The mistakes committed by Gen MacArthur which led to the massive Chinese intervention could be summed up as follows: Over-confidence and over-estimation of the strength of his own forces, under-estimation of the strength and determination of the Chinese, an inability to read the Chinese mind, and treating lightly and dismissively Chinese warnings regarding the likely consequences of the UN forces reaching the Yalu river, thereby posing a threat to China.
Similar mistakes were committed--in a much larger measure-- by our political and military leadership before the Sino-Indian war of 1962 leading to the humiliating defeat of our Army at the hands of the PLA. There have been very few comprehensive studies available to the public in India on the reasons for our defeat. As we observe the 50th anniversary of the defeat, many articles have been appearing in the media, but they are largely a collection of wishful thinking, unverified assumptions, breast-beatings and claims unsupported by concrete facts. Such studies do not serve any purpose in enabling us to learn the right lessons so that such mistakes are not repeated.
One such unverifiable claim made recently is that if we had used our Air Force our Army might not have suffered a humiliating defeat. Such claims have not been supported by a factual analysis of the state of the Air Force of the two countries in 1962. Many of the analyses that have appeared recently have not brought out the fact that barring the military conflict with Pakistan in Jammu & Kashmir in 1947-48, our Armed Forces had not fought a major war since we became independent in 1947 .
As against this, the Chinese Armed Forces had fought a major war against the UN troops led by the US in Korea, almost giving a bloody nose to them. And their Air Force had played a very important and creditable role against the UN Air Force. No authentic assessment of the Chinese air power and capability as exhibited during the Korean war is available, but according to one Chinese claim they managed to shoot down 320 UN aircraft and lost 220 of their own. Their account of their losses indicate their already massive aircraft holdings in the 1950s, thanks to the assistance from the USSR. According to Western analysts as cited by GlobalSecurity.org, even in 1953, the PLA ( Air Force) had a total holding of 1500 combat aircraft of different types.
The 1962 war with India took place long after the Korean war was over. Even if there was no need for the Chinese to shift their Army units from the Korean border to the Indian border, they were in a position to shift a large number of their aircraft to Sichuan and Yunnan for possible use against India. Our Armed Forces with no experience of having fought a major war since 1947 were forced by our political leadership to confront the PLA whose self-confidence, experience and war-fighting capabilities had been enhanced by the experiences gained by it against the UN troops led by the US in Korea.
Our political leadership forced our armed forces to engage in a confrontation with the PLA thinking that the PLA of 1962 would be no different from the PLA of 1949 which had captured control of China from the KMT. Before we embarked on our so-called forward policy which led to a military confrontation, two intelligence assessments should have been made--firstly, an assessment of the Chinese strength and capabilities in Tibet and Xinjiang and secondly, an assessment of their military and air power, fighting capabilities and generalship as exhibited during the war in Korea.
Our Intelligence Bureau (IB) did the first assessment, however inadequate it might have been. It was not in a position to undertake the second since its area of focus was limited to the peripheral countries. Thus, we went to war with China in 1962 largely unaware of the advances made by the Chinese Armed Forces during the 1950s and of their professional qualities as exhibited in Korea.
Fifty years after the 1962 war, we still have limited mental horizons in matters strategic. Our horizons are largely limited by Pakistan, its ISI, the Lashkar-e-Toiba and its Amir Hafiz Mohammad Sayeed. There is a huge panoply of threats arising from China which have not received our attention. It is Pakistan, Pakistan and Pakistan all the time.
As an example of how our mental horizons in matters strategic continue to be limited, let me narrate the following: We had a military conflict with Pakistan in the Kargil heights in 1999. After the conflict, the government of Mr Atal Behari Vajpayee, the then Prime Minister, set up a committee headed by the late K. Subrahmaniam to identify the inadequacies noticed in the conduct of the war and to recommend steps for removing them.
On the basis of its recommendations, a number of Task Forces were set up to examine weaknesses in our national security structure and recommend action for removing them. These Task Forces dealt with Defence Management, Intelligence Revamp, Border Management and Internal Security. Their reports were vetted by a Group of Ministers nominated by the Prime Minister and the national security architecture was modified.
Since the GOM and its Task Forces were the outcome of the Kargil war with Pakistan, their terms of reference mostly related to likely threats from Pakistan. Most of their recommendations were Pakistan-centric. So was the modified national security architecture that came into being. Some of their recommendations did collaterally strengthen our capabilities with regard to China, but the focus of their study was not China.
Ten years later, Prime Minister Dr Manmohan Singh set up a blue ribbon Task Force on National Security chaired by Mr Naresh Chandra, former Cabinet Secretary. Since it was not the outcome of any war with Pakistan with restricted terms of reference, it was expected to cover a much larger strategic depth, with a greater focus on the examination of our capabilities vis-à-vis those of China.
The Hindu of October 9, 2012, has carried a moving tribute to Mr Brajesh Mishra, the National Security Adviser under Mr Vajpayee, who passed away recently, by Mr Shivshankar Menon, the present NSA. He has said that when the national security structures built up under Mishra ‘were reviewed after 10 years by a Task Force, they actually suggested more of the same, rather than a radical restructuring.” He is referring to the Task Force chaired by Mr Naresh Chandra.
I interpret this as an implied criticism of the report of the Naresh Chandra Task Force submitted to the Prime Minister on May 24, 2012, which is presently under examination. The report went into greater details than the reports of the GOM regarding likely concerns arising from China, but these concerns have not been adequately reflected in suggesting a further modification and modernisation of our national security architecture.
Attention on Pakistan continues to be important. It continues to target our jugular vein. But in our preoccupation with Pakistan, we should not lose sight of the fact that an architecture created for dealing with Pakistan, will not be able to deal satisfactorily with China. To deal with China we need a different mindset, a different ability to read its mind and message, a different military and intelligence capability etc. The focus of the Task Force should have been on them.
Some other countries had in the past undertaken comprehensive studies of the Sino-Indian war of 1962 in order to see what lessons it has for them. A very useful study released in April 1984 was by Lt Commander James Barnard Calvin of the US Navy on behalf of the Marine Corps and Staff College of the US. His interesting conclusions are annexed. They are quite valid even today.