Whose Role Is It Anyway?

hen charismatic Brazilian president Luiz Inacio Lula da Silva and Turkish prime minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan persuaded Iranian president Mahmoud Ahmedinejad to agree to an enriched uranium swap that may help Teheran avert further UN sanctions, many in India were reminded about the heyday of the Non-Aligned Movement. In those times, India wasn’t a spectator, content to watch important international events from the sidelines, mute and reactive. Under the sagacious leadership of Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru, India led the Third World, propounding new principles of diplomacy, providing moral support to those chafing under colonial rule, and rallying the ‘wretched countries’ of the world. India was always strident, its stand unequivocal, and it led from the front—whether it was the battle to end apartheid in South Africa or the wars in the Korean peninsula and Indochina. In his idealism, Nehru had the support of Egypt’s Nasser, Yugoslavia’s Tito, Indonesia’s Sukarno and Ghana’s Kwame Nkrumah.

The Iran uranium swap is an eloquent testimony to the changing times, to India vacating the space reserved for those who lead the developing world—and Brazil, Turkey or China swiftly moving in to occupy it. Paulo Sotero, director, Brazil Institute, at the Woodrow Wilson Centre in Washington, told Outlook, “From Brazil’s perspective, it was a legitimate issue for the promotion of peace and an opportunity to facilitate dialogue by avoiding confrontation (between Iran and the United States).” Sotero is quick to admit that underlying Lula’s decision was the desire to play the leader’s role in the developing world. “That’s obviously the motivation. President Lula wants to play a role beyond the region, he wants to be counted as a global player.”

Couldn’t India have played this role? Ali Ansari, an Iran expert at the University of St Andrews School of History, Scotland, says, “I am sure India could have played this role. But I am not sure whether it wants to play a role.” He says it is possible India is sceptical about the success of such a deal, believing it can only delay the proposed UN sanctions, not rule it out. But it’s also possible that New Delhi was apprehensive of intervening as it could have jeopardised its finely-crafted relations with the US.

Former foreign minister Yashwant Sinha feels India can’t be a Brazil because it lacks credibility in the developing world. As he puts it, “If you are touting the US line on all major foreign policy issues, then your credibility is zero.” By contrast, India played a leadership role at the time it was truly non-aligned, siding neither with the US nor the Soviet Union. True, America is the sole superpower today, yet for the developing world to take India seriously, it must, Sinha contends, maintain its independence and distance from Washington.

Sinha perhaps is referring here to India’s controversial decision to vote in favour of a US resolution against Iran at the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) in 2006. Iran had said then that it felt “betrayed” by India, refusing to believe New Delhi’s justification. Let alone Iran, many in the developing world too thought the IAEA vote stemmed from India’s desire to get closer to the US. Of course, India then was negotiating the much-celebrated nuclear deal with the US. New Delhi was acutely conscious that a vote against the US resolution would give sceptics in Washington a reason to scuttle the deal. Jim Masselos of Sydney University says, “The problem in the world today is that most nations are mainly worried about their own well-being.”

Call it the death of ideology or blame it on the changing times,  “but in each time span, things are different,” says Masselos. He feels India is more “cosmopolitan” in its outlook now than before. This cosmopolitanism has prompted India to turn its gaze mainly towards the West, from the East and its own neighbourhood. “This does not mean that India does not have links with the developing world. But its main focus has become decidedly the West,” Masselos explains.

But this change in focus, say experts, wasn’t whimsical or sudden. It started in the 1980s with Indira Gandhi attempting to affect a shift in her last stint as prime minister, reaching out to the US, which had never been convinced of India’s nonaligned credo. Rajiv Gandhi tried to strike a balance between Moscow and Washington, besides taking the lead in intervening in a series of regional developments, particularly the civil strife in Sri Lanka.

Perhaps India’s disastrous experience in Sri Lanka or the wobbly Indian economy prompted Rajiv’s successor, P.V. Narasimha Rao, to deliberately vacate the front seat in NAM to laggards like Malaysia. With liberalisation as his principal mantra, Rao opened up the Indian economy, much to the delight of the West. Simultaneously, in an unprecedented step, he reached out to pro-western groupings like the ASEAN. Successive governments in New Delhi pursued the policies initiated by Rao with greater vigour, not only forging links between the Indian and the western markets but also weaving New Delhi into the western diplomatic fabric. This was an adjustment to the unipolar world in which, it was believed, only America and its allies could provide India respite from terrorism and grinding poverty.

his shift also implied that India couldn’t go around courting issues inimical to western interests. Asked why India didn’t think of intervening in the Iranian imbroglio, a senior Indian diplomat said, “We now have a distaste for mediation.” He says recognition in the world can be won only through a strong economy, which remains the most effective way of surmounting domestic challenges. He argues that “not too many countries took us seriously when our economy was weak. But with a steady economic growth of 6-8 per cent plus for the past several years, most countries now regard us as a major global player”.

Others in the Indian foreign policy establishment feel that leading the NAM and championing the causes of the developing world are now passe, more so as India has entered the coveted league of big boys of global politics. “Look at the countries fighting to host the NAM—Cuba and Iran? Do you really think we should be competing with them?” a prime ministerial aide was heard remarking recently.

True, India has come a long way. Though still a member of groupings like G-77, NAM or G-15, consisting of developing countries, it has also been included in the club of G-20 and enjoys observer status in G-8. For a permanent seat in the UNSC, it has formed an alliance with highly developed countries like Germany and Japan in G-4. (Brazil, incidentally, is the fourth member here!) India also has regular strategic dialogues with all the P-5 countries and participates in annual bilateral summits with the European Union, the ASEAN, Brazil-Russia-India-China (BRIC) and India-Brazil-South Africa (IBSA).

Perhaps then the category of developing countries needs a relook. As Timothy J. Forsyth of the London School of Economics told Outlook, “The developing world is far too diverse these days. In it you have countries like China, India, Brazil, and South Africa, which are all much industrialised and are now regarded as emerging economies, while you also have sub-Saharan countries which are quite underdeveloped. It is difficult to lump all of them together as developing countries any longer.” Perhaps this explains why there are no unanimous leaders of the developing world as there were in the past. China or Brazil do stake claims to the leadership, but end up failing to muster support from many developing nations.

Others, however, argue that there’s no reason why India shouldn’t utilise its growing profile in the international arena to champion the cause of the developing world. Srinath Raghavan of the Centre for Policy Research, Delhi,  says, “It is a paradox that when India’s economic and military strength was considerably weak, it did not hesitate to play the leading role in NAM or in championing the cause of the developing world. But today, when its economic as well as military muscles have developed significantly, it hesitates in playing that role.”

Yashwant Sinha agrees, citing the philosophy underlying IBSA, the formation of which was his initiative. He says IBSA was formed not only to strengthen trilateral cooperation, but the three countries had also tentatively agreed to intervene in various “hot spots” in the world for the goal of achieving peace. But before this aspect of IBSA could be implemented, his government was voted out of power.

Perhaps it’s about time then that India gives Sinha’s proposal another serious look. As Raghavan says, “India should keep in mind that its ambitions of finding a place at the high table are directly linked to its ability to shape the international agenda.”