Confusing Data

A satisfactory assessment of the results achieved till now in the US-led waragainst terrorism is rendered difficult by confusing data emanating fromAfghanistan and Pakistan.

Even more than three months after the war was launched on October 7, 2001,one does not have a clear idea as to what was the strength of the Osama binLaden-led International Islamic Front For Jehad Against the US and Israel beforeOctober 7, 2001; how many of them have been killed or captured during the war;how many managed to survive and where are they presently.

During his daily media briefing at Islamabad on December 26, 2001, KentonKeith, of the US Embassy there, distributed a chart showing the present(according to the US) hierarchy (brains trust) of  the Al Qaedaorganisation with bin Laden at the top.  It had 42 names, out of whom sixwere shown as 'killed in action' (KIA) and two under arrest. Those shown askilled were Osama's deputy Muhammad Atef, his aides Muhammad Salah, Assadullahand Tariq Anwar Fathy, the organisation's  operational coordinator AbuSaleh al-Yemeni and a trainer, Abu Ubaida.  The two shown as arrested are Abdul Aziz and Abu Faisal, who were detained on December 12 and 14respectively. The remaining  34 members of the brains trust, including binLaden and his second-in-command Aiman al-Zawahiri, were described as  stillon the run.

Keith said: "Some of these Al Qaeda members have been accounted for, butothers are either in hiding, on the run, or holed up in one of the remainingpockets of resistance.  Some of those accounted for might actually havebeen killed in Tora Bora region or elsewhere.  The interrogation ofcaptives and the investigation of former hiding places will bring someclarification over the coming days."

From this, it is apparent that the dead bodies of those believed to have beenkilled have not been recovered and identified.  The reports of their deathsare based on human (HUMINT) or technical intelligence (TECHINT).

He also distributed a  list of 27 Taliban leaders, of whom oneJalaluddin Haqqani was shown as  killed in action, while, Muhammad Fazaland Mulla Noorullah Nori were shown as prisoners of war (POW).

No credible details have been forthcoming from the allies regarding thedamages caused by the war on the cadres of the Al Qaeda and the other componentsof the International Islamic Front.  A mistake, which the US officials andanalysts have been making from the very beginning of this war, is to treat theAl Qaeda and the Front as one and the same.  The Al Qaeda, which isSaudi-centric, is only one of the 12 components of the Front.

Before the war began, the Front was assessed as having 12 components---the AlQaeda, three each from Egypt and Pakistan, the Taliban, two from Uzbekistan andone each from Southern Philippines and Xinjiang in China.  The threecomponents from Pakistan were the Harkat-ul-Mujahideen (HuM), theLashkar-e-Toiba (LeT) and the Sunni extremist Sipah-e-Sahaba.  Detailsreceived after the outbreak of the war indicated that the Jaish-e-Mohammad (JeM)was also a component.

Of these, the maximum casualties due to the US bombing and the fightingagainst the Northern Alliance and other anti-Taliban groups were sustained bythe four Pakistani components. Another Pakistani organisation, which is not amember of the Front, but which also fought in Afghanistan and sustained largecasualties, was Mufti Sufi Mohammad's Tehrik-e-Nifaz-Shariat-e-Mohammadi (TNSM),an organisation whose following is confined to the Federally-Administered TribalAreas (FATA) of Pakistan.

While the Pakistani authorities have been silent on the casualties,independent reports from the Pakistan-Afghanistan border areas put the number ofcasualties sustained by these four Pakistani organisations at 8,000 plus. While the HuM brought some of its initial fatal casualties to Pakistan forburial, the rest of them were buried in Afghanistan itself at the places oftheir death.

While some idea of the extent of Pakistani involvement and the casualtiessuffered by the Pakistanis is thus available, the picture regarding the Arabs,Chechens and other foreigners is confusing.  In order to divert the focusfrom the large Pakistani involvement, the Pakistani authorities and analystsco-operating with Islamabad have been over-estimating the extent of the foreign(non-Pakistani) involvement, projecting most of the casualties as those of theArabs, Chechens and others.  They were talking of Chechens in theirthousands being involved, which is absurd.

Leaving this confusion aside, the most important question today is how manyof the Pakistanis and non-Pakistani foreigners managed to survive and where arethey now.  It is from these survivors that the future threats to thesecurity of India, the US, Russia and other countries will arise.  Anotherequally important question is the fate of Mulla Mohammad Omar, the Amir of theTaliban, bin Laden and his brains trust.

While it is conceivable that at least some, if not many, of these survivorsmight have dispersed in the Afghan mountains and countryside and might be lyinglow for the time being, there are credible reports from Pakistan that a largenumber of the survivors managed to enter Pakistan with the complicity of servingand retired personnel of the Pakistani military-intelligence establishment andhave taken shelter in the FATA, in the Provincially-Administered Tribal Areas (PATA)of the North-West Frontier  Province (NWFP) and in the mosques/madrasas,which had been providing the recruits for these organisations---particularly inthe Binori complex in Karachi, in the Darul Uloom Akora Khattak in the NWFP andthe Jamiya Ashrafiya in Lahore.  The ISI always maintains a strictsurveillance over these three principal mosques/madrasa complexes of Pakistanand they could not thus have taken shelter there without its knowledge, if notcomplicity.

Practically the entire Taliban leadership is reported to have taken shelterin the mosques/madrasas in the NWFP and Balochistan.  The surviving membersof the brains trust of the International Islamic Front have moved over to theFATA, which is the safest place for them in the world.  The talk in theFATA is that bin Laden is also amongst them, but this is yet to be confirmed.

The FATA, like the Northern Areas (Gilgit and Baltistan), is stilladministered by Islamabad under the Frontier Crime Regulations promulgated bythe British before 1947, which treated the tribals of the frontier areas as bornor potential criminals and imposed restrictions on their movements, change ofplace of residence etc and banned political activities there.

The second Benazir Bhutto administration (1993-96) allowed some politicalactivities in the Northern Areas and the interim administration, which came intooffice in November, 1996, after her dismissal by the then President FarooqLeghari at the instance of the ISI, tried to bring the FATA into the nationalmainstream by introducing a modified form of elections there, while continuingthe ban on the national political parties setting up branches there.

Despite this, the tribal leaders and Mullas hold sway in the FATA totallycontrolling every aspect of social life and the economy, which is largelydependent on heroin smuggling. The FATA had become shariatised and Talibanisedin Pakistan long before the Taliban came into being in Afghanistan in 1994.

Though theoretically, the continuance of the Frontier Crime Regulationsshould allow Islamabad a better control over the region, in practice, over theyears the tribal leaders and clerics have managed to dilute the central control. The military-intelligence establishment has been careful not to rub the tribalson the wrong side.  This is not only because of their propensity forviolence, with the people of the area having more arms and ammunition than thepeople of any other frontier area of Pakistan, but also because of concerns overthe impact of any strong action on the lower and middle ranks of the ArmedForces.

The FATA has a large concentration of ex-servicemen and many of the tribalfamilies have their relatives serving in the military.

It is, therefore, doubtful, whether the junta would sincerely co-operate withthe US and its allies in smoking out the Al Qaeda people who have taken shelterin the FATA. It would make a pretense of vigorous action by moving large forces here and there, but would see to it that the end result is zero.

The return of the surviving members of the HuM, the LeT and the JeM, withredoubled anger against India and the US for the losses sustained by them inAfghanistan and for the humiliation heaped on them by the Afghan people in Kabuland other cities, should be a matter of common concern to India and the US. If there is a September 11 or December 13 encore, it would originate from thejehadi pockets in Pakistan, with the post-October 7 Afghan returnees playing anactive role.

In response to the post-December 13 US pressure, Musharraf has reportedlyarrested or detained in their houses some of the leaders of the LeT and the JeMsuch as Prof. Hafiz Mohammed Saeed of the LeT and Maulana Masood Azhar of the JeM,frozen their assets and accounts and sealed off the branch offices in smalltowns, but he has not acted against Mufti Shamzai of the Binori complex, who isthe god father of all the terrorist groups of Pakistan and the Taliban and aclose associate of bin Laden.  His past fatwas against Americans were moreblood-curdling than those of bin Laden.

While making a pretense of better control over the madrasas, Musharraf hasavoided action against the Binori, the Akora Khattak and the Ashrafi, which arethe snake pits of international terrorism in Pakistan.

Instead of wasting its resources and energies in a wild goose chase in placessuch as Somalia and Iraq, the US should now turn its attention to the snake pitsof terrorism in Pakistan before the snakes start moving out again to play havocin the US, India and other countries.

It is admitted that the US can't replicate in Pakistan what it did inAfghanistan, but it should stop its policy of showering lollipops on Musharrafand put in place an apparatus for a close monitoring of the goings-on inPakistan and use the stick more frequently and effectively against Musharraf.

The increasing role assigned by Musharraf to Gen.Mohammad Aziz Khan,Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff Committee, and the head of the clandestine Armyof Islam, in the counter-terrorism operations and in the search for bin Ladenand others shows that he is not sincere in wanting to help the US in smoking outthe surviving terrorists from wherever they have taken shelter in Pakistan.

Reportedly under US pressure, Aziz was removed by Musharraf from his earlierpost as a Corps Commander in Lahore on October 7, 2001, and placed in thelargely ceremonial post of Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff Committee.  Evenfrom that post he was quite active in maintaining contacts with and advising thePakistanis fighting against the US in Afghanistan, arranging medical assistancefor bin Laden and interacting with the brains trust of Lt.Gen. (retd) Hamid Gul,Lt.Gen. (retd). Javed Nasir and others, who were advising the Taliban and the AlQaeda.

He has now staged a highly visible come-back and presided over a meeting ofthe Corps Commanders before Musharraf's return to Islamabad from China.  Itis significant that the Corps Commanders  met without Musharraf.  Eventhough Musharraf has given the impression that this meeting presided over byAziz was held on his instructions in view of the fast-developing situation onthe Indian border, one cannot rule out the possibility that this indicates thestrengthening of the position of Aziz, who is widely perceived in Pakistan asone of the Mullahs' Generals. 

(The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. ofIndia, and, presently, Director, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai)