Schedules and timetables are difficult to adhere to in international relations. This was proved once again on November 21, when both India and China belied expectations that they would exchange "sample maps" of each other's respective perceptions of where the Line of Actual Control (LAC) lay in the uncharted western sector by 2002-end.
It was former foreign minister Jaswant Singh who, on his March visit to Beijing, had claimed to have secured a commitment from the Chinese government to accelerate border talks. On March 29 this year, at the Diaoyuti Guest House in Beijing, Jaswant gushed: "We have agreed to exchange sample maps of the LAC in the western sector by the end of 2002 and begin the exchange of sample maps of LAC in the eastern sector early next year. So, on the LAC we now have a timetable for the two sectors."
But the 14th meeting of the joint working group (JWG) which ended on November 21 made it obvious that exchange of sample maps in the western sector could now only happen after 2002. About the November 21 meeting, New Delhi was only willing to say that the talks were held in a "positive and forward-looking manner", and that the expert group's (EG's) meeting would be held in January 2003.
The border demarcation exercise between India and China is a complicated process. At the apex is the omnibus jwg that is responsible for overseeing the Indo-China relations. The jwg's many functions include reviewing the progress of the EG that was established in 1993. It is the EG that is responsible for delineating the Indo-China border under the Peace and Tranquility Agreement. But before this happens, the EG has to undertake various steps. First, the two sides share their perceptions of where the LAC lies; the second involves exchange of sample maps on a mutually agreed scale; then come clarifications required due to varying perceptions; and, last, confirm each other's position on where the LAC lies. In areas where there is congruence, the LAC obviously stands delineated—and confidence-building measures are introduced in the border areas.
But the seeming ease of the process is only theoretical. The Indo-China border area is divided into three sectors—the eastern, the western and the middle sectors. In November 2000, after a long-drawn process, India and China exchanged sample maps on a mutually agreed scale of where the LAC lay in the middle sector. Sources say even the process of confirmation in the middle sector is yet to be completed.
The western sector is even more complicated. Sources say this is because of the primacy China attaches to a Frontier Agreement it reached with Pakistan in 1963. Article 2 of the agreement delineates an interim boundary between the two. This came into being after Pakistan ceded a portion of occupied Kashmir, contiguous to the Xinjiang province, to China. India understandably finds this agreement illegal. But the Chinese view it differently.
Consequently, say sources, the discussion on the western sector does not include those disputed areas which India does not control. Moreover, Article 6 of the agreement clearly states that the subject of further negotiations, or delineation of these areas, will arise only after the Kashmir issue is formally settled between India and Pakistan.
There is also the problem of determining what the Chinese feel about where the Indian LAC starts—to the west of Karakoram Pass or at the pass itself (see map). The trouble is that from the map grid point NJ9842 to the southwest of Siachen, there exists no clear ceasefire line which vaguely moves "thence to the glaciers". For most part, the discussions are over perceptions of where the Chinese and Indians think the LAC lies in the Aksai Chin area, which the Chinese took in the '62 war.This is the lesser of the two contentious issues.
Considering the complexities involved, it's no wonder progress has been tardy, never mind Jaswant's optimism. Diplomatic sources say that even under the best of circumstances the EG discussions move at a glacial pace, and is subject to political turbulence. Post-Pokhran II, when New Delhi cited China as the reason for the test, the EG made no progress till the Chinese extracted from New Delhi an official statement to the effect that China and India do not represent a threat to each other.
Explicit timetables stated off the cuff are, therefore, unrealistic. Jaswant, for instance, wrote to his Chinese counterpart in April 2000 that "we address the whole issue in such a fashion that we are able to find resolution of the LAC by end-2001". The Chinese response, which came two years later in 2002, only conceded that the process would be quickened—and to which Jaswant referred to in March!
So, what you have is a long haul, perhaps spreading over a generation. Once the middle sector is clarified and confirmed, and the process is repeated in the western sector that might spill over several years, India and China will turn to the challenge that the eastern sector poses. For one, China hasn't recognised Sikkim's accession to India, nor Arunachal Pradesh as a part of India. This process can only be quickened—and completed—through an unprecedented political initiative. This doesn't seem an immediate possibility.