Our Intelligence Bureau (IB), which is largely an urban-based organisation, hasvery little capability for preventive intelligence collection in the ruralareas. We have to depend on the rural police for this purpose. The ability ofthe rural police to collect intelligence depends to a considerable extent on itsmobility (patrolling) and its relationship with the village communities in theaffected areas. Fears caused by the frequent use of landmines with devastatingeffect by the Maoists and the failure of the States to provide the police withadequate mine detection and clearing capability have affected the mobility andrural patrolling. This has also an impact on police-community relationship. Apolice force, which is not able to remain in regular touch with the villagers,cannot collect much worthwhile intelligence.
The inability of the State to deal with the Maoist insurgency-cum-terrorismeffectively so far can be attributed to the absence of a mix of political andoperational strategies. The political strategy has to identify and address theroot causes of the spreading Maoism. While the spread is alarming, it is not yetout of control. There are still large areas in the tribal belt where the peopleare not supporting the Maoists and are observing law and order. The State has sofar failed to undertake a crash development of these areas, which have not yetbeen infected by Maoism, in order to prove to the people that they can achievetheir justified economic and social objectives through peaceful means, withouthaving to take up arms against the State. Simultaneously, there has to be animprovement in rural policing and intelligence
collection in order to thwart the efforts of the Maoists to bring these areastoo under their sway.
The areas, which have already come under the effective control of the Maoists,need a different strategy, with the emphasis more on the professional andoperational aspects of counter-terrorism and counter-insurgency than on thepolitical and economic. The objective is to wrest control of these areas fromthe Maoists. This would be possible only through expanding and strengthening thepolice presence in the areas, creating in the IB and the intelligence wings ofthe Police an improved capability for intelligence collection in the rural areasand strengthening the capability of the police and the para-military forces tocounter the modus operandi of the Maoists such as their devastating use oflandmines.
Concerned over the spread of Maoist terrorism and insurgency, suggestions areincreasingly being made for giving the police a military edge through trainingin jungle warfare techniques etc. We should definitely improve the technicalcapabilities of the police in matters such as mine-detection and neutralisation,but we should not militarise the methods of operation of the police.
The growing interest in some of our officers----serving and retired---in thehighly militarized British and American methods of dealing with insurgency andterrorism needs to be curbed. The former British occupying power in Malaya usedand the current American occupying power in Iraq uses highly militarisedmethods. They were/are operating against foreign nationals in foreign territoryand had/have, therefore, no qualms about the kind of methods they were/are usingto suppress the insurgency-cum-terrorism.
Our Police and para-military forces are operating in our own territory againstour own people. We have to temper effectiveness with self-restraint. We had touse the jungle warfare methods in Mizoram and certain areas of the North-East inthe 1960s and the 1970s because of the involvement of Pakistan and China inkeeping the insurgency sustained in those areas. We cannot unintelligently usethose methods in our tribal heartland in Central India. Modernisation of thepolice forces' rural counter-terrorism and counter-insurgency capability, yes;
but, militarisation, no.
While dealing with the Maoist insurgency, we have to make a distinction betweenthe poor people who have legitimate causes for anger against the State andagainst those whom they perceive as the exploiting classes of society and theMaoist ideologues, who are trying to exploit this anger to achieve politicalpower through the barrel of the gun. The ideologues must be made to realise thatthey cannot achieve their objective by using the rural poor as their cannonfodder. The State has to act firmly against them. At the same time, it isimportant to
prevent the rural poor from letting themselves be used as the cannon fodder ofthe Maoist ideologues. This is only possible through appropriate angercontainment and reduction measures. Unless they perceive the State as theprotector of the poor and exploited classes and not of the exploiting classes,it would not be possible to wean them away from the Maoist ideologues.
A comprehensive strategy of anger containment and reduction on the one side andbetter counter-insurgency and security in the rural areas on the other isrequired. This strategy has to be worked out centrally with inputs from theaffected States and co-ordinated in its implementation from the Centre. Such acomprehensive strategy is presently lacking.