The ImportanceOf Being Earnest

Groaning under mounting international pressure, and facing the grim prospect of India attacking the country's eastern flanks, Pakistan President Pervez Musharraf and his military advisors are burning the proverbial midnight oil to fashion anew the government's policy on religious fundamentalism, support to jehadi outfits and Kashmir. The broad parameters of the new policy were hammered out at a joint meeting of the federal cabinet and the National Security Council held in Islamabad last week under the helmsmanship of Gen Musharraf.

Pressured into disavowing terrorism in the presence of British prime minister Tony Blair, Musharraf and his team were, at the time of writing this report, busy finalising the text of the speech he is expected to deliver to the nation, unequivocally spelling out stringent measures the government plans to take to curb religious militancy. Those privy to high-level discussions say these contemplated steps include closing down of institutions responsible for fomenting extremism, ban on some prominent jehadi outfits, scrutiny of students in madrassas as well as their sources of funding.

These measures will consequently bring to an end the nearly two decades of nurture Pakistan had been providing to religious extremism. Says a senior military officer: "The general has recognised that only a military government can rid Pakistan of a very small minority of religious militants who have defaced this great country." In other words, what one military regime initiated—the policy of courting religious parties began under President Zia-ul-Haq—another now promises to bring to an end.

The crackdown on religious extremism does have the support of the middle classes and the intelligentsia who, even before the September 11 attacks on the World Trade Center, had expressed grave concerns about the growing 'Talibanisation' of Pakistani society. Incidents of sectarian conflict have been growing and militant outfits have been flouting the laws of the land with impunity.

Yet what has complicated the situation for the general is the impact the new policy will have on the Kashmir movement. Unable to ward off international pressure on putting a stop to sponsoring the jehad in Kashmir, Musharraf will be tested severely in reformulating the Kashmir policy in a way that eschews militancy without compromising the interests and aspirations of Kashmiris. This is precisely why some feel his speech could have some bold initiatives on Kashmir, hoping to rally world support for the movement there.

But a radical change in the Kashmir policy isn't going to be as simple as the general's U-turn on the Taliban was. For one, the domestic sentiment about Kashmir is such that no Pakistani ruler can afford to ignore it. Second, the change in itself is being brought about under duress. As political scientist Dr Hasan Askari Rizvi points out, "On the one side is the massive Indian military build-up and on the other is the pressure Britain and the US are mounting on Pakistan to change its Kashmir policy. They are winking at India not to relent on huge troop deployment. Under these circumstances, it would be a monumentally difficult decision for Musharraf to take, definitely far tougher than ditching the Taliban and joining the US-led coalition against terror."

So, what precisely could be the contours of Pakistan's new Kashmir policy? Unlike his open denunciation of both the ideology and the politics of the Taliban, most senior foreign officials feel Musharraf can't but continue to extend moral, political and diplomatic support to the Kashmiris and their movement. For one, these officials say, jehadi organisations will be asked to relocate to Azad Kashmir (Pak-occupied for Indians) or Occupied Kashmir. Pro-azadi groups, however, won't get military training and weapons and will also be required to purge all elements other than Kashmiris.Islamabad is already rife with speculation that Musharraf has ordered the ISI to cut off backing to Islamic militant (non-Kashmiri) groups fighting in the disputed territory.

The first sign of a shift in the Kashmir policy came in the government's decision to appoint former Azad Kashmir president Mohammad Abdul Qayyum Khan as head of the National Kashmir Committee. A known moderate who is opposed to a violent movement, Khan's task is to rally world opinion in favour of the Kashmir movement. This in itself is testimony to the government's intent to delink or downplay the element of militancy in its Kashmir policy.

Such changes will obviously scale down the intensity of the freedom movement in Kashmir—and enable the otherwise hardpressed Indian government to breathe a little easier in the Valley. This could also enable New Delhi to split the Hurriyat, marginalise the hardliners and broker a deal with the moderates. But a senior military official says Islamabad's hands are tied. Argues he: "Gen Musharraf genuinely feels that lowering the level of freedom movement is not too high a price to pay for protecting the country against attacks by India, whose conventional forces far outnumber Pakistan's."

But what most Pakistanis find appalling is the way the US and UK have been pressuring Musharraf into curbing terrorism in Kashmir without trying to address its root cause—namely, the alienation of Kashmiris and their desire for an independent homeland. Leading political analyst Nasim Zehra, for instance, is horrified that the US, UK and India have usurped the role of monitoring whether or not Pakistan is sincere in its crackdown on terrorist outfits. "All government moves are being carried out under US dictation," she says.

Zehra says the military regime shouldn't capitulate on Kashmir, saying that Pakistan has a solid, well-substantiated and UN-supported case. Nor should Islamabad, says she, give in to India's might. "No foreign advice, nor the Indian military build-up on the borders should dissuade Pakistan from effectively presenting its case on Kashmir—privately, publicly, diplomatically and politically. A non-substantive dialogue often benefits the militarily more powerful and those seeking perpetuation of the status quo," she says.

Zehra's views, in many ways, articulate the problem Musharraf faces: how to curb religious extremism without in any way compromising on the Kashmir issue. Shocked at the way the foreign powers have endorsed India's bullying tactics, leading strategic thinker Dr Shireen Mazari too thinks Pakistan needs to keep the real issue of conflict—Kashmir—centrestage. Says she: "Pakistan must keep reminding the international community that it is the issue of self-determination of the Kashmiri people and the struggle against India's occupation of Kashmir that are the source of instability in the region. In many ways, the diplomatic ante on Kashmir needs to be raised and the indigenous nature of the Kashmiri struggle needs to come to the fore once again. For the latter to happen, there is a need for Kashmiri freedom-fighters to overtly come under the formal control of the Hurriyat's political leadership. The external forces that have damaged the indigenous struggle of the Kashmiris need to be isolated."

Dr Mazari also thinks that India's military build-up and the intent behind it will affect not only Pakistan but also other states of the region. "That is why those who seek stability and peace in the region need to assert more forcefully their concern over India's aggressive intent. Otherwise there could be a domino effect. Dialogue with Pakistan on Kashmir is viable before Indian military aggression—otherwise the whole context of the dispute and the strategic parameters of the region will alter, thus compelling Pakistan into responding in kind."

No wonder most Pakistani intellectuals feel Musharraf's Kashmir test is more severe than what he underwent during the weeks post-September 11. Jehadis he must curb, madrassas he must monitor, but what he can't do is to be seen to have lost out on the Kashmir issue.

This apart, the Musharraf government also has to decide on its response to the Indian demand for handing over 20 alleged terrorists to New Delhi. Confusion persists due to contradictory statements emanating from Islamabad. As one leader of a jehadi organisation points out: "Although President Pervez Musharraf has said that no Pakistani citizens named in the list of wanted people will be handed over to India, foreign minister Abdul Sattar has said Pakistan will consider handing over the wanted criminals to India if proof was provided against them. That is why fears of surreptitious extraditions still lurk, especially considering Pakistan's past record."

Adds another jehadi leader: "Pakistan's claims that no Pakistani national would be handed over are not reliable. The ongoing crackdown to arrest jehadi leaders and keeping them without formal institution of cases against them suggests Pakistan's willingness to avoid war by fulfilling Indian demands." But Musharraf has snubbed those who claim that the arrests are being carried out under foreign pressure. He says Pakistan will try the accused under the law of the land only if India provides solid proof against them.

Some in official circles also feel that Musharraf can't possibly hand over any of those mentioned in India's list of the most wanted. Says a senior government official: "If we hand over 20 people today, tomorrow they'll ask for 30 and keep demanding for more, which is not acceptable to us. President Bush and Prime Minister Tony Blair had been informed that Pakistan has taken enough measures, now India should be told to reciprocate and pull back its troops to peace-time positions."

In the absence of any extradition treaty between India and Pakistan, experts say Islamabad is not legally bound to extradite any accused or criminal to India. "Only the SAARC Convention on Terrorism provides some ground for Pakistan to consider extradition, that too only when incontrovertible proof is provided." An official of the Punjab home department rules out any immediate extradition of Masood Azhar. "Chances are he'll be tried in Pakistan. He was taken into protective custody to prevent him from creating further problems for the government post-September 11."

This official says that many jehadi groups, including the Jaish-e-Mohammad, failed to take any pre-emptive measures to ensure that the government didn't have to crack down on them. Their rhetoric remained shrill and strident, refusing to recognise the perilous situation the Pakistan government had been trapped in post-September 11. The official says the Lashkar did replace its chief Prof Hafiz Saeed with Maulana Abdul Wahid, a Kashmiri. But even this face-saver came too late. In other words, those who didn't cooperate with Musharraf can now scarcely expect him to show mercy.