When a convoy of 18 trucks from China swept down the Kodari highway to Kathmandu, under a heavy escort of the Royal Nepal Army (RNA), the political class here began speculating on the consignment which had arrived in the night of November 22-23. But the cloak of secrecy was lifted the following day as RNA spokesperson Brig Deepak Gurung confirmed, "We have procured some non-lethal weapons." He refused to provide specific details but it is believed that the cargo from China included 4.2 million rounds of 7.62 mm rifle ammunition, 80,000 high-explosive grenades and 12,000 AK rifles.
The news about the arrival of 18 trucks in Kathmandu brought back to memory the crisis of 1987. Then, too, Nepal had procured arms from China, provoking India to retaliate through an economic blockade of the land-locked country. The ensuing economic hardship had triggered unprecedented anti-royalty sentiments. Glossing over the lessons of history, and cocking a snook at New Delhi, King Gyanendra has signalled, through the purchase of arms from China, that he isn't as yet going to relent to pro-democracy forces, which have been arguing against resumption of arms supplies to the RNA until the king unequivocally restores democracy.
For long, Gyanendra has been threatening to play the China card. The February 1 royal coup had goaded India into suspending arms supply to the RNA. Restore democracy first, New Delhi had demanded as a precondition. In subsequent official meetings, the king's government laboured the point: would India want the RNA to run out of ammunition and lose the battle to 'terrorists' (read Maoist insurgents)? Simultaneously, officials began to harp on the need to develop alternative sources of arms should India, and the international community at large, continue to starve the RNA of fresh supplies. They claimed that the situation in Nepal was perilous, pointing to American assessments that Kathmandu could fall to the Maoists in case the king and the 'constitutional' forces did not align.
Nepal's decision to procure arms from China was reportedly deferred till the last moment. Back in April, King Gyanendra had been able to secure a commitment from Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh during their meeting in Jakarta that New Delhi would supply the 'arms in the pipeline'. But the king's decision to prematurely go public about Manmohan's commitment prompted the Left to oppose the move. Since then, the situation only worsened for him. Only last month, President George Bush signed a total arms embargo on Nepal. Prominent Senator Patrick Leahy even went to the extent of appealing to the RNA to defy the king should he deploy the army against the democratic movement. Bush's position echoed the sentiments of other western powers, including the European Union, leaving the embattled king with just a handful of countries to whom he could turn for bolstering the morale of the RNA and retaining its fealty.
The king's decision to purchase arms from China has a wider canvas. Weeks before the 18 trucks from China arrived in Kathmandu, Gyanendra had signalled his intention to align with Beijing during the SAARC summit at Dhaka. Then he had led the initiative to accord China an 'observer' status in the SAARC, and linked his idea to the issue of accommodating Afghanistan in the South Asian grouping. The SAARC, however, decided to evolve a set of criteria for granting observer status to other countries, effectively postponing the issue.
Yet, analysts here feel China's entry into SAARC even as an observer could make it a legitimate rival to India in South Asia, where the dominance of New Delhi is nonpareil. Against this backdrop, Nepal's move isn't just a case of a desperate king pulling out all stops for his survival; it's more about an ambitious king playing off China against India; of threatening to provide Beijing a toehold in the Himalayan kingdom should New Delhi not relent to his demands; of attempting to whittle down India's clout in its very neighbourhood.
Gyanendra's China card could provoke India to retaliate a la 1987. Nepal enjoys crucial economic privileges from India. For instance, the Bilateral Trade Treaty, due for revision in 2007, allows duty-free, quota-free access to Nepali goods on a non-reciprocal basis. India accounts for nearly 65 per cent of Nepal's exports. A revision of the treaty to the detriment of Nepal could weaken its economy—and engender anti-king sentiments. Hundreds of Nepalis flock to India for jobs. It's debatable whether China can extend such privileges to Nepal.
India hasn't yet officially commented on the arms purchase. In Dhaka last month, though, Manmohan Singh had conveyed to the king that India would resume arms supply only to a democratic regime. New Delhi is bound to perceive the recent arms purchase as inimical to its interests. Others like the US and the European Union have voiced their resentment. They had, in the past, advised China not to provide military support as it would make Nepal politically unstable and strengthen an authoritarian regime.