions for deception.

5. Can block explorers detect impersonated addresses?

Some explorers label high-risk or newly-generated addresses, but impersonation is still difficult to flag automatically.