One often talks of terrorism having become a globalphenomenon. It is essentially jihadi terrorism, which has become a globalphenomenon.
The inadequacies in our capabilities are spread right across the counter-terrorism spectrum--intelligence, policing, physical security, crisis management, investigation and prosecution.
One often talks of terrorism having become a globalphenomenon. It is essentially jihadi terrorism, which has become a globalphenomenon.
One can trace the origin of the globalisation of jihadi terrorism to theformation of the International Islamic Front (IIF) by Osama bin Laden inFebruary,1998, for waging a global jihad against what he projected as the commonenemies of Islam--namely, the Crusaders and the Jewish people. In April, 2006,he included the Hindus as the third common enemy of Islam. He now projects theglobal jihad as directed against the alleged conspiracy of the Crusaders, theJewish people and the Hindus against Islam.
His success in the globalisation of jihadi terrorism has resulted ininnumerable jihadi terrorist organisations, which were already operating indifferent countries for different local reasons and for different localobjectives, coming together in a united front for helping each other, benefitingfrom each other's capabilities and achieving a common pan-Islamicobjective of a global Islamic Caliphate.
Under bin Laden's leadership, international jihadi terrorism has been drawinginto its fold educated, self-motivated Muslim youth of differentcountries, who are able to harness the latest advances in technologies relatingto communications for building a trans-national networking. They have also showna worrisome capability for innovative modus operandi (MO), often involving theuse of explosive devices fabricated by them from commonly available material. Their constant search for new MO is seen in the the way they used hijackedplanes as cruise missiles in their terrorist strikes of 9/11 in the US andin their present quest after weapons of mass destruction material.
Self-motivation, ability to operate autonomously in small cells without unduedependence on a common command and control, graduation from the past use ofhand-held weapons to extensive and devastating use of explosive devices,suicide terrorism, careful selection of soft targets as well as targets, whichhave a significant economic, strategic or religious value, a willingness toinflict mass casualties on the civilian population without worrying aboutits likely adverse impact on public opinion and skilful use of psychologicalwarfare (PSYWAR) techniques through the Internet, FM radio stations and TVchannels are some of the defining characteristics of the international jihaditerrorists.
Growing miniaturisation of international jihadi terrorism is another recentdevelopment. One saw the first evidence of it in the London explosions of July10, 2005. This refers to self-motivated and self-directed individuals, notbelonging to any organisation and not even subscribing to the pan-Islamicobjectives of international jihadi terrorism, giving vent to their anger throughacts of terrorism against the perceived enemies of Islam, with assistance fromthe members of the IIF.
International jihadi terrorists have demonstrated a capability for actionsmounted from the air, the land and the sea. The tourist infrastructure, publictransport and energy production and supply infrastructure have been among theirfavourite targets. They contemplate attacks on other critical infrastructure,including nuclear establishments and maritime trade.
The 11/7 blasts in Mumbai mark the extension of the area of operationof international jihadi terrorism to India. The Madrid train blasts of March,2004, have apparently provided the model. More such well-planned andwell-executed terrorist strikes in the Indian territory are likely. The success of the terrorists could be attributed to intelligence and physicalsecurity inadequacies. There has definitely been a failure of theintelligence agencies of the government of India as well as of the intelligencebranch of the Mumbai Police. The failures have been in human as well astechnical intelligence.
Physical security for the suburban trains has also been wanting. No lessonsseem to have been learnt from the Madrid and London blasts, both of which weredirected at mass transportation systems. Inadequacies in the policing ofMumbai, which has been a frequent favourite target of the terrorists, is alsoevident. While the Central intelligence agencies are responsible for strategicintelligence collection, the collection of tactical intelligence is theresponsibility of the local police.
The police collect tactical intelligence through methods such as citypatrolling, local enquiries, surveillance of terrorist and criminal suspects andpolice-community relations, particularly with the community from whichterrorists arise. If these methods are non-functional, intelligence flow willdry up.
The failure of the police to make a breakthrough so far in their efforts toidentify and arrest the perpetrators of the blasts is worrisome. Ata time, when the terrorists are steadily improving their capabilities, ourcapabilities have not been able to counter their improved capabilitieseffectively. The inadequacies in our capabilities are spread rightacross the counter-terrorism spectrum--intelligence, policing, physicalsecurity, crisis management and investigation and prosecution.
An important lesson of 9/11 was the need for an interlocking system offail-safe mechanisms relating to intelligence, policing, physical security andcrisis management. The idea is that even if one component fails, others willcompensate for the failure. For example, if intelligence fails, effectivephysical security should be able to thwart a terrorist strike even in theabsence of preventive intelligence.
Another lesson was the need for a single nodal point to identify allvulnerabilities and co-ordinate all physical security arrangements. TheDepartment of Homeland Security in the US is an outcome of this lesson.Unfortunately, we learnt no lessons from others. The jihaditerrorists are trying all the time to learn from each other's experiences.Counter-terrorism agencies have to constantly learn from each other too.
Since 9/11, there has been a number of acts of terrorism by internationaljihadi terrorists in different countries of the world. The details of thosestrikes, the MO used, the details of the investigations ,the results of anyenquiries held by the local officials into possible intelligence and physicalsecurity failures should have been studied by governmental organisations as wellas non-governmental think tanks and appropriate lessons drawn.
This has not been done on a systematic basis. Our Kashmir-centric approach tojihadi terrorism is no longer justified. Jihadi terrorism in the Indianterritory outside Jammu & Kashmir (J&K) is not necessarily Kashmirrelated, though the Pakistani jihadi surrogates involved in J&K and outsideare the same and Pakistan's Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) acts as the commonmotivator and controller of all jihadi terrorist activities--whether in J&Kor outside.
Jihadi terrorism in the Indian territory outside J&K has become part ofthe global jihadi terrorism. Our studies of jihadi terrorism can no longerremain exclusively influenced by our preoccupation with J&K. A globaldimension to our studies is called for. Acts of jihadi terrorism in Indianterritory directed against the IIF's global targets such as the US and Israelcould be an outcome of India becoming a new front for the terrorists in theirglobal jihad.
We need to strengthen not only our intelligence, physical security andpolicing capabilities, but also our anti-explosives capability. Theinternational jihadi terrorists are relying on explosive devices and suicidebombers for over 75 per cent of their terrorist strikes. The explosion at theNew York World Centre in February,1993, involved the use of nitrogenousfertilisers (ammonium nitrate) as the explosive material. This was perhaps thefirst time it was used. Since then, Al Qaeda and other jihadi terroristgroups in different parts of the world have been increasingly using ammoniumnitrate. For the Mumbai blasts of 11/7 too, the terrorists are reported to haveused a mixture of ammonium nitrate, RDX and fuel oil. Ammonium nitrate is easyto procure without giving rise to suspicion.
In the London explosions of July last year, the suicide terrorists werereported to have fabricated their own peroxide-based explosives by mixingappropriate chemicals which were bought without giving rise to suspicion. Thejihadi terrorists are graduating from military-grade and industry-madeexplosives to self-made explosives, which could be fabricated in one's bathtub.
How to prevent the terrorists from having easy access to explosives,commonly-used substances which can be used as explosives and commonly-usedsubstances, which can be used for fabricating explosives is a question whichneeds urgent attention.
We have already dithered too long in giving a new shape and thrust to ourcounter-terrorism strategy keeping in view the new mutations of jihadi terrorismand its constantly improving capabilities. A new counter-terrorism strategy tocounter the new jihadi terrorism is called for. It should, inter alia, includethe following steps:
B. Raman is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt.of India, New Delhi, and Director, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai.