Caught In An Ambush

Disappoint Musharraf may not, but his decision has sharpened the schism between right-wing radicals/fundamentalists and liberal/moderates who want Pakistan to emerge from the lengthening shadows of obscurantism and reorient itself to the task of rejuvenating the languishing economy. Joining this debate is also a small but articulate section which fears that the US, for its own national interest, could accelerate Pakistan’s slide into ruin. They ask: wasn’t Washington, in the first place, responsible for the Afghan problem and the emergence of the jehadi cult?

Even as Musharraf mouthed self-validating lines like "Nations should not make emotional decisions", trouble was brewing in Peshawar. A day later it witnessed stormy protests by hundreds of Islamists, not far from the Afghan border. On friday, three people were killed in Karachi. "If our government gives air or ground space to America, we will declare a jehad against the government," declared Hafez Hussein Ahmed, a central leader of the Jamiat-Ulema-e-Islam (jui). "Afghanistan will become the graveyard of Americans." This was also the day the grand conclave of ulema in Afghanistan voted to ask bin Laden to leave the country voluntarily, and the US ordered its combat aircraft to the Gulf. Together they are portents of the ferment Pakistan is likely to face in the weeks ahead. And the question it poses is: can Musharraf pull his nation through what he says is a crisis comparable to the 1971 debacle?

Washington, to the relief of some, stepped in promptly to dissipate rising tensions in the country through a grandiose promise of a munificent economic package. The American ambassador to Pakistan, Wendy Chamberlin, publicly declared last Wednesday: "President Bush is looking at a number of ways to help Pakistan in its economic and social development." Others, predictably, saw in this reason to suspect a plain sellout.

Washington’s sudden effusiveness also failed to allay the scepticism that experts like London-based political analyst Tariq Ali express. "On a trip to Pakistan a few years ago," he says, "I was talking to a former general about the militant Islamist groups in the region. I asked him why these people, who had happily accepted funds and weapons from the US throughout the Cold War, had become violently anti-American overnight. He explained that they were not alone. Many Pakistani officers who had served the US loyally from 1951 onwards felt humiliated by Washington’s indifference." Ali then quotes the general as saying: "‘Pakistan was the condom the Americans needed to enter Afghanistan. We’ve served our purpose and they think we can be just flushed down the toilet. The old condom is being fished out for use once again, but will it work?’"

Tariq feels an over-commitment to Washington could split the armed forces and lead to civil war in Pakistan. Pointing out that the Taliban could not have captured Kabul only through religious zeal, he says: "They were armed and commanded by volunteers from the Pakistan army. If Islamabad decided to pull the plug, the Taliban could be dislodged, but not without serious problems. The victory in Kabul counts as the Pakistani army’s only triumph." The trouble is: it’s a victory a section of the army might not want to let go of.

Agrees Dr Shireen Mazari, director-general of the Institute of Strategic Studies, Islamabad: "Pakistan needs to be cautious in its relationship with the US, having burnt itself many times before and having had many ‘new starts’." She says Pakistan should cooperate in the anti-terrorism campaign without compromising its strategic imperatives. "Amongst these imperatives," she says, "is the need to safeguard our homeland and nuclear facilities. Also, we should deny India the opportunity to exploit the current scenario for bringing in the mujahideen struggle (in Kashmir) within the US anti-terrorist ambit." Obviously, any success for India in getting Kashmiri mujahideen groups declared terrorists could prove catastrophic for the military regime.

Such scepticism towards Musharraf’s pro-US policy from a secular perspective hasn’t come from mainstream political parties. But for the Nawaz Sharif-led Pakistan Muslim League (N), almost all major political groups, including the Pakistan People’s Party (ppp), have endorsed Musharraf’s decision. Former premier Benazir Bhutto publicly suggested to the Taliban leadership that their first priority should be to stop military action against Afghanistan for the sake of its people. She said: "My Pakistan People’s Party has put aside its partisan differences with the military regime at this time of difficulty for Pakistan and the international community." In contrast, the acting president of pml-n, Makhdoom Javed Hashmi, warns that if Pakistan decides to provide ground assistance to the US forces, it would not survive in its present shape. What this churning means for Musharraf’s roadmap to electoral democracy remains to be seen.

Perhaps the strident, emotive and spontaneous reaction of religious groups and mujahideen has influenced Hashmi’s perception. Equally worrisome for the regime and the moderates is the fact that Gen Musharraf’s decision has brought about a sudden unity among the otherwise bitterly-divided religious parties and groups. Not only did they vociferously seek a prompt rejection of the US demands, they also said that betrayal of the Taliban for monetary gains would earn them the wrath of the Almighty and would be tantamount to ‘selling national self-respect’.

Some religious groups even want to fight with the Taliban against the US. Qazi Hussain Ahmad, the fiery ameer of the Jamaat-e-Islami, which is the strongest among the right-wing religious parties, told Outlook that an attack on Afghanistan would be considered as an attack on Pakistan and will be combated with full might. Maulana Fazlur Rehman of the Jamiat-Ulema-e-Islam, who is widely respected by the ruling Taliban of Afghanistan, says: "The Taliban are not only our Muslim brothers but also close and trustworthy allies, and with their presence in Afghanistan, our western borders were secure after decades of uncertainty.... Not only will our western borders become insecure but Musharraf’s decision will create serious internal instability. Our arch-enemy India will capitalise on both these situations to inflict lethal blows on Pakistan."

Most political analysts admit that the first casualty of Musharraf’s decision last week has been Islamabad’s imminent loss of influence in Afghanistan. Says political scientist Dr Hasan Askari Rizvi: "Now, with a major shift in the Afghanistan policy, Pakistan’s lost whatever influence it had in Afghanistan. It has embarked on a risky policy although the other course of action was no less troublesome."

Indeed, it was a Hobson’s choice for Musharraf. Was he to incur the wrath of the US and run the risk of being bombed overnight into the Stone Age? Wasn’t it, instead, preferable to alienate the jehadis whose Kalashnikovs the army can definitely match? The second option promises Pakistan its survival, no matter how painful and tumultuous. Imtiaz Alam, editor, current affairs of The News, Lahore, says the government has taken a correct decision because the Taliban anyway had to be confronted one day, tending as it was to destabilise and Talibanise Pakistan.

Yet the anger against the hypocrisy of the US cuts across all ideological divides. Secular groups today support Musharraf’s decision not because they feel the US is morally right but only because its formidable strength could wreck their country. Fuelling their anger primarily is Washington’s perceived mollycoddling of Israel. As Nasim Zahra, writer on security affairs, says: "When it comes to the American policies in the Middle East, Washington’s unstinted support for Israeli state-terrorism continues. Whoever may have masterminded the September 11 attack, the fact is the arrogance of power prevents the breaking of patterns that drag the human race towards more disasters."

Implicit in their suggestion is that the war against terrorism can’t succeed unless the US changes its policy towards Palestine. But were this to happen, most agree that the allure of Islamist ideology would lose much of its sheen and appeal. Such a scenario would also enable Musharraf to counter religious extremists easily.

Indigenous religious hotheads are the least of Pakistan’s headache. Most of their leaders are beneficiaries of state patronage and are expected to, ultimately, dance to the Establishment’s tune. Says Pakistan’s former interior minister Aitizaz Ahsan, who’s also a ppp leader: "A majority of the religious party leaders are the proteges of the military and they could never go against the present military regime. There are just a few of them who are not on the agencies’ payroll. I don’t think these mullahs, who have always toed the government line, would resort to any serious agitation against the government." Official circles say the government plans to adopt a carrot-and-stick policy towards them, allowing them to articulate the disenchantment of their followers in the streets and remorselessly crushing them were they to stray beyond what can be called guided agitation. Also, these extremists became powerful because their interests coalesced with those of the Establishment—both in Afghanistan and Kashmir. Now at loggerheads in Afghanistan, and with Islamabad hoping for Washington’s intervention in the Valley, the extremist groups sharing affinity with the Taliban could find themselves deprived of political oxygen.

What is, however, expected to pose tremendous problems for Pakistan is the hostility of the Taliban. The military regime has seriously taken their threat, publicly articulated by Kabul’s ambassador Mullah Abdus Salam Zaeef, of attacking any neighbouring country providing airspace and ground bases to the US. Senior security officials fear the Taliban could activate its madrassa network, especially in the nwfp, to foment social unrest. To start with, the Taliban could fan the conflict between the Shias and Sunnis, considering that it harbours the most-wanted sectarian criminals of Pakistan.

Justifiably, the Pakistan army has deployed troops along the Afghan border, just across the Khyber Pass, where the Taliban has massed up to 25,000 fighters armed with Scud missiles. "For the time being we fear they may attack us, but we will defend the motherland," says one military source.

In the long term, equally worrying for Pakistan is the presence of the US in the region. Military analysts say that with Pakistan bearing the brunt of the US-led military operation in its neighbourhood, nuclear installations could be easily sabotaged in the ensuing confusion. This is precisely why the military high command has ordered extraordinary security arrangements at nuclear installations in Chagai Hills, Kahuta and Khushab and the missile sites at Sargodha on Kirana Hills. Sources in the defence ministry claim that different airports in the country were shut down temporarily on September 12 for a few hours to transport some ‘sensitive luggage’ from the country’s nuclear installations.

Says Kamila Hyat, director, Human Rights Commission of Pakistan: "The threat of US activity in the region, and a potential backlash from extremist elements within the country, remain our biggest fears. The blunt warning of war from the Taliban and the opposition to the government decision to back the US compounds these fears. But, some hope that the groups responsible for militancy may finally be taken on and that, rather than mere words, a move to control seminaries and other institutions may be converted into reality." As Musharraf’s Pakistan steps out to exorcise the demons possessing it, the country can either return to the path of sanity or plunge into frightening madness.