ON July 8, 1996, the Press Trust of India (PTI) put out a story from Bangalore that India had "successfully tested a nuclear-powered attack submarine somewhere on the east coast" recently. Given India's articulated reluctance to sign the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty in the preceding fortnight, the timing of the announcement seemed strange.
More so because the news-agency quoted sources in the Defence Research & Development Organisation (DRDO), one of the three partners in the N-sub project. But, before the story could set defence and diplomatic circles abuzz, PTI advised editors to "kill" it. No reasons were given, but presumably it was the "national interest". Some newspapers did carry the story; but there were no retractions from DRDO.
What's up? Is the N-sub finally ready after 25 years of work? And will it begin guarding our long coastline in another 7-10 years, as defence experts say? Or will it never probe the depths of our seas, as critics allege? "So far, there's been no indication at our docks that the Navy's submarine-building efforts are at an advanced stage, no evidence that nuclear scientists have designed or developed a reactor compact enough to fit into it, and no proof that we're producing the tonnes of highly enriched uranium required to run it," says activist-journalist Praful Bidwai. "Or else, they'd be crowing about it."
Admittedly, like all things nuclear in the country, a disproportionate amount of secrecy has accompanied the N-sub aka Advanced Technology Vessel (ATV). Says a naval officer: "The Government, to hide its own disinterest and inadequacies, is treating the N-sub like the bomb," which it is not; the only thing nuclear in it is its propulsion. But....
There is no mention of the N-sub project in the fifth defence standing committee report of August 1995. 'Plan 2005' of the DRDO doesn't talk about it. There are no earmarked budgetary allotments unlike the DRDO's other major projects. In fact, former naval chief of staff, Admiral J.G. Nadkarni, claims "the Navy has all along denied it's going in for the N-sub".
But this much is clear: the project is on. Jane's Fighting Ships 1996-97 says the Navy, DRDO and Department of Atomic Energy (DAE) men have been at it since the mid-'80s with a vice-admiral in charge. Former atomic energy commission (AEC) chief Raja Ramanna says he's no longer in the picture. DRDO supremo A.P.J. Abdul Kalam is said to be doing the "technical audits".
Hyderabad is the project 'headquarters' for practical and tactical reasons: the Nuclear Fuel Complex, which will source enriched uranium required to run the sub's reactor from the Rare Materials Plant in Mysore, is located here.
And the Bay of Bengal-faced Vishaka-patnam, where the ATV will be built if the shore-based reactor prototype is okayed, is close by. It was at Vishakapatnam that the Charlie I class N-sub leased from the erstwhile Soviet Union, christened INSChakra, was docked for three years from 1988.
The reactor prototype is being built a stone's throw away from the Madras atomic power plant at Kalpakkam. Say naval and DAE sources: "Work on the submarine hull work and reactor are going on simultaneously but not at the same place."
Officially, the Navy, DRDO and DAE are building the sub at Vishakapatnam, Madras, Hyderabad and Delhi. But sources say several industries—BHEL, Walchandnagar, L&T—are involved. According to Jane's, "fabrication is planned to start in 1997, probably in Vishakapatnam, with a projected in-service date of 2004. The plan is for a class of five fitted with Sagarika or Russian cruise missiles. The ATV is taking money from all other naval programmes".
Jane's time-frame prediction is more or less on target—it took nine years and eight months for India to build two conventional submarines in the '80s. But the Navy is looking to fit indigenous, tri-service missiles. Jane's claims that the project is taking precedence over replacing obsolescent aircraft carriers is hotly disputed.
In 1971, the project was granted a mere Rs 5 crore by P.N. Haksar, principal secretary to Indira Gandhi. A plea for a Rs 150-crore grant in 1980 was turned down by the then prime minister because the Navy found flaws in the DAE's reactor designs. Rajiv Gandhi devoted the most attention to the project till the HDW scandal broke out. The V.P. Singh government is said to have given Rs 100 crore. Under Narasimha Rao it was all downhill. Manmohan Singh looked at the defence budget to reduce fiscal deficit.
But more than funds, the N-sub programme has faced major technical problems, naval and nuclear, delaying its arrival.
The N-sub is a marvel of frontier technology. Its reactor has to be compressed to fit into a hull of 8-10 metres diameter. Unlike regular reactors, which operate at a constant load, it has to go flat out and shut down when needed. And, in spite of the weight and space constraints, radioactivity, caused by high neutron flux, shouldn't leak out.
Atomic energy scientists have been hard put to measure up to the task. Three designs were dropped between 1971 and 1980 after Captain B.K. Subbarao found flaws in them. Former AEC chairman M.R. Srinivasan confirmed 18 months ago that a land-based prototype was being readied. But there have been no indications of much progress since.
In the mid-'80s, an Admiral who was shown one such "prototype" said acidly: "Even my dockyard worker will cut ther-mocol better." Srinivasan admits there were problems in the initial stages. Plutonium pins had to be replaced with uranium plates. But Subbarao, who encountered more startling foul-ups, says the DAE scientists are plainly incapable of developing a miniature reactor: "In six months I can train IIT students to do better than all of them put together."
The N-sub requires a pressurised water reactor (PWR). Nuclear nabobs prevailed upon Rajiv Gandhi to allow them access to a PWR to do the 'trick'. Accordingly, the Russian Charlie I class N-sub was leased, although Admiral Nadkarni says that was only to give his men hands-on experience of the vessel. The Russians reportedly gave the drawings for the hull design but refused to part with the reactor details.
The submarine hull facility in Bombay, considered the best in the world just 12 years ago when the conventional HDW subs were being built, is dying because the Navy couldn't fund further construction. The best people—some 600-700 of them—have left for greener pastures. Hull work stopped in 1988-89. "The resource crunch is hard to bear but not hard to understand," said Admiral V.S. Shekhawat, himself a submariner, recently.
AND, independent reports say the uranium enrichment at the RMP in Mysore has been far from satisfactory. The N-sub needs highly enriched uranium by the tonne. The RMP is said to have produced it in grams, if not kilos. Attempts to use a mixture of uranium and plutonium oxides (MOX) as fuel have come a cropper. Insiders say experimental MOX rods, which were used in the Tarapur atomic power plant, broke. The N-sub can't afford such risks.
To make matters worse, naval and nuclear personnel have been involved in a constant tug-of-war. The Navy has tried to take the whole project into its hands because the DAE's efforts to build the reactor were taking it nowhere. And a minister in the V.P. Singh government is believed to have got the project tri-furcated in a game of oneupmanship with the Navy. Says Rear Admiral Raja Menon: "I can't think of more than two or three people in the Navy, DAE or DRDO for whom being in the project meant more than just another posting."
Analysts feel the lack of noise and urgency to induct the N-sub highlights the poor defence-diplomatic coordination. In spite of START I, sub-based warheads account for 68-70 per cent of the world's stockpile. But post-Pokhran India is smug in the belief it's just a screwdriver turn away from the bomb. Brigadier Vijai K. Nair of the Forum for Strategic and Security Studies says the N-sub adds bite to a land-based defence several times over like nothing else.
"For the Indian Navy to be a credible and meaningful power, it must add the N-sub to its armoury," says Vice-Admiral K.K. Nayyar, who was associated with the project. Adds Admiral J.G. Nadkarni: "N-deterrence has to be sea-based. Conventional deterrence hasn't worked: we have had three wars with Pakistan."
A small pen of N-subs will also reduce India's requirement for diesel-powered subs (when hydrocarbon reserves are drying up) and augment a depleting fleet. Says Air Commodore Jasjit Singh, director of the Institute of Defence Studies and Analyses (IDSA): "N-subs may cost more, but they can stay at sea for longer durations. Effective deployment is easier."
Strategic clarity has been found wanting. Says C. Uday Bhaskar, a senior fellow at IDSA: "Britain and France are investing heavily on sub-strategic missiles, and China is trying to develop submarine launched ballistic missiles." India, on the other hand, has ordered no new warships in the past six years; there is a backlog of 20 ships; and according to Jane's, only half our fleet is fully operational, the remainder is only sea-worthy.
According to Pune-based defence analyst Colonel Anil Athale, "managerial more than maritime incompetence has reduced a necessity like the N-sub into a liability." The inter-disciplinary approach of Americans is lacking. Says Captain B.K. Subbarao: "Each one does his own thing. There is no all-rounder to oversee the project." The Americans had a maverick genius in Edmund Rickover to hold the project together. All the N-sub has is one A.P.J. Abdul Kalam.
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