Whining vs. Winning

Not a day passes without either Islamabad or New Delhi issuing comments against each other that are strident and undiplomatic. "Lay off," snarled Pakistan President Pervez Musharraf, eight days after the attacks on the World Trade Center. This did not discourage New Delhi from raising its own pitch or desisting from the temptation of taking advantage of the precarious situation Musharraf finds himself in. Home minister L.K. Advani has repeatedly warned Pakistan to be prepared for consequences of its policy of supporting terrorism and hints at "hot pursuit". And defence minister George Fernandes promised to be ruthless in dealing with infiltrators. Even as intermittent shelling continues across the border, Prime Minister Atal Behari Vajpayee has asked Pakistan to make up its mind whether it wants peace or not.

This war of words has led the US to counsel urgent restraint, asking both India and Pakistan to ensure that the situation in the region doesn't spiral out of control. Both New Delhi and Islamabad want to prove through their rhetoric the mala fide intent of each other and exploit the situation in ways that would embarrass the other.

Ministry of external affairs sources, though, talk of creeping despair at the way the government keeps returning to Kashmir and Pakistan as factors in its relationship with the US. Says one diplomat, "Here the Americans are trying to lift us out of the hole in which we are with the Pakistanis but we are signalling, 'No let us remain in this hole. This is our true place in the world.'" As Vajpayee prepares to go to Washington in November, it is worth pondering if the ongoing war of words with Pakistan could impact on the quality of India's emerging relations with the US.

Says P.R. Kumaraswamy, professor in the School of International Studies at Delhi's Jawaharlal Nehru University (jnu), "After Pokhran, we had worked to delink Pakistan from our bilateral relations with great powers, largely because of our aspiration for a great-power status. The question is: are we not reintroducing the linkages with Pakistan by focusing again on Pakistan? And if we are, are we not squandering whatever gains we may have made? Our utility to the American alliance campaign today is marginal because we are not in a position to give either logistical or intelligence support commensurate to what Pakistan is giving. Why then go in for a short-sighted policy?"

Similarly, Robert Hathaway, director, Asia Studies, Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, Washington, argues, "It will be a monumental shame if New Delhi permits its old quarrels with Pakistan to get in the way of creating a new partnership with the US. This is not to trivialise the anger Indians understandably feel about terrorist activities in j&k. But at some point, India's political leadership is going to have to come to terms with the reality that New Delhi's preoccupation with its old adversary in Pakistan undermines India's desire to be regarded as a major actor on the world scene. New Delhi will not and should not ignore Pakistani support for cross-border terrorism. But the Vajpayee government does need to balance this with its other objectives and interests."

If the blame game continues, it might enter the point of diminishing returns. Dennis Kux, a senior scholar at the Woodrow Wilson International Center, feels that a heating of tensions in the subcontinent is "an extremely unwelcome development". What the Bush administration hopes for, as Secretary of State Colin Powell stressed in both Islamabad and Delhi during his visit to the region, is reduced, not increased, India-Pakistan tensions.

No wonder Kux warns, "At this point, India is winning few friends in Washington by stonewalling Musharraf on talks and underscoring, ironically, Musharraf's claim that Kashmir is the core problem between the two countries. A better approach, again from the American perspective, would be for the prime minister to meet Musharraf in New York and carry forward the dialogue." Kux thinks New Delhi's rhetoric is surprising considering that Powell attempted on his visit to the region to allay India's concerns about terrorism in Kashmir.

Worse, Pakistan seems to be winning all over again the public relations game. "Musharraf came across in his Larry King cnn interview earlier this week as sincere and straightforward. India in terms of the impression created here in Washington looks petty," points out Kux.

Government officials, however, do not think that a meeting with Musharraf serves any purpose at this point in time, unless the dialogue focuses on terrorism. The intent is to deny Musharraf the added PR advantage of the kind he mustered in Agra. Says a diplomat: "Already, the impression is gaining ground that Musharraf is both reasonable and a liberal. We need to signal that even though he is 'cooperating' on Afghanistan, Kashmir is a different proposition altogether. It's better to watch which way the chips will fall as a result of the Afghanistan crisis before we can proceed."

Argues Kanti Bajpai, a professor at jnu: "After Powell's statement in Islamabad on human rights and Kashmir being central to Indo-Pak relations, it would have been difficult for New Delhi to meet Musharraf, as it would have looked like being carried out at Washington's prompting. We should probably lie low at this point. Terrorism is not the only thing on the plate."

Bajpai feels New Delhi seems to have decided that being a 'model citizen' does not get it brownie points. In contrast, Pakistanis do the opposite and always secure brownie points. "Therefore," explains Bajpai, "the thinking that we can also play the game of being a bloody nuisance. The downside is that we come across as though we want to exploit the situation. Currently, the international community is not attuned to our concerns and we risk alienating the very people we want to have on our side strategically."

Before he leaves for Washington, say diplomats, Vajpayee ought to ponder that there is every reason for Pakistan to raise the alarm at India's bellicose posturing. This is mainly intended to drive a wedge between India and the US. It would allow Musharraf to project that he's besieged both internally (the jehadi forces) and externally (Afghanistan and India), and consequently deserves continued indulgence and assistance.

Indeed, the prime minister needs to make it clear that the Washington trip is not about Pakistan. Otherwise, it wouldn't be worth the effort. As one senior government official put it: "We should use the breathing space we have got by getting the political process moving in Kashmir where things are quiet." Quite.