(Paper presented at aconference jointly organised by the State Islamic University (UIN) of Jakartaand the Institute for Defence Analyses (IDA) of Washington DC at Bali,Indonesia, from October 19 to 21, 2005 )
INTRODUCTION
The Internet enables every jihadi to feel part of a larger whole. Itenables every angry Muslim to give vent to his or her anger in myriad ways. Itenables every Muslim to become a participant in the jihad in his or her own way,with or without a leader. It has strengthened Islamic solidarity. Cyber spacehas become the spawning ground of jihadi warriors. The use of the Internetby the jihadi terrorists illustrates the folly of dismissing them as irrationalsor as persons with a medieval mind. An irrational person or one with amedieval mind cannot use the Internet as effectively as the jihadi terroristshave been doing. In this paper, the increasing use of the Internet byinternational jihadi terrorist organisations would be discussed under six heads:Propagation; Communication; data-mining; cyber warfare; other aspects; andNet-centric counter-terrorism.
PROPAGATION
2.All political dissident and other minority groups who in the past lacked access to the conventional media---print or electronic--- have found inthe Internet an easily available means of propagating their cause,creating an awareness of their ideology, winning adherents and promoting afeeling of solidarity and unity of action for achieving their objective. Webactivism is not a recent phenomenon and not confined to Islamicgroups---moderate or extremist.
3. Terrorist organisations of different hues ---ethnic, ideological orreligious--- too have found in the Internet an ideal tool for facilitating thepursuit of their objectives. The international jihadi terroristorganisations were not the first to turn to the Internet. Ethnic terroristorganisations like the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE), ideologicalterrorist organisations such as the Maoist groups of India and Nepal andreligious terrorist organisations such as those of the Punjab in India and theIrish Republican Army (IRA) in the UK were amongst the earliest to have realisedthe utility of the Internet as an operational tool in their attempts toachieve their objective.
4. Amongst the indigenous jihadi terrorist organisations, those of thePalestinians and pro-Palestinian groups, the Chechens and the Kashmiriswere the first to start using the Internet for propagating their cause. Thesewere followed by organisations in Indonesia. Jihadi terrorist organisations with pan-Islamic objectives and trans-national networking started using the Internetin a big way only in 2000 and, since then, have replaced the indigenous jihaditerrorist organisations as the most extensive and innovative users of theInternet.
5. The initial use of the Internet--whether by the indigenous jihadiorganisations or by the pan-Islamic ones--was confined to the creation and theuse of web sites for propagating their cause, for enrolling members andcollecting funds. The web sites were also used for a psychological warfare (PSYWAR)against their State adversaries through the dissemination of details of theiralleged suppression of the Muslims.
6. Well-known and well-identified jihadi organisations restricted their use ofthe web sites for purposes, which would not bring them into conflict with thelaw. They refrained from using their web sites for purposes such as givinginstructions on how to wage a jihad through means such as the fabrication of animprovised explosive device (IED), publicising their claims relating to thesuccessful commission of acts of terrorism etc.
7. Amongst the ostensibly legitimate purposes for which they used their websites were proclaiming their objectives and policies, disseminating statementsof their leaders, carrying articles on different aspects of Islam, and makingappeals for volunteers and funds. The web sites took care not to let themselvesbe seen as indulging in and justifying acts of terrorism.
8. However, this cautious policy did not prevent them from indirect facilitationof acts of terrorism through means such as dissemination of articles carried bythe professional journals and web sites of governmental institutions like theArmed Forces and the police on matters such as the low-intensity conflict, whichindicated the various ways in which terrorist and insurgent organisationsfunctioned. Their purpose in carrying such articles was to facilitate copy catterrorism, without falling foul of the law. In their perception----which wasvalid---since they were mostly reproducing articles on the modus operandi ofother terrorist organisations written by governmental experts, they were notcommitting any breach of the law.
9. The period before 2000 also saw the emergence of a number of web sitescreated by either Muslim individuals or by organisations not identified withindigenous or pan-Islamic terrorist organisations. They sought to encouragefeelings of Islamic solidarity and made Muslims aware of the writings andteachings of well-known jihadi leaders associated with organisations such as theMuslim Brotherhood. An important example is the writings and statements of thelate Abdullah Azzam, considered one of the mentors of Osama bin Laden, whichstarted appearing in these web sites. The purpose of these web sites was toprovide a religious and ethical justification for jihad.
POST-1998 MUSHROOMING
10. Statements condemning the US and Israel and projecting them as theenemies of Islam and the Muslims started appearing with increasing frequency inall the web sites of the pan-Islamic jihadi terrorist organisations after theformation of the International Islamic Front (IIF) for Jihad Against theCrusaders and the Jewish People by Osama bin Laden from his hide-out in Kandaharin February, 1998. The IIF sought to bring together in a trans-national network bin Laden's Al Qaeda, an exclusively Arab terrorist organisation, and a numberof non-Arab jihadi terrorist organisations operating from countries such asPakistan, the Central Asian Republics, Egypt, the Philippines, Bangladesh etc.The frequency and virulence of the anti-US statements carried by theseorganisations increased after the US Cruise missile attacks on alleged trainingcamps of the Al Qaeda in Afghanistan and the Sudan in August, 1998.
11. The projection of the US as the principal enemy of Islam became the definingcharacteristic of all pan-Islamic jihadi extremist or terrorist organisationsafter the Cruise missile attack. However, the indigenous jihadi terroristorganisations such as those of the State of Jammu & Kashmir (J&K)in India and Chechnya in Russia refrained from adopting any anti-US propagandaline in their web sites.
12. In February, 2000, a search of the World Wide Web (WWW) by this writer,even if not very exhaustive, led to about 1,500 sites of Islamic organisations.Most of them had the benign objective of helping in a better understanding ofIslam among Muslims and non-Muslims alike. They contained interpretations of theholy Koran, explanations of Islamic religious traditions and practices andarticles on the contribution of Islam to science and fine arts etc. They alsoprovided a useful database of the Muslim scientists, thinkers and womenengineers of the world, the Muslim media and so on.
13. The following conclusions emerged from their study undertaken by this writerat that time: