De-Frankenstein It

Hameed Gul

Former ISI DG

"The ISI's role in domestic, foreign policy makes it as dangerous as the KGB." 
Hussain Haqqani, Ex-information minister

"It's dishonest to say the ISI is run by rogues and its bosses don't know it." 
Najam Sethi, Editor Daily Times

"The agency has been held responsible for interfering in national goals." 
Sherry Rehman, National Assembly member

nce upon a time, long before 9/11 occurred and the US launched its war on terror, India was the only country accusing the Inter Services Intelligence (ISI) of fomenting terrorism and hatching diabolic plots of death and destruction. These allegations Islamabad would dismiss outright, arguing that New Delhi saw in the ISI a convenient, external bogey for its own inability to address domestic discontent.

The world accepted this logic. Or, it ignored the ISI's chicanery, confined as the problem was to the subcontinent.

This perception is changing now, considering the fusillade of charges from around the world against the ISI in the last few weeks. Forget New Delhi's claims about the ISI masterminding the Mumbai bomb blasts; that's old hat. What should worry the ISI is Afghan President Hamid Karzai's accusation that it is bolstering the Taliban and providing sanctuary to Osama bin Laden and Mullah Omar. Add to this the demand of NATO commanders from five nations operating in Afghanistan that their governments get tough with Pakistan over the ISI's support for the Taliban.

Particularly damaging for the ISI has been a report leaked by a British defence ministry think-tank, a little before President Pervez Musharraf met PM Tony Blair in London early this October. Abrasively critical, the report said, "The (Pakistan) army's dual role in combating terrorism and promoting the six-party religious alliance—the Muttahida Majlis-e-Amal—at the same time, besides supporting the Taliban through the ISI, is coming under close international scrutiny. Indirectly, Pakistan has been supporting terrorism and extremism through the ISI, whether in London on 7/7 or in Afghanistan or Iraq."

Stunned, Musharraf's riposte was typical: "Remember my words: if the ISI and Pakistan are not with you, you will lose in Afghanistan." In another interview, though, he was a little circumspect. "Some dissidents, some rogue elements, retired people who were at the forefront of the ISI during the period of the Afghan jehad between 1979 to 1989, may have some links here and there. We are monitoring them and will get hold of them if at all that happens," he said.

Quick to join the debate was Najam Sethi, the editor of Daily Times. He wrote, "It is dishonest to argue that the ISI is run by rogue elements, and its boss, the DG-ISI, and his boss, the COAS (Musharraf), don't know what is going on at the lower level. While this can't be ruled out in particular instances here or there, there is no way that some rogue elements can actually make or break ISI policy made by the national security establishment headed by General Musharraf."

Established in 1948 as the army's intelligence wing, and becoming a veritable 'state within a state' under Gen Zia-ul-Haq to run the anti-Soviet insurgency in Afghanistan, the ISI has nurtured its officers on a rich diet of Islamic extremism and terror as a legitimate foreign policy instrument. Many think that these officers can't be ordered to play an opposite role now. As Lt Gen (retd) Hameed Gul, one of ISI's staunchly Islamist intelligence director-generals who headed the agency in the late 1980s, recently said, "It will not be easy for officers to set aside their beliefs and change sides. The Americans will have to change their policy and support the Taliban one day. They are not going to go away so easily. They are integral, organic and historic."

The ISI's worldview inherited from the past is the reason why it's so dangerous, says Husain Haqqani, Pakistan's former information minister and now director, Center of International Relations, at Boston University. "The ISI has become the classic overgrown covert operations security agency that has a specific worldview. It has a role in foreign policy as well as in domestic politics and is accountable to none. That is what made theKGB so dangerous."

Haqqani says instead of protecting Pakistan from enemies identified by a lawful government, the ISI now defines what is or isn't good for Pakistan. Instead of implementing policy, the ISI virtually makes it. "It's convinced that India is Pakistan's eternal enemy, Kashmir can be won through unconventional warfare, and Afghanistan should be the backyard of Pakistan in every way," says Haqqani. In other words, as long the agency clings to these views it will remain a source of problem.

However, the ISI's beliefs can't be changed, suggests analyst Prof Azizuddin Ahmed, "by simply retiring a few top and middle-level officers from a highly motivated agency." The ideological conviction runs deep in the ISI. It wasn't a genuine change of heart that brought about Pakistan's U-turn on using militant groups to achieve foreign policy goals. As Ahmed points out, "Musharraf's about-turn after 9/11 was, as he has candidly admitted, caused by the US threat to bomb Pakistan into the stone age rather than ideological conversion. He is still a jehadi at heart. So are many officers still serving in the ISI."

The only way to transform the ISI is through a systemic overhaul. Explains Haqqani, "Historically, intelligence agencies that have grown so powerful and unaccountable as the ISI cause problems for the state they control. In my opinion, instead of the ISI controlling Pakistan, the Pakistanis should be controlling the ISI. Otherwise, covert operations will continue to undermine Pakistani democracy and keep Pakistan engaged in conflicts with Afghanistan and India."

This is true as the ISI's policies don't enjoy popular endorsement. As National Assembly member Ahsan Iqbal points out, "While the ISI bosses believe that Kashmiri militants keep pressure on the Indian establishment, the civilians argue that the militancy has damaged the Kashmir cause, providing India the opportunity to portray the freedom struggle there as sheer terrorism."

National Assembly member Sherry Rehman says because the ISI isn't accountable to either Parliament or the foreign office, it plays games even in domestic politics. She thinks it's irrelevant to ask the question: is the ISI operating on its own even today? "Either way, the agency has been openly held responsible for seriously interfering in articulated national goals. This opens up critical questions about its activities on both the sensitive eastern and western borders of Pakistan." Critical questions Pakistan must answer urgently.