Talk The Talk, Walk The Walk

Putin was equally forthright. "Mr Prime Minister," he said, "you know our attitude towards terrorism in general and, in particular, towards terrorism in Kashmir. I would like you to have no doubt that in fighting terrorism, in any case, we would be on your side, whatever is the event. And I wanted you to hear this from me..." Two days later, Russian foreign minister Igor Ivanov rang up external affairs minister Jaswant Singh to say that the actions India had demanded of Pakistan, for the prohibition and punishment of terrorists, were justified.

Post-December 13, it isn’t just Russia, a tested ally, that has taken such a stand. Canadian foreign minister John Manley spoke to Jaswant Singh on December 23, after his return from Kabul where he had gone to attend the swearing-in of the interim government in Afghanistan. The fact that it was a Sunday didn’t deter Manley from working the phone, nor did he dither in expressing support to India.

Manley told Jaswant, "You should be assured of the efforts that a number of us are making to get your neighbour to act... We are insisting to Pakistan that they take necessary action against the Jaish-e-Mohammed (JeM) and the Lashkar-e-Toiba (LeT), and also track down those who support or participate in the kind of activities that we all need to fear. We've made efforts in recent months to bring Pakistan into the mainstream of the international community. And we have clearly delivered the message, especially in the last week, that Pakistan must act in keeping with the responsibility that comes in being in the mainstream."

It does seem India's response to the attack on Parliament, its threat of retaliatory strikes against Pakistan, and the massing of troops on the border made the US and its allies nervous. For they didn't want India to take precipitious action on Pakistan's eastern flank, compelling it into redeploying troops on its western border with Afghanistan and consequently undermining the hunt for Osama bin Laden and the Taliban.

India recognised that the emerging situation post-September 11 was to its advantage. For one, the international community, shocked at the WTC attacks, could now be persuaded about the gravity of New Delhi's complaints against Islamabad's brazen sponsorship of terrorism in the Valley. But, obviously, this change couldn't be brought about until the international community, more particularly the US, was made to realise that it too had a stake in pressuring Pakistan to not use terror as an instrument of state policy. In other words, Pakistan wouldn't grasp the seriousness of the situation unless it was threatened with war; and Washington wouldn't pressure the country unless it believed that war in the subcontinent could thwart its goal of hunting down bin Laden. The massing of troops on the border sent precisely this signal.

No wonder that US secretary of state Colin Powell told Jaswant on December 23 itself that not only had President George W. Bush called upon Pakistan President Pervez Musharraf to take "decisive action against LeT and JeM and other terrorist organisations, their leaders, their finances and their activities, but that the US and the UK had jointly made a very strong demarche to Pakistan to take immediate steps against LeT and JeM and against other terrorist groups that might be operating out of Pakistan".

It was obvious Powell didn't want India to act in haste, that he wanted to persuade New Delhi about Musharraf's intent to curb terrorist organisations in Pakistan. As proof, Powell mentioned that JeM leader Masood Azhar had been incarcerated by Pakistani authorities. Jaswant told Powell that his perception of the so-called arrest was different, that in fact there had been no such arrest. This was his way of cautioning Powell against taking Islamabad at face value. Taken aback, Powell promised to check back with Musharraf.

The US secretary of state then asked Musharraf for clarification. The latter admitted that the person arrested was not Masood Azhar but his brother. This in itself was strange, considering that Azhar's identity is public knowledge. Powell then dialled Jaswant to say that he had been correct in his allegation against Islamabad.

Indeed, New Delhi had made a telling point about Islamabad's duplicity. Finally, India's diplomatic manoeuvrings were also starting to yield dividends.

No wonder that Jaswant pushed the envelope even more when British Prime Minister Tony Blair arrived on his trouble-shooting mission in New Delhi last week. He told Blair that the way Pakistan was harping on India having engineered the Parliament attack only amounted to trivialising the issue. "There cannot be either active or passive support for terror," Jaswant told Blair, citing the provisions of UN Security Council (UNSC) Resolution 1373 and pointing to Pakistan's steadfast unwillingness to jettison cross-border terrorism as an instrument of state policy.

Blair was also told bluntly that Pakistan cannot 'morally' or 'diplomatically' support terror.This was an attack on Pakistan's stance that it only provided diplomatic and moral support to the Kashmiris, as opposed to that of a military nature. Expressing dissatisfaction at the steps Islamabad has taken, Jaswant told Blair that the international pressure on it just wasn't enough.

The external affairs minister had indeed done his homework well. In mentioning the UNSC Resolution No. 1373—passed a fortnight after the September 11 attacks—Singh was subtly pointing to the hypocrisy of the West. And it must have stung Blair, for it is his country which heads the committee responsible for monitoring the implementation of the resolution.

The mention of the UNSC resolution only bolstered India's case. For, it requires nations to "freeze without delay funds and other financial assets or economic resources of persons who commit, or attempt to commit, terrorist acts or participate in or facilitate the commission of terrorist acts". It also asks nations to "refrain from providing any form of support, active or passive, to entities or persons involved in terrorist acts, including by suppressing recruitment of members of terrorist groups".

It was a defining moment in diplomacy. Blair was quick to grasp the point, declaring, "Your position is reasonable. I am acutely aware of the ambivalence in the Pakistani position. Half measures can't work." It was now the British prime minister's turn to work the phone, calling up Bush in Washington to fashion the strategy Blair should adopt on his visit to Pakistan.

Results were quick to come. Bush, Powell and Blair publicly took uncompromising positions, giving Pakistan little room for equivocation. For instance, after meeting L.K. Advani in Washington, Powell declared, "I think there's room for additional work on Musharraf's part. We are looking forward to the speech he will be giving later this week, which I think will be a powerful signal to his nation and to India and the rest of the world. But it's not just the speech. We will be looking to see what additional action he has taken."

India expects Musharraf to

• abjure publicly support for all kinds of terrorist groups and terrorist activities in Pakistan and Pakistan-held territory against India, including Jammu and Kashmir;
  
  
• ban organisations already responsible for such activities in Jammu and Kashmir and which have been operating in Pakistan;
  
  
• take action against those individuals and fugitives already identified as having committed acts of terrorism against India.