Perfect Cemetery?

sually, a peace deal anywhere aims to unite society, heal festering wounds and really speaking insulate the future from a bloody present. In Pakistan, though, the deal between the Tehrik Nifaz Shariat-e-Mohammedi (TNSM) and the government has driven a wedge between the liberals and conservatives, the Urdu and English media, the rulers and their people. Worse, the deal threatens to provide an opportunity for the militants to regroup and become a bigger menace to the Pakistan of the future.

Ironically, what unites these contending sections in Pakistan is the belief that the deal, signed between the TNSM and the NWFP government, marks the defeat of the State in the picturesque valley of Swat in Malakand division. Unable to vanquish the Taliban—to which the TNSM is closely linked—the State has bought peace through the Swat deal that allows the implementation of Shariat in return for the militants terminating their attacks on security forces. This guarantee from militants has been underwritten by TNSM chief Sufi Mohammed, who espouses pro-Taliban views.

Imtiaz Alam, secretary-general of the South Asian Free Media Association, says the deal is part of the Taliban's strategic gameplan to push its advance countrywide. "As in the past," he explains, "the Taliban will use this ceasefire to regroup, rearm and consolidate its position in territories under its control, even as it works to extend its influence in contiguous territories. Earlier too, such peace deals had only helped the Taliban-Al Qaeda forces to secure safe havens and expand the sphere of their jehad."

There are already worrying signs for the future. Days after the Swat deal was signed, three major Taliban groups formed a new alliance—the Shura Ittihadul Mujahideen (Council for Unity of Holy Warriors)—in the twin tribal agencies of North and South Waziristan. They declared the fugitive ameer of the Afghan Taliban, Mullah Mohammed Omar, as their supreme leader and Al Qaeda chief Osama bin Laden as their role model. The leaders of the three groups—Baitullah Mehsud, Maulvi Nazir and Hafiz Gul Bahadur—reportedly met in secret and decided to resolve their differences to foil the crafty designs of the external forces to divide the multiple Taliban groups operating in Pakistan.

The Taliban announcement heralding unity ought to interest Indians. It said, "As Jews, Christians and Hindu infidels stand united against Muslims under the leadership of the United States, the mujahideen have set aside internal differences and joined hands." The following day, on February 23, Mullah Omar reportedly wrote to the three leaders admonishing them for targeting Pakistani security forces and killing their Muslim brethren. "If anybody really wants to wage jehad, he must fight the occupation forces inside Afghanistan," the letter stated. "Our aim is to liberate Afghanistan from the occupation forces, and death and destruction inside neighbouring Pakistan have never been our goal."

The Swat deal suits not only Pakistan, says senior defence analyst Dr Ayesha Siddiqa, but also the US and NATO. As she told Outlook, "It's argued that the reason why US secretary of state Hillary Clinton was not eager to denounce the deal was that this was considered a way of dividing Al Qaeda-controlled Taliban and the Swat Taliban. However, the bottomline is that while the conflict might be arrested for the short term in one part of the country, it might escalate in other parts where groups of people acting like the Taliban could impose their will on the rest of the population—in the name of changing the judicial, economic or political system. Ultimately, this could even redefine Pakistan's identity completely."

he Swat deal is a threat to Pakistan's very identity, the progressives insist, because it institutionalises a framework of Islamic laws and empowers religious authorities (qazis) to hear cases in Malakand division. The government, however, justifies the deal arguing that the new judicial system had been a popular demand for years and seeks to provide speedy justice to the people of Malakand.

Not true, contend the critics, pointing out that the masses in the 2008 election had voted for secular, liberal parties. Indeed, both the Awami National Party and the Pakistan People's Party, promising to fight extremism, had together won more seats than the six-party religious alliance—the Muttahida Majlis-e-Amal—and subsequently formed an alliance to rule the NWFP. The deal, critics also say, legitimises the politics of Sufi Mohammed, who had taken 10,000 people from Swat to help the Taliban fight the United States in Afghanistan post-9/11. Many of his fighters perished there and Sufi was imprisoned on his return. Again, Sufi's son-in-law Maulana Fazlullah (Radio Mullah) runs a private militia which wreaked havoc on Swat in recent years, compelling thousands to flee the area. By providing amnesty to Fazlullah and his men, as the deal does, militant groups are likely to use terror to blackmail the state into submission elsewhere also.

This struggle for identity also finds an echo in the sharp division between the Urdu and English media. The Urdu press has largely applauded the Swat deal and has declared it as the government's wisest decision. The editorial of a leading Urdu daily, the Nawa-i-Waqt, said, "It's quite a timely decision and a sensible one at that too. The war that had erupted in Swat was a proxy war that Pakistan was fighting on America's behalf." Another Urdu paper, the Daily Pakistan, endorsed the view. "Finally," its editorial read, "the Pakistani government has taken a decision that directly and positively affects the population of Pakistan while ignoring the enormous pressure from US. This government has shown the guts to go with the national interest and ignore it if it upsets America. Bravo."

In contrast, the English media, both print and electronic, has castigated the Swat deal, describing it as a consequence of Islamabad's duplicity and desperation. The News, for instance, pitilessly detailed what President Asif Ali Zardari had said days before the Swat deal was signed. Zardari had reiterated, the newspaper noted, his government's resolve to uproot terrorists. "We are fighting for the survival of Pakistan," the daily quoted Zardari as saying. But then he did a somersault in Beijing where he told journalists that the fight against terrorism couldn't be won with guns and bombs alone. The News concluded, "The peace deal will produce not more than a brief lull before a rising storm, even as Islamabad's manifest weakness is exploited in new theatres across the country, creating expanding spaces for extreme violence."

English daily Dawn voiced similar concerns when it noted that the Swat deal would see militants raise fresh demands and impose new conditions for peace that the state would then find difficult to accept. Topping the list of new demands would be withdrawal of all troops from Swat and the release of all militants in state custody, the paper predicted. The editorial asked the state to remain firm, saying that "legitimate demands for a better justice system should be met but control of the area should be taken back and the terror infrastructure dismantled". Of course, that's easier said than done.