Clinton Calling

It was within hours of waking up that morning, and learning of the killings in Kashmir, that President Clinton got on the phone to Vajpayee. Western diplomatic sources say this response is nothing short of being historic; it usually takes days to work up a presidential phone call. In the course of the conversation - which was supportive of the decision to pave way for political dialogue - Clinton is understood to have expressed his intention of taking up the matter of the killings with Islamabad. This, apparently, has been done. And, it's being stressed that it's not a one-shot process.

Vajpayee is believed to have resolved to stay the peace course, though this was difficult given the provocative situation on the ground. Sources also indicate there is some coalescing around the view that a lot now depends on how this matter is taken up with Islamabad. Outlook has also reliably learnt that recently there have been many private discussions on Kashmir involving Washington. For instance, on July 14, the chief of Pakistan's Jamaat-e-Islami, Qazi Hussain, met assistant secretary of state Karl Inderfurth and Michael Sheehan, undersecretary of state for counter-terrorism, among others.

But it's being stressed that Washington is not engaged in any 'sub-national diplomacy', so there are no formal diplomatic back-channels open with either the Hurriyat, Hizbul, Jamaat, or even the National Conference. New Delhi thus has autonomy of both thought and action. Apparently, at this stage the nuances of the four R's recited by Clinton during his visit to the subcontinent (restraint, respect for the LoC, reduction of violence and renewal of lines of communication) remain unarticulated. It's also reliably learnt that the US is working on branding the Lashkar-e-Toiba a foreign terrorist organisation, as happened in the case of the Harkat-ul-Ansar. Mike Sheehan is reportedly impressed with the evidence presented by New Delhi on this issue, though just when Washington will carry out its intention remains a matter of speculation as administrative and other processes usually take years.

Despite all this, there's also a marked reluctance to go the whole hog and name Pakistan a state sponsor of terror. This is due to the fact that the leverage the US perceives itself to have vis-a-vis Pakistan is at a significant low. Added to this is the strategic US notion that Pakistan is already an over sanctioned entity. Washington also finds the cross-border terrorism question in terms of trends and furnished evidence as being short of the very best. Also, the ongoing task of meeting New Delhi's request that the hijackers of IC-814 be indicted formally is not totally devoid of challenges, even though the FBI and the cbi are working on making this case presentable in the relevant forum. On the flip side, even if Lashkar is named a foreign terrorist organisation, it's unclear if that can change the ground situation: Harkat-ul-Ansar, after it was proscribed, for instance, changed its name to Harkat-ul-Mujahideen and is still very much operational. Though Kashmir has displaced non-proliferation in the pecking order of US concerns, it's not abundantly evident if, come September, there could be enough to stage a Rose Garden ceremony, or even get Vajpayee to attend. But one thing is beyond dispute: a year after a US arranged denouement in Kargil, it's pay-off time.