Verbal Gestures

Listening to British foreign secretary Jack Straw in London last week, you might think that the Jaish-e-Mohammed's attack on the Srinagar assembly was politically suicidal. "An attack right at the heart of a democratic government, at the centre of the operation of democracy, a democratic assembly." Landmark words, to the extent words can be landmarks—the British have never before given the Srinagar assembly such recognition.

Did Straw say too much? Perhaps some mandarins at Whitehall thought so. He had spoken just after lunch with foreign minister Jaswant Singh as guest. Next day, in the House of Commons, Straw again condemned the attack, this time calling it an attack "at the heart of their democracy." Little surprise that the English language should lend itself so well to British diplomacy. That little twist stopped the Brits short of an endorsement of the Srinagar assembly, and left more room to accommodate Pakistan.

But Singh, after his parleys with Straw and prime minister Tony Blair, following from meetings with US president George Bush, secretary of state Colin Powell and earlier French president Jacques Chirac, was in no doubt that the leaders he met see Pakistan for what it is. Did they see Pakistan as a country that has itself been promoting terrorism? "Absolutely," Jaswant Singh told Outlook in London.

The Lashkar-e-Toiba and the Jaish-e-Mohammed will be targeted as terror groups operating under the Al Qaeda umbrella, Singh said. "And I was assured in no uncertain terms that the first list is not the end of the story." Singh was speaking of assurances he was given in Washington and also in London. He was emphatic that the US "will come forward with other lists. "At these meetings," he added in standard Jaswantese, "the matter of Afghanistan had come up not unnaturally."

There is little doubt that Jaswant Singh was told what he was told. But diplomats still raise the distinction between what the leaders say and what they do. The central question hasn't stopped doing the rounds. Are the renewed allies partnering Pakistan because it suits them while they sweet-talk India? Or are they really allying with India while using Pakistan for now?

The signs in London pointed last week towards cause for at least a little optimism. The strong stuff from Straw on the Srinagar assembly, although he qualified this later, was one. Blair's decision to include India in his tour after Pakistan was another factor, particularly because the country is not operationally necessary for the intended assault on Afghanistan. Blair spoke to Vajpayee last Wednesday morning before departing from protocol to meet Jaswant Singh.

On the other side, the protocol hardly appears pleasing for Pakistan. Beneath the quick dust of Blair's visit to Pakistan, Lord Charles Guthrie, former chief of defence in Britain, has been sent to Islamabad to talk to his old friend, Pervez Musharraf. Guthrie had visited Pakistan last year also, in tandem with then US assistant secretary of state, Karl Inderfurth, to persuade Musharraf to target Osama bin Laden. The Washington Post reported last week that Nawaz Sharif had agreed to send Pakistani commandos to kill bin Laden but Musharraf put a stop to that after he deposed Sharif. Guthrie couldn't persuade Musharraf last year. This time, he has with him a lot more of what diplomats call 'persuasive powers'.

The signposts in London point to elemental tactics rather than any subtle diplomacy. Pakistan is being shown the perennial carrot and stick. The plan's something every sub-inspector of Delhi Police is taught: to catch a thief, set a thief. The danger is that here, the thieves also get rewarded.