No one is smiling in Pakistan. Least of all Nawaz Sharif, whose recent photographs betray a very gloomy, worried and dejected prime minister. It is for the first time in over two years that the house of Ittefaq (the Sharif family-owned conglomerate) has been completely bypassed in one of the most vital defence policy decisions since the test of a nuclear bomb last May.
Sharif-who's also the defence minister of Pakistan-is not amused. This is despite the fact that Raiwind (as Nawaz's family estate is known) had ensured a handpicked chief of the isi, General Ziauddin, who was to act as the eyes and ears of Sharif.
Latest reports doing the rounds in Islamabad say the tapes released by New Delhi in which the chief of army staff, General Pervez Musharraf, is allegedly talking to his second in command also contain some remarks not very flattering to General Ziauddin. In fact, there are rumours that it was actually the isi chief who leaked these tapes because he had not been taken into confidence on several defence matters which only General Headquarters in Rawalpindi had access to.
So what is the short and long-term fallout of the Kargil policy of which Sharif, like the proverbial wife, was the last to know? The Kargil conflict has put Sharif in a Catch-22 position from which it is not easy to wriggle out. So he has made the only move through which he hopes to survive both domestically and globally. By opening several channels of communication (some covert, others overt) with not just New Delhi but world leaders, Sharif seems to be buying time for his army to consolidate on the heights they have captured. The army, in turn, is praying for an early monsoon which would completely bog down the Indian war machinery.
This move also portrays Sharif as a man of peace put in an awkward position by the army establishment. A man who, while not wanting war, cannot at the same time be seen to be letting down his own army. Add to this domestic peaceniks and those who matter abroad who are giving Sharif a more or less clean chit over the Kargil policy. No one is blaming him for what the West now calls the 'intrusion'.
This is why an American general was sent to talk to the 'relevant' quarters in Rawalpindi. In fact, several leading publications abroad have explained how Sharif has no control over the military events in Kashmir. "We in the Awami National Party (anp) have always maintained that Kashmir has always been off limits to the civilian governments. Kashmir cannot be solved militarily. We have to talk and tackle the issue politically," anp president Asfandyar Wali told Outlook.
This was precisely why former foreign secretary Niaz Naik told prime minister Vajpayee "his prime minister is most interested in peace and in reviving the Lahore peace process". Sharif wouldn't have provided a special plane for Naik if he did not want this message to reach New Delhi loud and clear.
Sharif's luck has till now survived the bitterest of battles at home. Kargil, however, is a new test for him because even though he is the defence minister, he is being allowed little room to manoeuvre. For now, at least, Sharif can thank his lucky stars that the Kargil conflict has completely overshadowed the problems he was facing at home, ranging from the Sindh situation, allegations of corruption, his attempts to crush a free press and most importantly, cutting short attempts by the opposition-especially the Pakistan People's Party-to launch a movement against him.
How will the army react if Sharif agrees to a pullout?
As prime minister, Sharif cannot simply command Musharraf to retreat from Kargil as the official Pakistani stand is that positions on the LoC are not clearly demarcated. Besides, Sharif fully realises the strategic strength the Pakistani army enjoys at 18,000 feet, courtesy the biggest intelligence let-down in Indian history. General Musharraf, like his predecessors in all matters relating to Kashmir, has spelt out his policy loud and clear. When asked about his troops being withdrawn, Musharraf replied, "It is too early to say, but it's a government decision. It is the prime minister's decision. We will not withdraw from the LoC unilaterally. Obviously, we don't want to escalate the situation and I'm sure India does not want to escalate it. Therefore, we want to reach a solution that is mutually acceptable to us and to India also. There is the tactical military issue of Kargil and Dras and the political dimension of Kashmir and both have to be tackled together. Pakistan is trying to find a solution to Kashmir which is agreeable to itself, the US and also the Indians. We are peace-loving people, not warmongers. But there can be no compromise on our honour and dignity."
In other words, the army wants to hold on to its positions at all costs. "It should not be forgotten that the military stakes in Kargil are high for both sides and thus any attempts to reach a diplomatic settlement will be resisted by the military on both sides if it compromises their tactical positions," comments The Nation in an editorial.
To add to this, Musharraf announced in Karachi that Sharif and US President Bill Clinton would soon meet. The foreign office did not know where to hide. Besides the players in the government who have literally hijacked the foreign office, it was now no less than the army chief who was announcing a major foreign policy decision. Why did Sharif not announce this? That is precisely what is being asked in Pakistan: what is the army's policy on Kargil and the LoC, and what are the gains and losses of this whole exercise?
Writes noted political analyst Aziz Siddiqui, "Did those who planned the Kargil act not apparently take all the possibilities sufficiently into calculation? Mounting an operation of this kind was doubtless a difficult feat. But sustaining it against all the likely odds is a lot more challenging. There was also apparently the assumption that no one else would be made answerable for an action by independent elements of the Kashmiris. This could be true in the case of normal hit-and-run guerrilla strikes. But when the tactic consists in seizing and holding a stationary position of vantage and making a running operation of it, it becomes a different game. The players become less slippery. Or those who could have facilitated their activity, or at least who could now set up disabling hurdles in their way but don't become identifiable, they also become a sitting diplomatic target."
Can the Pakistani economy survive minus the IMF loan?
It is no secret that at least in its June presentation, there was no mention of how far this military exercise would impact the budget, which anyway caters in a significant manner to the army in a country where the poor are becoming poorer and the corrupt more corrupt. The government itself appears to be the biggest threat to the targets outlined in the budget. It has admitted that the total foreign debt stands at $28.6 billion, while domestically, the government owes around Pakistani Rs 1.2 trillion (see also p 38).
Independent parliamentarian Daniyal Aziz told Outlook, "Two days ago, the Indians used their loudspeakers to create a war hysteria. People in my constituency of Shakargarh near the international border have started to leave their villages. This is despite the fact that the local army commanders are pleading with them to remain. But they have had bitter experiences of the '65 and '71 wars and are trusting only their own judgements. The villagers have already sold their wheat harvests and there will be no rice cultivation this year. Ours is a humanitarian problem. Is there a contingency plan that has taken into account these incidents? If things do not change in 10 to 15 days, we will be without a crop, which means a loss of millions of rupees. These are cheap tactics by the Indians."
Others, like economist M. Ziauddin, say the expenditure being incurred on defending Pakistani interests on the LoC up to Kargil as well as the high cost of moving forces to the international borders to ward off any surprise attack by India are likely to render next year's defence budget-amounting to Pakistani Rs 142 billion-obsolete within no time. "So the next year's budget will have to make available additional resources to take care of the cost of the recent cyclone and Kargil which is likely to go up to about at least Pakistani Rs 100 billion. The saving of Pakistani Rs 67 billion from the debt relief for the year could be diverted to cover part of the cost, but other expenditures which this amount was to take care of would be affected. Also, at least another Pakistani Rs 30 billion would be needed to make up the remaining gap," says Ziauddin. Other estimates speak of expenditure between Pakistani Rs 700 crore-1,000 crore by the end of August if the present Kargil conflict is maintained.
Sharif fully realises that the donors' mood after Kargil is very hostile, to put it mildly. Already, The Economist Intelligence Unit's review for 1999-2000 forecasts that "world trade growth will remain well below the level of '97. Pakistan's top export markets (for textile, yarn and leather goods) will offer little succour: growth in the US is projected to slow further, while gdp growth in the EU and Japan, though rising, will remain weak." Says the weekly Pulse, "This means that the finance minister's projected 18 per cent increase in exports, in the face of an 11 per cent decrease in '98-99, is totally misplaced." Adds The News, "Nawaz Sharif has been told that even if the multilateral agencies managed to withstand US pressure to maintain their support for Pakistan, the Kargil hostilities have the potential to run the country's foreign exchange reserves completely dry in the next three months."
Given these circumstances, Sharif's concerns with the economy are justified. So he is not taking the US threat to hold back $100 million from the IMF which is due this month very lightly.
Is Pakistan on the road to Talibanisation?
Sharif's biggest threat, if he is seen to be "selling out" on Kargil, will come from those fundamentalist and militant outfits which he at no point of time during his two stints in power ever discouraged from practising Islam through the power of the gun barrel.
It is these groups-some loyal to Osama bin Laden, who says his mission is to fight with the soldiers of Islam-that would pose a threat to Sharif if he as much as attempts to draw back. "If Sharif now goes back when we have made so many gains at Kargil and have fought against heavy odds, it will not be the first time that we have been betrayed. But there is talk that then our guns would be aimed at Lahore and not at the Indian soldiers," was how one disgruntled mujahideen expressed his feelings.
But world pressure mounting against Sharif speaks with one voice: "Get the infiltrators out of Kargil." Says leading columnist Ayaz Amir, "There is little point in saying at this stage that the Kargil operation was flawed. That it was ill-conceived, with its political objectives not clearly thought through, seems to be pretty clear. It is important, then, for Pakistan to salvage something from the Kargil situation. A verbal concession on Kashmir if no more, an assurance by India to discuss the problem more meaningfully than it has hitherto done, is the minimum that Pakistan should demand of the world community if the Kargil and Dras peaks have to be evacuated." During a senate debate on Kargil, Aitizaz Ahsan, leader of the opposition, said: "How can the army win a war without the support of the civil society? We are always threatened to be labelled a terrorist state. The Americans seek our help to get at bin Laden. We are held responsible for the Taliban inside Kabul. Attempts are being made to Talibanise Pakistan. We will not allow this." Many would agree in India too.
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