Theory apart, the specific areas of worry have frightening dimensions. This would cover the systematic undermining of the civil administration, including the police force, ever since the advent of Gen Rao on the scene. The retired army general was clear that the Army must have a pre-eminent, predominant role in anti-militancy operations and would brook no counsel to the contrary. And in his focussed approach to the fight against militancy, he ignored the civilian requirements almost completely. That he seldom allowed a holistic view of the problems of the state to emerge is evident. During his three-year stint as head of state and government, he hardly ever had a full meeting with his advisers, who are virtually cabinet ministers when the Governor’s rule is in force. "Even during the entire 40-odd days of the Chrar-e-Sharief imbroglio, not a single full meeting of the advisers was held," admits one of them. "We hardly knew the thinking of the government in which we were supposed to be as good as ministers," he says. The deprived official’s analogy is telling: the structure of the Governor’s government was like that of the Army, with offi-cials being informed only on a need-to-know basis.