Between July, 2005, when India and the US agreed in principle on civiliannuclear co-operation, and June, 2006, Beijing's reaction was unmistakablyunenthusiastic. It sought to justify its lack of enthusiasm on the ground thatsuch a special waiver to India, when it has not signed the NuclearNon-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) and not given up its military nuclear ambitions,could weaken the global non-proliferation architecture.
While Chinese government spokespersons avoided outspoken comments on theIndia-US deal while making obvious their lack of enthusiasm for it, the government-controlledmedia in China observed no such restraint. For example, the People's Dailywrote on November 4, 2005:
"This would be a hard blow on America's leading role in the global proliferation prevention system as well as the system itself. This will bring about a series of negative impacts. Now that the United States buys another country in with nuclear technologies in defiance of international treaty, other nuclear suppliers also have their own partners of interest as well as good reasons to copy what the United States did. A domino effect of nuclear proliferation, once turned into reality, will definitely lead to global nuclear proliferation and competition. Always calling itself a 'guard' for nuclear proliferation prevention, the US often condemns other countries for irresponsible transfers but this time, it hesitates not a bit in revising laws, taking the lead in 'making an exception' (in the case of India). Such an act of the United States once again proves that America is not at all a 'guard' of NPT and the treaty, however, is no more than a disguise serving the US interest. The most immediate reason for the foundation of NSG (Nuclear Suppliers Group) was India's first nuclear test in 1974, after which the United States instantly cut off its nuclear cooperation with India and established the NSG in 1975 to restrict selling sensitive nuclear technologies and raw materials to non-NPT countries. Over the past 30 years, the United States has always been trying to prevent India from access to nuclear technologies. Today, however, the United States wants a change."
The editorial came in the wake of a meeting of the Nuclear Suppliers' Group (NSG)on October 20, 2005, at which a US representative briefed the NSG members on theIndo-US deal and spoke of the US intention to move for the lifting of the NSGrestrictions against India after the passage of the enabling legislation by theUS Congress and the finalisation of a formal bilateral agreement (the 123Agreement now signed) by India and the US.
The lack of enthusiasm for the Indo-US nuclear deal was again evident at thetime of the visit of President George Bush to India in the first week of March,2006. In the daily media briefing of the Chinese Foreign Office at Beijingon March 2, 2006, its spokesperson Qin Gang said:
"India should abandon nuclear weapons and strengthen atomic safeguards. India should sign the NPT and also dismantle its nuclear weapons. As a signatory country, China hopes non-signatory countries will join it as soon as possible as non-nuclear weapon states, thereby contributing to strengthening the international non-proliferation regime. China hopes that concerned countries developing cooperation in peaceful nuclear uses will pay attention to these efforts. The cooperation should conform with the rules of international non-proliferation mechanisms."
This negative attitude was in a great measure caused by the Chinese suspicionthat the Indo-US nuclear deal was the US' quid pro quo for an Indian willingnessto co-operate with the US in countering the growing Chinese power in the Asianregion. This suspicion was strengthened when our Prime Minister, Dr ManmohanSingh, decided not to attend the summit meeting of the Shanghai Co-operationOrganisation (SCO) as an observer at Shanghai in June, 2006. The Indianexplanation that since India was only an observer of the SCO and not afull-fledged member, its participation at the level of the head of governmentwas not warranted did not seem convincing to Beijing. The Prime Minister'sdecision not to go was interpreted as due to the US suspicion that one of themain objectives of the SCO was to counter the US presence and role in theCentral Asian Republics. As a result, China's lack of enthusiasm for the Indo-USnuclear deal continued.
In the meanwhile, President Pervez Musharraf of Pakistan initiated a campaignto counter the Indo-US deal at two levels. He did not oppose the deal. Nor didPakistan energetically try to have the deal disapproved by the US Congressthrough Congressmen and Senators sympathetic to it. Instead, it sought tocounter the deal by using the following arguments. First, it will bediscriminatory to Pakistan if it was not made applicable to it too. Second, itwill create a military nuclear asymmetry in the sub-continent by enabling Indiato divert its domestic stock of fuel for military purposes, while using theimported fuel for civilian purposes under international safeguards. Thus, itwill have an adverse effect on Pakistan's national security.
The US rejected the Pakistani arguments by pointing out that Pakistan'seconomy was unlikely to grow as rapidly as the Indian economy in the short andmedium terms and hence it should be possible to meet its energy requirementsfrom conventional sources. The US also repeatedly made it clear that in view ofthe role of Dr A. Q. Khan, the so-called father of Pakistan's atomic bomb, andsome of his colleagues in clandestinely supplying nuclear technology to Iran,North Korea and Libya, Pakistan cannot be treated on par with India, which hadan unimpeachable record of non-proliferation.
While sticking to his arguments, Musharraf requested the Chinese leadersduring his State visit to China in February, 2006, for Chinese assistance in theconstruction of six more nuclear power stations, with a capacity of 600 or 900MWS each. The Chinese reportedly agreed in principle to supply two stations of300 MWs each to be followed later by four more. This subject again figured inthe General's bilateral discussions with Mr Hu in the margins of the SCO summitin June, 2006, and in the subsequent discussions between the officials of thetwo countries, who met at Islamabad and Beijing for doing the preparatory workfor Chinese President Hu Jintao's visit to Pakistan from November 23to 26.
Gen Musharraf and his officials were so confident that an agreement inprinciple for the construction of two new nuclear power stations (Chashma IIIand IV ) would be initialed during Mr Hu's visit that they even set up a siteselection task force.
Then for reasons, which were not clear, there were indications ofchanges in the Chinese attitude---less negative towards the Indo-US nuclear dealand increasingly guarded on the Pakistani request for new nuclear powerstations. In the case of India, the changing Chinese attitude was reflected inthe daily media briefing of the Foreign Office spokesperson and in a mediainterview given by the Chinese Ambassador in New Delhi. In the case of Pakistan,the change was reflected in the daily media briefings of the spokespersons ofthe two Foreign Offices at Beijing and Islamabad.
In an interview to the Press Trust of India (PTI), which wascirculated by the agency on November 20, 2006, before the arrival of Mr Hu inNew Delhi, Mr Sun Yuxi, the Chinese Ambassador in New Delhi, was reported tohave stated as follows:
``Every country has the right to develop energy in any form, including nuclear form, to meet its development needs. The objectives of non-proliferation should also be maintained and strengthened." When it was pointed out by the agency that India had contended that it abided by all non-proliferation rules although it had not signed the NPT, he said: ``Anything which can strengthen non-proliferation efforts should be welcomed by the international community.'' He added that Foreign Secretary Shivshankar Menon had recently apprised him about the issue and told him that India was trying to strengthen the non-proliferation regime. "I (would) like to take his word... If India is making effort, if any effort (is being made) to strengthen non-proliferation, I agree,'' he said. The Chinese envoy, however, refused to comment on the Indo-U.S. civil nuclear deal on the ground that it was a bilateral issue between India and the US.
A few hours later, in response to a question on the subject, Jiang Yu,spokesperson of the Chinese Foreign Ministry, said at Beijing:
"China has sought more information and explanations from India to address the concerns of some countries on the Indo-US civilian nuclear deal. We hope that Indian side can attach importance to these opinions and provide more information and explanations. Chinese side has noted that during the deliberations in the NSG regarding US-India nuclear cooperation, some countries expressed concern and doubts. The Chinese side will continue to participate in these relevant discussions with an earnest and responsible attitude."
Almost coinciding with these explanations at New Delhi and Beijing, thespokespersons of the Foreign Ministries of Pakistan and China tried todiscourage expectations in Pakistan that Gen Musharraf and Mr Hu would beinitialling a memorandum of understanding on the Chinese supply of two morenuclear power stations. They described the reports in this regard, which hadbeen appearing in the Pakistani media for weeks before Mr Hu's visit, asspeculative and not based on facts.
The Joint Declaration issued on November 21, 2006, at the end of the formaltalks between Dr Manmohan Singh and Mr Hu said:
"Energy security constitutes a vital and strategic issue for producing and consuming countries alike. It is consistent with the common interest of the two sides to establish an international energy order, which is fair, equitable, secure and stable, and to the benefit of the entire international community. Both sides shall also make joint efforts, bilaterally as well as in multilateral fora, to diversify the global energy mix and to increase the share in it of renewable energy sources. Global energy systems should take into account and meet the energy needs of both countries, as part and parcel of a stable, predictable, secure and clean energy future. In this context, international civilian nuclear cooperation should be advanced through innovative and forward-looking approaches, while safeguarding the effectiveness of international non-proliferation principles. Both countries are committed to non-proliferation objectives and agree to expand their dialogue on the related issues, in bilateral and international fora."
The reference to promotion of international civilian nuclear co-operationthrough "innovative and forward-looking approaches" was interpreted,with some validity, as confirming the evolution of the Chinese view on theIndo-US deal from negative to hopefully positive. As a result, there was agreater confidence in New Delhi that China might not oppose the removal ofrestrictions applicable to India when the matter formally came up before the NSGat the initiative of the US. This guarded optimism was also evident from aninterview given by Shri Pranab Mukherjee, the Indian Minister For ExternalAffairs, to Shri Karan Thapar of the IBN-CNN TV channel on November 26. Therelevant extract is annexed.
Dr Manmohan Singh and Mr Hu had formal talks hardly for a little more than anhour. The carefully-formulated position on the nuclear issue could not have beenthe outcome of such a brief meeting. The final version of the Joint Declarationwas already ready before the two leaders formally met and approved it. It hadbeen drafted by the officials of the two countries in their preparatory meetingsin the weeks before Mr Hu's arrival. The change in the Chinese position musthave been the outcome of these discussions in the weeks before Mr Hu's visit andnot a sudden change on the eve of the summit or at the summit itself.
As against this, the change in the Chinese position with regard to Pakistan'srequest for six more nuclear power stations came about suddenly in the days (notweeks) before Mr Hu's arrival in Islamabad. Well-informed Pakistanisources attributed the more guarded Chinese position to the bilateraldiscussions between President George Bush and Mr Hu at Hanoi in the margins ofthe summit of the Asia Pacific Economic Co-operation (APEC) Organisation onNovember 18 and 19, 2006. The speculation was that during these bilateraldiscussions, Mr Bush pointed out to Mr Hu that the Chinese supply of new nuclearpower stations to Pakistan could not be projected as a continuation of theChinese assistance to Pakistan under a 1985 bilateral co-operation treaty underwhich CHASHMA I and CHASHMA II were given and hence would need the clearance ofthe NSG. According to this speculation, Mr Bush was also reported to havereferred to the Pakistani rejection of repeated requests from the InternationalAtomic Energy Agency (IAEA) to hand over Dr A. Q. Khan for an independentinterrogation and pointed out that the Chinese supply of the new power stationscould encourage Pakistan's non-cooperation with the IAEA.
It was believed by these sources that Beijing, which has been projectingitself as a responsible and co-operative interlocutor of the US, Japan and SouthKorea on the question of North Korea's nuclear test and has won praise forits role in bringing North Korea back to the negotiating table, did not wantthis positive image to be dented by disregarding the reservations of Mr Bushrelating to the supply of new power stations to Pakistan. It, therefore, changedits stance at the last minute.
There was no substantive reference to the co-operation between China andPakistan in the field of civilian nuclear energy during Mr Hu's visit toPakistan. The joint statement issued on November 25, 2006, by GenMusharraf and Mr Hu said: "The two sides also agreed to strengthen cooperationin the energy sector, including fossil fuels, coal, hydro-power, nuclear power,renewable sources of energy as well as in the mining and resources sector."Addressing a press conference after his talks with Gen Musharraf, Mr Hu said inreply to a question on nuclear co-operation: "Cooperation in the energysector is an important component in the relationship between the two countries.We reached a common understanding on strengthening energy cooperation. We wouldcontinue this cooperation in future as well." While Mr Hu himself did notrefer to any future supply of new nuclear power stations, some Pakistanianalysts interpreted Mr Hu's remarks as indicating a willingness to supplymore nuclear power stations.
Pakistani officials and analysts close to the government tried to give theimpression that the fact that no memorandum of understanding was signed did notmean that the Chinese were not going ahead with the project. But, the ChineseForeign Office spokesperson was very clear on this point during a media briefingon November 20, 2006, at Beijing. He said: "As far as I know, therewill be no new arrangement in this area."
Interestingly, in reply to a question on this subject, Mr Sean McCormack, aspokesperson of the US State Department, said in Washington as follows onNovember 27, 2006:
"The US welcomes strong ties between China and Pakistan and urges China to play a constructive role in world affairs. We encourage development of bilateral relations between Pakistan and its neighbours. China and Pakistan have a long history of relations. As for any sort of nuclear angle on this, I’m not aware of anything new that was announced or is allowed for by these agreements other than what was already grandfathered in by the Nuclear Suppliers Group. So I don’t think there’s anything new on that front."
What he apparently meant was that in addition to the Chashma I and Chashma IIpower stations given by China under an old agreement of 1985 for civiliannuclear co-operation between China and Pakistan, there would be nothing new for the present till approved by the NSG.
What was significant was that China paid attention to the US reservations onthis subject instead of going ahead with its assistance as it did in the past inmatters such as the supply of M-9 and M-11 missiles and nuclear equipment toPakistan. This new attention to US reservations is what the Americans welcomedas China's constructive role.
There was no reference to China's possible assistance to Pakistan for theconstruction of Chashma IV and V for nearly seven months ---either from thePakistani side or from the Chinese side. On July 18, 2007, there was asurprising reference to it in a Chinese statement on the Pakistani commandoaction in the Lal Masjid. This caused anger against the Chinese, who weresuspected to have forced Musharraf to order the commando action after thekidnapping of six Chinese women by some students of the girls' madrasaattached to the Masjid. The China Daily reported as follows on July 18,2007:
"China did not push Pakistan for operations against the Red Mosque, Chinese Ambassador to Pakistan Luo Zhaohui said. It is the consistent policy of China not to meddle in the domestic affairs of other countries, he told The News, a major Pakistani daily. Luo said he was considering an invitation to visit the mosque but it was made impossible due to the unstable security situation. "We enjoy very cordial relations with the ruling party here and likewise we maintain friendly ties with other segments of the society including the political parties of the opposition," he said. "I had no knowledge as to why Chinese nationals are being targeted and were the victims in five recent incidents", Luo said, referring to several Chinese who were killed in that country. He said if Chinese continued to be targeted, cooperation between the two countries could suffer. To protect the 3,000 Chinese working in Pakistan, China and Pakistan have decided to set up a Joint Task Force (JTF), the Ambassador revealed. China and Pakistan are still close friends and neighbors, Luo said. The Chinese government is in discussions about proposed Chashma-III and IV for nuclear power projects. Chashma-II will be completed early next year, he said."
Apparently concerned over the anti-Chinese turn in some sections of publicopinion in the tribal areas, the Chinese once again started talking of possibleChinese assistance for the construction of Chashma III and IV in order toreassure Pakistani public opinion that China would continue to be a steadfastfriend of Pakistan.
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