Inside The Terror Swill

t seems Pakistan is undergoing a radical metamorphosis, moving from the phase of Talibanisation of its society to what can be called the Pakistanisation of Al Qaeda. Preliminary investigations into the Mehran attack suggest it was a coordinated operation involving Al Qaeda interim chief Saif Al Adal, who’s based in Waziristan, Ilyas Kashmiri, a Pakistani who’s now counted among the Qaeda’s top strategists, the Tehreek-e-Taliban and the Punjabi Taliban, a term used to describe Punjab-based militant groups who are opposed to, and fighting, the Pakistani state and the United States. Experts believe the Al Qaeda-Taliban alliance has gained an edge because of the support local groups provide.

Ideological ties bind the Al Qaeda, the TTP and the Punjabi Taliban, driven as they are about evicting international forces from Afghanistan. These three share intelligence, human resources and training facilities even as the US-Pak forces (however strained the relationship between the two countries may be) target them. These three initially came together after the United States invaded Afghanistan post-9/11, prompting Al Qaeda and the Afghan Taliban to rely on local partners such as Pakistani pro-Taliban tribes, anti-Shia outfits such as the Lashkar-e-Jhangvi and jehadi mercenaries in Pakistani seminaries for shelter and assistance.

The ties between local groups and Al Qaeda were cemented further as the Afghan Taliban’s astonishing successes against the international forces prompted the US to increase drone attacks in the tribal areas and turn the heat on Pakistan to crack down on the TTP.

But what gave the alliance a fillip was the migration of battle-hardened Pakistani jehadi commanders from the battlefront in Kashmir to north Waziristan. Veteran leaders like Ilyas Kashmiri and Badr Mansoor adopted the Al Qaeda ideology wholesale—that the weakening of the world’s only superpower is essential for the Muslim world. Commanders like Kashmiri also brought with them contacts in the lower echelons of the Pakistan establishment and intricate knowledge of the Pakistan terrain. The ties were mutually beneficial— working with Al Qaeda activists like Saif, who had served as a colonel in the Egyptian Army Special Forces, boosted their capabilities. Is it any wonder then that the Pakistan military has been unable to thwart attacks on its personnel and assets?