On June 26, 2012, spokesmen of the President’s office had indicated that the President had decided to commute his death sentence to one of life imprisonment which could pave the way for his pardon and return to his family in India. His reported decision was widely welcomed as a humanitarian gesture in India and was hailed during prime-time TV debates.
It has been reported by “the Hindu” correspondent in Islamabad that the reported decision of Zardari to pardon Sarabjit Singh was strongly criticised by the Jamaat-e-Islami (JEI) and the Jamaat-ud-Dawa (JUD), the political wing of the LET, as a shameful act at a time when Ajmal Kasab, the lone LET survivor of the 26/11 strikes, was under a death sentence in Mumbai.
Zardari seems to have blinked under the criticism of these organisations and possibly also from the Army and the ISI. His spokesmen have sought to give the impression that no pardon had been issued by Zardari to Sarabjit and that the media had confused a release order issued by the Govt in respect of Surjit Singh, another Indian languishing in Pakistani jail, as indicating an impending release of Sarabjit Singh.
The contention of the Presidential spokesman that the confusion was created by the media in India and Pakistan has not carried conviction with many analysts in both the countries. The snafu indicates a possible weakening of the position of Zardari and his decreasing ability to withstand pressure from the Army, the ISI and the LET in matters relating to India.
The LET’s ability to dictate terms to the Government has been demonstrated once again. Encouraged by its re-enhanced influence and the backing of the Army and the ISI, it is to be expected that the LET will redouble its efforts for another terrorist strike in India.
The decision of the Saudi authorities to transfer Ansari to Indian custody unmindful of the unhappiness of Pakistan will be seen in Pakistan as a blow to its much-flaunted relationship with Saudi Arabia. Zardari is likely to be blamed by the Army and the LET for the failure to dissuade Saudi Arabia from transferring Ansari to Indian custody. It will come as a surprise and shock to the fundamentalist organisations in Pakistan and Indian Muslim organisations such as the Students Islamic Movement of India and the Indian Mujahideen which had in the past maintained close interactions with sympathetic elements in Saudi Arabia.
The ISI and the LET will be determined to demonstrate that the action of Saudi Arabia will not weaken their anti-India motivation by orchestrating a fresh terrorist strike against India.
The interrogation of Ansari by the Indian authorities should focus on ascertaining the present thinking and the future plans of the ISI and the LET. The other members of the Indian Muslim community, who were in contact with the LET, the ISI and David Headley, of the Chicago cell of the LET, should be quickly identified with Ansari’s help and arrested. Questioning him regarding what role he played in connection with the 26/11 strikes can be taken up later on.
Our counter-terrorism mindset continues to be influenced by the “Fix ISI” reflex. It should instead be influenced by the “Counter And Neutralise ISI” mindset.