"I Will Not Name The Indian Mole"

Twenty-four hours after Capt (retd) Gohar Ayub Khan managed his 15 minutes of fame through a sensational statement that his father and president Field Marshal Ayub Khan had purchased New Delhi's '65 war plan from an Indian brigadier, Outlook presented him two names—Maj Gen R.S. Nirohna and Narendra Singh—to verify whether one of them was indeed the person. Gohar chuckled and said, "No, these two were too junior at the time. I'll respond when you give me some more names to choose from." He then went on to clarify that Pakistan had purchased the war plan a little before 1958, and Outlook should shortlist names of those who were brigadiers in the 1950s and are still alive.

The following day, Outlook presented Gohar with a list of six new names—Sam Manekshaw, D.K. Palit, O.P. Malhotra, M.N. Batra, G. Sarkar, and G.G. Bewoor. Gone was the bluster he had demonstrated a day earlier. Gohar was taciturn, "No comments today. The issue has become too hot in India. It's now for them to find out who was the brigadier who sold a secret war plan to my father for Rs 20,000."

There's speculation that Gohar had become subdued due to pressure from the military, which thought his remarks were ill-timed in the consistently improving Pakistan-India relations. But then, Gohar tossed another bombshell on the eve of the Hurriyat leaders' visit to Pakistan: he said his father Ayub was misled by Kashmiris who had despatched erroneous reports vouching for the Valley's readiness to fight the Indian forces. The claims were subsequently belied, leading to the killing of scores of Pakistani commandos.

Gohar's decision to publish his father's memoirs culled out from his personal diaries and tentatively titled Diaries of a Field Marshal, was never a secret here. Last week's media spotlight has ensured that the book won't gather dust in bookshops when it's published in December. Was publicity for the book his real intent? "No," he said. "A journalist came to see me. During the course of the conversation I mentioned the book and the Indian secret war plan. I was totally surprised by the reaction in New Delhi."

In Pakistan, though, there hasn't been much of a reaction. The only exception has been the former army chief, Gen Mirza Aslam Beg, who said, "As per our records, our (war) archives, there is no mention of such a deal. The only information we got was from a dispatch rider from Jammu." But that was a very small plan, Gen Beg pointed out, claiming nobody could have sold an entire war plan for a paltry Rs 20,000, inflation notwithstanding.

Gohar insists the Indian mole handed the secret battle plan to a go-between a little before 1958 and the payment was made in London. "I personally met the Indian officer in London at a conference. I will not name him even in the book except for the date of his commission and the battalion he joined." Why won't he name the mole? "It is just not done when one writes such books," he replies.

Gohar's book would also claim that all orders of then PM Jawaharlal Nehru to the army HQ in Delhi would reach Ayub Khan's desk, that Islamabad clandestinely obtained from Bangalore a replacement for a damaged canopy of an Indian Gnat (aka Ajeet) plane which had been earlier compelled to land in Pakistan. The Gnat, Gohar claims, was used as an 'enemy aircraft' in Pakistan's battle exercises.