In the terrorist attack by 10 Pakistani terrorists of the Lashkar-e-Toiba (LET) at Mumbai from November 26 to 29, 2008, there were 163 fatalities. Five of these fatalities were caused by explosives and the remaining 158 by hand-held weapons (assault rifles and hand-grenades).
There had been commando-style attacks with hand-held weapons by terrorists in the Indian territory even in thepast--in Punjab by the Khalistani terrorists in the 1980s and the early 1990s, in Jammu & Kashmir by the Kashmiri and Pakistani terrorists since 1989 and in other parts of the country by the jihadi terrorists from India, Pakistan and Bangladesh as well as by the Maoists from Central India. However, attacks with hand-held weapons by the jihadi terrorists in the Indian territory outside J&K were mainly against armed static guards of the security forces outsideimportant establishments. Examples: The attack on the Indian Parliament House at New Delhi in December,2001, the attack on the police guards outside the US Consulate in Kolkata in January,2002, the attack on the guards outside an important Hindu temple at Ahmedabad in September 2002, the attack on a training centre of the Central Reserve Police Force (CRPF)at Rampur in Uttar Pradesh in the early morning hours of January 1,2008 etc.
For attacks on unguarded soft targets in public places, the jihadi terrorists had mostly preferred timed orremotely-controlled improvised explosive devices (IEDs). After the Rampur attack, jihadi terrorists from a group calling itself the Indian Mujahideen (IM) had carried out attacks on soft targets in Jaipur (May), Bangalore (July), Ahmedabad (July) and Delhi ( September). All these involved timed IEDs. There was one minor attack with a rifle by a terrorist of the LET on the participants in a conference of scientists at Bangalore in December,2005, killing one participant. The terrorist managed to escape to Pakistan.
The Mumbai attack of November 26 to 29, 2008, was the first act of mass casualty terrorism by the jihadi terrorists against innocent civilians using hand-held weapons. The previous two acts of mass casualty terrorism with fatalities of more than 150 were carried out with timed IEDs-- in March 1993 and in July 2006, both in Mumbai.
The increasing use of IEDs by the terrorists since 9/11 had led to strict anti-explosive checks even by private establishments such as hotels, company offices etc. The killing with IEDs tends to be indiscriminate with no way of pre-determining who should bekilled. Moreover, the publicity earned from IED attacks tends to be of shortduration-- hardly of one or two hours. As was seen during the attack on the Parliament House, the visual impact of TV-transmitted images of attacks with hand-held weapons as they are taking place tends to be more dramatic. In an attack with hand-held weapons, the terrorists can pre-determine whom they want to die and kill with precision.
In Mumbai, 72 people were killed in the terrorist attacks in two hotels and in the Nariman House where a Jewish religious-cum-cultural centre is located and 86 innocent civilians in public places such as the main railway terminus through which an estimated 2.8 million passengers pass daily, a hospital, a cafe etc. The attacks in the public places by two terrorists on the move lasted less than an hour, but caused more fatalities. The static armed confrontation in the hotels and the Nariman House lasted about 60 hours, but caused less fatalities. In terms of publicity, the static armed confrontation got the terrorists more publicity than the attacks by the two terrorists on the move in public places. By the time TV , radio and other media crew came to know what washappening in the public places and rushed there, the attacks were already over. There was hardly any live coverage. The only live visuals were from the closed circuit TV cameras installed at the railway station. In the hotels and the Nariman House, the media crew were able to provide a live coverage of almost the entire confrontation.
Within a few hours of the start of the confrontation, the security staff of the hotels reportedly switched off the cable transmissions to the rooms. The terrorists were, therefore, not in a position to watch on the TV what was happening outside, but their mobile communications enabled them to get updates on the deployments of the security forces outside from their controllers in Pakistan who, like the rest of the world, were able to watch on their TV what was happening outside. This could have been prevented only by jamming all mobile telephones. Such jamming could have proved to be counter-productive. It would have prevented the terrorists from getting guidance and updates from their controllers in Pakistan. At the same time, it might have prevented the security agencies from assessing the mood and intentions of the terrorists and could have come in the way of any communications with the terrorists if the security agencies wanted to keep them engaged in a conversation till they were ready to raid.