The State Of Militancy

With 331 insurgency related fatalities (138 civilians, 50security force personnel and 143 militants) in 2005, Manipur ranked second amongstates worst affected by militancy in the country, behind Jammu & Kashmir,where 1,739 lives were lost. In the fragile northeastern region, over 46 percent of the total insurgency-related fatalities was reported from Manipur, whichaccounts for just 6.3 per cent of the population, and 8.52 per cent of the landmass of the region. Manipur’s share of civilian fatalities in the Northeastwas 42 per cent, and 46 per cent of militant fatalities also came from this state.But fatalities among the security forces accounted for a staggering 72 per centof all SF fatalities in the region, making it the most unsafe place for thetroops. These lives were lost in sustained violence throughout the year, with anastonishingly uniform distribution through the year. Thus, the first, second andfourth quarters of the year recorded 83 deaths each, whereas the third quarter(July-September) recorded 82 deaths.

The geographical distribution of the violence was, however,substantially skewed. The four Valley Districts, Imphal East, Imphal West,Thoubal and Bishnupur, with just 11.14 per cent of Manipur’s total area,accounted for 55 per cent of the fatalities, while the five Hill Districts,Chandel, Churachandpur, Tamenglong, Senapati and Ukhrul witnessed 149 of the 331deaths (45 per cent). However, while violence in the Valley Districts was evenlyspread, the two Hill Districts of Churachandpur and Tamenglong, sharing theirborders with Nagaland, Assam and Mizoram, were the worst affected, accountingfor 99 of the 149 deaths. Churachandpur remained the most violent district ofthe state, with 69 deaths, followed by Imphal East, with 50 deaths. Senapati,inhabited by the Naga and Kuki tribes, was the least violent, accounting for 12deaths in the year.

The situation has worsened considerably as compared to 2004,with civilian fatalities in 2005 a full 176 per cent higher than the 2004figure, and total fatalities up by 52 per cent. Fatalities have risen steadilyover the past five years, and year 2005 recorded the highest numbers since1997. 

In terms of individual losses suffered by themilitant groupings, the United National Liberation Front (UNLF)suffered the maximum, losing 92 cadres (52 killed and 40 arrested); the PLA lost80 (26 killed and 54 arrested); and the Kanglei Yawol Kanna Lup (KYKL)68 (33 killed and 35 arrested) cadres. However, the total neutralization of 449militants (143 killed and 306 arrested) in 2005 had little impact on themilitancy, with 15 active outfits operating in the state with an estimatedcombined strength of 10,000 cadres. The scale, intensity and focus of themilitancy was evident in the following major attacks through 2005.

On January 16, UNLF killed six security force (SF) personnel during an attack at a place between Tuilaphai and Sijon village in Churachandpur District.

On April 25, two Assam Rifles personnel were killed and four others sustained injuries during an ambush by UNLF militants on their vehicle at Sonapur under Jiribam police station in the Imphal East District.

On July 10, three Assam Rifles personnel were killed and seven persons, including two civilians, were injured as PLA militants triggered a powerful bomb explosion and subsequently ambushed an SF patrol in the Waithou Area of Thoubal District.

On September 19, 10 SF personnel were killed in an attack by KYKL militants at upper Ngaryan Hills range in the Bishnupur District.

On September 21, two BSF personnel were killed in an ambush by the PLA at Kumbi-Khodrak Road under the Kumbi Police Station in Bishnupur District.

On November 8, twenty-one persons, including 13 women, were injured in an explosion at the Thangal market area in Imphal city. Two persons subsequently succumbed to their injuries.

On November 13, three CRPF personnel were killed and two others sustained injuries in an ambush by the UNLF at a spot between Kaimai and Sibilong, under Nungba police station in the Tamenglong District.

Militant power, evident in the numerous decrees passed duringthe previous years, was further consolidated through new demands and decrees in2005:

On January 6, the KYKL decreed that girl students of classes IX and X must wear eeyongphi phanek (the traditional local dress) to school.

In February, the Kangleipak Communist Party (KCP) banned government doctors from working in private clinics.

On March 1, the KYKL banned ‘cabin restaurants’ in the state, terming them a ‘major factor in the moral degeneration of society".

In May, the PLA banned the sale and consumption of tobacco products in Imphal.

On June 21, the KYKL asked civilians not to attend or take part in the civic action programmes of the SFs.

On September 16, the KCP banned shooting and exhibition of digital movies and music albums for a year.

In November first week, the KYKL banned local fairs in the state, describing them as the "bed rock of immorality, obscenity and drug abuse".

Though there were some attempts by the marginalized civilsociety to raise murmurs of protest, the militants continue to hold sway andbrowbeat all opposition into submission. As a result, vast stretches of the state’sterritory, including some areas in the immediate neighbourhood of the statecapital, continue to remain out of the control of the state machinery and aretraversable only under substantial armed escorts.

Peace remains elusive in the state despite some politicalinitiatives. On March 7, Chief Minister Ibobi Singh said that his government hasreceived proposals for peace talks from two militant groups in the state. Twoweeks later, on March 21, the Chief Minister was talking of ‘sendingfeelers’ to the UNLF. On July 15, the state Legislative Assembly passed aresolution urging the union government to initiate peace talks with the militantoutfits. Policy makers and potential ‘negotiators’, however, had little tooffer, in the face of the total indifference demonstrated by militant groups.Even though the union government managed to effect cessation of hostility witheight minor Kuki militant groups in September 2005, the non-involvement of andsubsequent opposition by the state government created an avoidable and unwelcomeschismbetween the security setup and the state government. In any event, peace dealswith the fragmented and marginalised Kuki groups had little operational value;in the year 2005 the eight outfits had been responsible for the death of justfive civilians and one SF personnel. Major groups such as the UNLF, on the otherhand, either rebuffed intermittent appeals for peace or prevaricated withfanciful demands, such as UN mediation.

Evidence of a nexus between the political classes and theinsurgents continued to pile up. Revelations by Outlook in December,quoting the Army Chief J.J. Singh, claimed that Chief Minister Ibobi Singh hascontributed INR 15 million to two insurgent groups operating in the state,revived the persistent question of political collusion and infirmity in thehistory of insurgency in the state. Earlier, on August 26, CRPF personnel seizeda vehicle being used by the Zomi Revolutionary Army (ZRA),which belonged to the Chairman of the Manipur Assembly’s Hills AreasCommittee. In both the cases, the accused denied charges.

Any prospects of peace dawning on Manipur in 2006 haverapidly receded, with 18 reported fatalities in the first week of the New Year.While other states in the region are showing sustained signs of improvement andsome significant steps towards peace, Manipur appears to be spiraling into theabyss. Astonishingly, the union government continues to pay scant attention tothe rising anarchy that is Manipur.

Bibhu Prasad Routray is Research Fellow, Institute forConflict Management. Courtesy, the South Asia Intelligence Review of the SouthAsia Terrorism Portal