Wise Man From The West

IT was like putting the cat among the pigeons. Frank Wisner, US ambassador to India, arrived in Pakistan for a lecture at its Command and Staff College, Quetta. And he immediately got down to business—a lecture on why and how relations with India should be improved. It was not the usual lecture dripping only with platitudes and diplomatese. Trying hard at balancing his discourse, not to sound as if he favoured India, Wisner came out quite clearly, urging Islamabad to recognise "certain fundamental realities" of the last 50 years. He endorsed the elections in Kashmir, going along with the Indian Election Commission's description of them as "imperfect" but saying they had contributed to the "empowerment of the Kashmiri people—and to the beginning of a political process in the state".

Wisner's lecture was prepared carefully. He was addressing the most powerful decision-makers in Pakistan. On issues related to India, the army has a decisive say. His visit naturally created quite a stir. The newspapers in Pakistan splashed everything he said. In a press conference he addressed in Islamabad, he made virtually the same point—that the time is ripe to settle the Kashmir dispute.

While US officials claim there has been no rethink on its Kashmir policy, anybody can see it has come a long way from RobinRaphel questioning the accession of Kashmir to India. Says former foreign secretary S.K. Singh: "These are all indications of change in the American thinking. The US intelligentsia, if not the administration, is beginning to realise that becoming a military crutch to Pakistan is good neither for them nor for Pakistan. Besides, they can't cope with the violent effervescence of Islam. There is also a growing awareness that the US has not given India's democracy the weightage it should have been given. Moreover, the size and sophistication of the Indian market is beginning to be very attractive for them."

 It's indeed unusual for the US ambassador to India to tell the Pakistanis to start talking. The timing is significant. Prime Minister H.D. Deve Gowda, in a prompt response to Benazir Bhutto's offer, had offered to initiate secretary-level talks on all issues. But Benazir was taking rather long to reply to that missive. As a Pakistan foreign office official said, "Wisner's visit would help us start talking bilaterally".

Wisner used his diplomatic push wisely, aware of the Pakistani establishment's reservations to a bilateral dialogue which does not have a plebiscite in Kashmir on top of the agenda. Says Singh: "It depends on us how we exploit this change to our advantage. It will give us greater space if we know how to play this change."

 Islamabad was naturally abuzz with theories on why Wisner made those comments. Some speculated that Wisner had conveyed a specific formula to the Pakistani leadership, others spoke of a Camp David-like summit. Before his visit, a leading English daily of Pakistan carried a story from Washington that the Clinton administration was considering such an Indo-Pak summit. The plan, said thereport, was prepared by Prof Stephen Cohen, a specialist on South Asia and director of the programme in Arms Control, Disarmament and International Security, University of Illinois.

In Islamabad, one thing was certain: things seemed to be moving. A dialogue between the two countries seemed a dis tinct possibility. Wisner's observation India was ready to discuss all issues, inc luding Kashmir, did give Pakistan something to think about. At the same time, it created difficul-ties. With India expressing its flexibility, Pakistan was left with little option but to come to the negotiating table. But Pakistani decision-makers don't want any talks with New Delhi unless they are sure India will discuss Kashmir in the context of the UN resolutions. That's why Islam-abad is taking its time preparing Benazir's response to Gowda.

The perception in New Delhi tallies with this. Having stuck to its line that talks are possible only if plebiscite is discussed, Pakistan is in a corner. There is considerable confusion in Islamabad because its India policy needs major reorientation.

Neither country wants to be seen unenthusiastic about the dialogue. But for Pakistan this is an opportunity that may not come soon again. The situation in Kashmir is quite different from January '94. With the Lok Sabha elections over and the assembly polls to be held in September, Pakistan needs the talks more than India. India has shown that it can live without a dialogue and counter whatever Pakistan tries to do there. Besides, Islamabad would have noticed that the Clinton administration has decided that the elections in Kashmir, though imperfect, are acceptable.

On July 15, when Wisner was on his way back to India, the Pakistani troika—comprising President Farooq Ahmed Khan Leghari, Prime Minister Bhutto and Army chief Gen Jehangir Karamat—met in Islamabad. The issues raised by Wisner were believed to have been discussed, besides the pending reply to Gowda. Pakistan's Kashmir Committee chairman Nawabzada Nasarullah Khan and Foreign Secretary Najmuddin Sheikh also attended this meeting. 

"In a way, we're in a tangle about the agenda. We're still weighing various options—whether to keep Kashmir as the focus of talks or to make a beginning by touching on issues like Siachen, Wullar Barrage, Sir Creek and trade. But we aren't in a hurry either. We don't want to indulge in a dialogue at the secretary-level which comes to a meaningless end after two or three meetings. We want it to be result-oriented," say Pakistan Foreign Ministry officials. "We want to reprioritise our agenda. And we need to start by deblocking the blocked issues. That takes time." 

These officials don't think pressure is building up on Pakistan because of India's flexibility. "We think the pressure is equal. We've welcomed third party mediation, India opposes it publicly. India also has CTBT on its hands," says an official.

Indian officials are blase about Wisner's speech. Many feel the US attempt to mediate won't succeed, though some of his remarks are quite pleasing to Indian ears. Says Chintamani Mahapatra, a fellow at the Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses: "Some of these things won't go down well with his Pakistani interlocutors. South Asia is the only region the US hasn't been able to get going as a mediator. Now, with the elections around the corner in the US, it's making a pitch again."

He feels the latest initiative may be part of the Cohen plan, without making it appear so. Mahapatra points to Wisner implicitly linking Kashmir with the nuclear issue, "which is not a bilateral problem between India and Pakistan. In fact, we agree on a lot of things on the nuclear issue. It's really a problem between South Asia and the US". Some Indian officials feel the Americans are keen that some step forward is taken on Kashmir, because in their assessment, the federalism-oriented Deve Gowda Government, though weak, has "honourable intentions".

Wisner, throughout his stay in Pakistan, never touched on the UN resolutions. Pakistan Foreign Ministry sources speculate that "probably he wanted to avoid controversy. But this doesn't mean we've budged from our stand regarding the internationally accepted principles. We remain firm on the relevance of the resolutions envisaging a plebiscite and self-determination for Kashmir". Says Nawabzada: "So what if Wisner did not touch on the UN resolutions? Who is he to decide anything anyway? Elections are no substitute for plebiscite. The world has seen enough drama in the name of Kashmir elections."

During his stay, Wisner met almost everyone who is relevant to Pakistan's decision-making. An exception was Army chief Karamat, whose reported meeting with the ambassador was denied by the authorities. He called on President Leghari, Prime Minister Bhutto, her predecessor Nawaz Sharif and several senior army officials. 

Mushahid Hussain, the Pakistan Muslim League (Nawaz)'s information secretary and security analyst, feels that America is trying for a Palestine-like solution in Kashmir. "But I think Wisner's visit is not going to produce anything immediately," he says. "The mention of a Camp David is premature. The US is not committing itself to a direct role. Wisner has himself said he had not come with any formula. I think the US would hold back such a move until their elections are over. I suspect whatever the solution, it would grant some sort of autonomy to Kashmir by keeping it with India. New Delhi is not going to concede anything to us." He feels Wisner's visit was aimed at "interpreting" the new Indian leadership to Pakistan.

Pakistani strategic affairs analyst Dr Shireen Mazari has serious misgivings about the US ambassador's 'fact-finding mission'. "It was not a healthy sign for Pakistan. Since India is in a no-win situation, they want to resolve the issue. Pakistan has to hold out for some more time because India can't sustain it for long," says Mazari, who is known for her hardline views. She is also opposed to Benazir's readiness for third party mediation. "Why should we opt for anybody's solicitation when the UN is already there to play that role?" she asks.

She believes Wisner came to pressure Pakistan. "The US may already have prepared a blueprint for a Camp David process. Autonomy to Kashmir and its permanent division could be in the offing, which would restart the debate on the Northern Areas' status," she observes.

Nawabzada Nasarullah Khan too is pessimistic about a dialogue with India. "Deve Gowda says he would follow the previous government's foreign policy and that state elections would be held in Kashmir. I.K. Gujral says Kashmir is a bilateral issue and no mediation is needed. These pronouncements pretty much take care of the Camp David summit and any meaningful negotiations. We'll stick to our old demand on the UN resolutions," says Nawabzada.

The US ambassador's "well-meaning" foray notwithstanding, the all-pervasive sentiment of scepticism on both sides does not seem to have diminished. The Quetta invitation could not have come without Gen Karamat's clearance. But having done that, will the all-powerful army allow Bhutto leverage to take things further?