"At 10-20 PM on Tuesday night, Air Tigers of the LTTE bombed the Thallaadi military base in the Mannaar region. The military base sustained heavy damages. Many were killed and injured. At 11-45 PM on Tuesday the Air Tigers carried out a successful attack on the Kelanitissa power station in Colombo. After carrying out these strikes, the aircrafts returned safely to base."
Pro-LTTE sources have tried to give the impression that more than one LTTE aircraft were involved in the two attacks. The report of the Reuters correspondent claimed that only one aircraft was involved in the attack on the militarybase. Sri Lankan military sources have also spoken of only one aircraft being involved in the attack on the Colombo powerstation. Pro-LTTE sources have claimed that the same aircraft or aircrafts, after dropping the bombs on the military base in the Mannaar area, flew to Colombo to bomb the power station. The military base attacked is about 250 Kms to the north of Colombo. Would the aircraft or aircrafts, which must have been carrying at least two bombs each, have had sufficient fuel to be able to take off from the Vanni region, bomb the military base, fly to Colombo, bomb the power station and then return to their secret base?
Pro-LTTE sources have claimed that there were many fatalities and severe equipment damage in the military base, but according to Army sources, there were no fatalities and very little equipmentdamage. Only one security forces personnel was injured, they claimed. The power station admitted the death of one of its employees due to shock when the bomb or bombs fell. The administrative buildings and the cooling system sustained some damage resulting in a fire, which was put out by the Fire Brigade. Pro-LTTE sources have claimed some damage to the turbines, but there are so far no reports of any serious disruption of the power supply in Colombo.
The attacks were tactically successful in the sense that the aircraft involved in the two attacks reportedly returned safely to base after dropping the bombs on the targets without being intercepted by planes of the Sri Lankan Air Force (SLAF) or without being hit and brought down by the anti-aircraft defence. But their strategic significance is limited since they do not appear to have caused any damage of a serious nature. However, the attacks could have a psychological significance in maintaining the morale of the LTTE cadres and its supporters in the Northern and Eastern Provinces and in the overseasdiaspora.
These attacks and the earlier strike by two officers of the Sea Tigers, one of them a woman, on two commercial ships used by the Sri Lankan Army for carrying military supplies to the Sri Lankan troops in the Kilinochchi area at the Kankesanthurai port on October22,2008, show that the LTTE's command and control is functioning well despite the losses suffered by it on the ground in the Vanni region during the current ground offensive by the Sri Lankan Army.
Military analysts have commented that since the LTTE started using its air wing in March last year, it has been emulating the tactics followed by North Korea during the Korean war of the 1950s. The tactics consisted of using small planes to surprise and embarrass the South Korean and American Air Force planes without achieving any strategic objective. Since the LTTE started using itsplanes, only in two instances were substantial human fatalities and equipment damage inflicted. The first was during the raid on the Anuradhapura training base of the SLAF in October last year and the second was during the attack on the Vavuniya military base on September9, 2008. Both these raids were conducted jointly by the LTTE's planes from the air and suicide cadres from the ground. It is the suicide cadres on the ground, who caused the fatalities and most of the equipment damage. The role of the aircraft was essentially psychological, meant, inter alia, to divert the attention of the ground personnel of the Sri Lankan security forces . But the combined operations carried out successfully did show good qualities of co-ordination between air-borne and ground-based cadres. Whenever the LTTE planes have operated alone and not in conjunction with ground-based cadres, the results achieved were not significant operationally.
Aircraft operating alone without support from ground-based elements can cause substantial damage to an economic target if the bombs are powerful enough and the bombing is precise. The LTTE has carried out two bombings of economic targets sofar--one against some petrol storage tanks in Colombo last year and the other against a power station in Colombo on the night of October 28. In both instances, the bombs were not powerful enough to cause serious equipment damage and the bombing was not precise. As a result, these two bombings failed to cause any economic dislocation.
The latest strikes like the previous ones once again highlighted the weak night operational capabilities of the SLAF and the weak anti-aircraft defences. They were neither able to bring the planes down through anti-aircraft fire, nor able to chase the raiding planes and force them down nor identify the place of landing of the LTTE planes as they returned to base and strike them from the air. It is reported that SLAF planes were patrolling in the air at the time of the return of the LTTE planes, but they failed to locate their landing place and strike at them as they were landing. The aircraft managed to land safely and ground-based technicians of the LTTE's air wing managed to dismantle them quickly and shift them to their intended place of concealment.