How valid do you think is India's stand on the CTBT?
SPECTOR: It's a shame that India has gradually changed its position. Historically, India wanted a treaty as a stand-alone measure. However, I understand India's secret reason—that it won't be able to develop a full-blown missile-based deterrent against China if it were to join in. Everybody perceives this to be India's rationale.
KREPON: The validity of India's case can be measured by the support, or lack of it, India received in the CD. Many countries agree with its call for progressive reduction and elimination of N-weapons, but almost no one supports its direct linkage to the CTBT. Why? Because the CTBT is an essential condition for the progressive reduction and elimination of N-weapons. To place the treaty in limbo is to place new impediments before a widely shared goal.
Is India being made a scapegoat?
SPECTOR: Last week I thought all were on board with the substance of the treaty and that the only debate was the "entry into force" provisions. But all are not on board. We were told the draft contains provisions that require adjustment and verification. Your question should be "has India been scapegoated or is it the principal stumbling block?" India's diplomatic position is appreciated but people are suspicious of its motivations. Over time, India will realise it would be advantageous to bring the treaty into force. India is not blocking the treaty.
KREPON: Some N-weapon states are using India's stand as a convenient justification to prevent the CTBT from entering into force. Most Indian strategic analysts believe the CTBT is all about constraining India's N-weapon programme. In reality, the CTBT is also about constraining the options of N-weapon states, which is why some of them are hiding behind India to foreclose the treaty's entry into force. Many here are working for a formula that would allow for the treaty's entry into force even if India stays out.
Shouldn't CTBT be tied to time-bound N-disarmament?
SPECTOR: India is being simple-minded about this. We're going through a process of gradual disarmament with our Russian friends, which will severely limit our ability and theirs to manufacture new weapons. Two thousand N-weapons a year are being destroyed in the former Soviet Union and the US. One has to give the global situation time. The stepping stone approach is more practical. N-powers are hesitant to commit themselves to an end-point but will commit to a process of moving in that direction. (By end-point I mean total destruction of weapons). The international community is prepared to take the treaty as a valuable stand-alone measure.
KREPON: The CTBT mandate made no mention of a time-bound framework for N-disarmament. The agreed purpose to these negotiations, which India accepted till this January, has been to negotiate a universal, effectively verifiable, comprehensive test ban treaty. It's no surprise that the N-powers opposed India's 11th hour attempt to change this mandate. Can India provide a time-bound framework for a solution in Kashmir or the date when it won't need to deter China? No one can foretell when political conditions will exist to dismantle N-arsenals completely. A CTBT will soften resistance among the N-powers toward next steps in disarmament. The effort to mandate a time-bound framework will have the opposite result.
Tags