The GC Saxena Task Force on intelligence revamp, set up by the government in 2000, studied the working of the CTC of the CIA and recommended the creation of a similar counter-terrorism centre to be placed in the IB consisting of officers of various agencies and headed by an IB officer. The government created it in the IB, but for reasons not clear to me, called it a Multi-Agency Centre and not a counter-terrorism centre. It did not get going for a long time because of the reported reluctance of the R&AW and MI to depute their officers to work in the MAC under an IB officer.
The 9/11 terrorist strikes in the US Homeland exposed deficiencies in the functioning of the CTC of the CIA. Normally, the recommendation of the Saxena Task Force for the creation of a CTC in the IB should have been re-examined in the light of the 9/11 strikes in the US and the exposed deficiencies in the functioning of the CTC of the CIA, which led to the decision to create the NCTC under the DNI. This was not done till the 26/11 terrorist strikes in Mumbai.
The 26/11 terrorist strikes in Mumbai revealed more or less the same deficiencies in our counter-terrorism architecture as the deficiencies in the counter-terrorism architecture of the US revealed by the 9/11 terrorist strikes. Namely, inadequate intelligence and lack of co-ordinated follow-up action even on the intelligence that was available. In his first statement to the Lok Sabha on the 26/11 terrorist strikes after taking over as the Home Minister, Shri P.Chidambaram said that the responsibility for follow-up action on available intelligence was found to be diffused.
Shortly thereafter, he had visited the US to study the working of the Department of Homeland Security and the NCTC, both of which came into being after 9/11. He came back a strong votary of two ideas: For the creation of a separate Ministry of Internal Security patterned after the Department of Homeland Security of the US and for the creation of an NCTC patterned after its US counterpart.
Shri Chidambaram’s ideas differed in one important respect from the Counter-terrorism architecture created in the US. In the US, the newly set up DNI oversees the functioning of the NCTC. Shri Chidambaram reportedly wanted that the entire counter-terrorism architecture, including the proposed NCTC, should function under the Minister for Home Affairs till his idea of a Ministry of Internal Security was accepted and implemented. That is, he wanted the National Security Adviser to be divested of all counter-terrorism responsibilities and the home minister to be made the counter-terrorism Czar of the government of India.
There was speculation (seemed well-informed) in the media at that time that Shri M.K. Narayanan, the then National Security Adviser, viewed this as a negative reflection of his handling of the 26/11 terrorist strikes and strongly opposed the ideas of Shri Chidambaram. There was a long examination of Shri Chidambaram’s ideas. What has come out on January 12, 2012, as a result of this examination is neither an ass nor a mule, but something in between and not recognisable.
There will be an emaciated-at-birth NCTC which will not be independent , but will form part of the IB. Thus, there will be no independent supervision over the performance of the follow-up action role. The NSA will have no responsibility for counter-terrorism. As desired by him, Shri Chidambaram will be the Czar for counter-terrorism, but he will be a Czar in Indian colours, not given the necessary tools for being an effective Czar.
In the US too, the NSA has no responsibility for counter-terrorism. This role is performed by an Adviser on Homeland Security to the President who is commonly referred to as the Adviser on Counter-Terrorism.
In my view, the proposed NCTC is unlikely to improve our capability for preventive action through effective follow-up action on the intelligence collected.