The Love Hate Triangle

Less than three and a half hours after President George Bush had called up Prime Minister Manmohan Singh to inform him formally of the US decision to give the F-16s to Pakistan, the state department organised an extensive background briefing in Washington. It was akin to conducting a tutorial. The briefing was held by three officers, referred to as senior administration official Number One, Two and Three respectively. Official Number One in his preliminary remarks said, "This year the administration made a judgement that the Next Steps in Strategic Partnership (NSSP), though very important, wasn't broad enough really...and so the President and the Secretary developed the outline for a decisively broader strategic relationship. Secretary Rice presented that outline last week to Prime Minister Singh. Its goal is to help India become a major world power in the 21st century. We understand fully the implications, including military implications, of that statement." Hours later, the state department's deputy spokesperson, Adam Ereli, confirmed on record, "I will say that India is fast becoming a major world power and our interest is in helping integrate that world power into the community...."

In many ways, these pronouncements were aimed at articulating Washington's new policy towards South Asia, and where India figured in it. No doubt, it was also aimed at appeasing New Delhi which had been expressing opposition to the sale of F-16s to Pakistan. But the outlining of the new policy wasn't just a case of hollow intent. There were also concrete offers: Washington was willing to work towards US-India co-production in the defence sector, and was willing to sell India not just the F-16s but also its next generation of multi-role combat aircraft, the F-18s; it was prepared to discuss defence transformation issues with India including command and control and early warning (pertaining to missile defence); and asked India to join in the proliferation security initiative (PSI) aimed at interdicting shipments of weapons of mass destruction and delivery systems through coordinated international action. There was also the promise of cooperation in the civilian nuclear energy sector.

Comparisons were, of course, quickly made between what Pakistan was to receive. These are still early days, but Bush's offer conveys an intent of anointing India as a regional ally. By contrast, the US decision to lavish financial assistance and the F-16s on Pakistan was aimed at goading it into good behaviour and move towards elections. Initially, though, the Indian government expressed disappointment over the F-16 sale to Pakistan. In fact, during secretary of state Condoleezza Rice's recent visit to India, New Delhi had told her that there were other ways of rewarding Pakistan (for joining the war of terror against Al Qaeda) than providing the F-16s.

Countering the perception that while Pakistan has got something tangible, India has got only promises, Timothy Hoyt, professor of strategy at the US Naval War College, said: "The critique implicitly puts the hyphen back into India and Pakistan. The US and India have been moving away from that kind of close linkage. Conceptual gains, in the long run, will be far more important for developing Indo-US relations than any immediate gift."

Questions still abound: is the US serious about assisting India to play a global role? Will the Bush administration push the promised package through the US Congress, spending the kind of political capital on India as it did for Pakistan when it protected Islamabad from punishment for the nuclear high crimes of Abdul Quadeer Khan? These questions assume importance because the US will have to contend with its own non-proliferation laws and rules of the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) before it can sell civilian nuclear technology to India.

US ambassador David Mulford was quick to counter the criticism that the US offer was vague. He described the Rice initiative as "serious and comprehensive. It is extremely unfair to dismiss it as an empty pipe dream, a throwaway wish list." He was combative on the MRCA (multi-role combat aircraft, the F-16s and F-18s ) saying that the US offer to India, in comparison to the bids from other countries, "would be significantly cheaper and significantly superior. It will be a pretty hard thing to turn down." He said the next 10 months would be a period of major accomplishment.

An Indian diplomat, however, cautions, "It takes a long time to nail things down with the US. It's not some simple transaction." The diplomat cited the NSSP example, claiming it began with a grandiose vision but culminated in a fairly modest project. And though the offer of co-production makes for banner headlines, the devil lies in the details. For instance, it will take a long time to work out what exactly can be co-produced; there are also many variables to counter. In other words, co-production can't happen overnight.

Again, Washington's intention to cooperate in civil nuclear energy will be tested at the time the US has to take a decision on whether or not to allow Russia and France to supply nuclear fuel to India. "Our immediate requirement is not reactors as much as nuclear fuel. If the US is serious, it can start off by allowing Russia and France to give us the fuel. Right now it is they who are tightening the screws on Russian President Vladimir Putin on this issue," says a diplomat. He points out that so far there are no signs that the US will bend the NSG guidelines or American law to give India nuclear assistance.

Yet, Washington's willingness to discuss cooperation in civilian nuclear energy underlines for India a crossing of the nuclear Rubicon. No wonder a diplomat remarked, "We now need the political will to use the opportunities. We shouldn't be mesmerised into inaction." Much will also depend on how the bureaucracy in the two countries take the process forward. For, as Mulford pointed out, "there will have to be negotiations on this. Research and negotiations. Within the US as well." Consequently, forward progress can get entangled in protracted negotiations between the United States and India.

These fears apart, South Asia analyst Stephen Cohen, of the Brookings Institution, gave the package for India an "A-" while characterising the F-16s for Pakistan as "more symbolic" than lethal. "It is a major breakthrough for three reasons: we are going to hold Pakistan to its commitment to democratise, it is the first time the state department has articulated a coordinated South Asia policy and third, India is being seen as a potential strategic partner," he said. "It is up to India to decide if they are willing to go down this road with us."

That India is willing to tango on the nuclear question was evident in a speech external affairs minister Natwar Singh delivered last week. He said, "As an energy-deficit nation, India has placed considerable importance on nuclear energy in its energy mix. We will continue on the path of indigenous development. The pace of this development can be accelerated with greater international cooperation in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy.... We have repeatedly said that every cooperation project in nuclear power would be open to international safeguards. However, such cooperation, today, remains hostage to restrictive denial regimes."

The feeling in New Delhi is that the F-16s to Pakistan isn't insurmountable militarily, unless the US enhances its technological capabilities. For instance, Washington can choose to fit the fighter with a software that could provide it Beyond Visual Range Capabilities.Much will also depend on the precise number of F-16s Pakistan will get, the details of which are still not known.

The F-16s, however, pose a political problem.It could strengthen the hardliners in Pakistan, instil in them a sense of bravado, and inspire them to flex their muscles. This could subsequently impact on the ongoing dialogue and peace process between India and Pakistan. Indeed, whenever the US has transferred arms to Pakistan, it has had an impact on Indo-Pak relations.

Some have expressed concern that the F-16s could trigger an arms race in the subcontinent. Others, however, dismiss this debate as spurious, pointing out that New Delhi's intention to acquire around 126 mcras has not been an overnight development subsequent to the F-16 announcement; it has been on the anvil for now nearly a year. Again, the aircraft Pakistan will get is already at the end of its life-cycle. In comparison, the offer to India is co-production of an aircraft (F-18) that is in the middle of its life-cycle. Also, the concept of co-production concedes the fundamental point that India's interest is to enhance technological self-reliance and ensure reliability of supply.

Ultimately, a lot would depend on the new configuration in the US national security council and the state department. "We couldn't have got a better combination—secretary Rice at the state department and Steve Hadley as the national security advisor," gushed a senior Indian diplomat. In addition, Philip Zelikow, who has directed the non-governmental Aspen Group strategic dialogue between India and the US, is now an advisor to Rice. "He is not an ideologue. He is a strategic thinker," said a former US official who was consulted on the package. Together, the team decided the existing framework of the NSSP announced in 2004 needed to be more "flexible" and expanded to carry more initiatives, he said. Significantly, it transpires that the three officials who had briefed the press in Washington were Zelikow, Michael Green, a senior director at the national security council, and Christina Rocca, the assistant secretary of state for South Asian affairs.

What has to also be factored in is the US Congress, whether or not it will stall last week's package to India. Peter Lavoy of the Naval Postgraduate School in California said the consensus in the Congress will develop because of the importance of this relationship for US interests. "We're not talking about gifts here; we're talking about mutually advantageous exchanges and actions, as exist with all of Washington's strongest security relationships."

But the Democrats on Capitol Hill are upset the Bush administration "broke its promise to consult the Congress" on the recent announcements. "They announced the package late Friday to deliberately avoid scrutiny, knowing people were away for the Easter weekend," said one congressional source. Calling the F-16 sale to Pakistan "a blunder," he added it would propel an arms race. Another diplomat thought that it is one thing to sell arms to a dictator of a proliferator country but it is quite another to pay for it as well. (From the economic packages of $900 per annum that Pakistan has been receiving for services rendered in the fight against terrorism. This would be supplemented by the military economic package.)

But even stranger is the fact that till the other day the US was describing Kashmir as one of the most dangerous places in the world, calling it a nuclear flashpoint. Today, the same country feels it is promoting stability and security by introducing nuclear-capable strike aircraft, which have no obvious role in America's fight against global terrorism. But then, historically, the triangle of the US, India and Pakistan has always had some disconcerting angles.

V. Sudarshan In Delhi And Seema Sirohi In Washington