On July 27 last, when Defence Minister George Fernandes informed the Lok Sabha that Russian President Vladimir Putin was self-confessedly the "greatest friend of India in Russia", it was difficult to overlook the fact that this statement came less than a week after the five Latvians accused in the Purulia arms drop case had been released. Russia's ort TV later reported that Putin "hailed the release as a gesture that'll contribute to the further successful development of relations between our two countries." It almost looked as if the release was a precondition for Putin's recent visit.
New Delhi rolled out the red carpet for Putin. And he responded suitably, gladdening Indian hearts with his denunciation of terrorism and its sponsors. Departing from the prepared text, he shared with MPs the "important and verified information" that it was the "same individuals, the same terrorist organisations" who were "conducting terrorist acts from the Philippines to Kosovo, including Kashmir, Afghanistan, and Russia's northern Caucasus." This even exceeded Bill Clinton's criticism of Pakistan.
Putin's remark is the outcome of Russia's growing concern about Afghanistan's destabilising influence in Central Asia. In fact, at Hyderabad House where the Strategic Partnership Declaration was signed, Putin was even more explicit, "We believe a shift of international terrorism has taken place to this part of the world. We have to coordinate all the services of the specialised agencies, as well as military and political activity." National security advisor Brajesh Mishra, who addressed the press a few hours later, denied the proposed cooperation had any military dimensions. But Putin, like Clinton, also supported peace parleys between India and Pakistan. "We hope for a renewed process of negotiations between India and Pakistan to weaken the regional military and political tension," he said.
Pakistan and Kashmir apart, if the number of documents signed is an indication of the status of mutual relations, then things are quite rosy. As many as 17 documents were signed as against only seven during former PM H.D. Deve Gowda's trip to Moscow in 1997. Says Russia expert Madhavan K. Palat, professor of Russian history, Jawaharlal Nehru University (jnu), "Russia is useful for its weakness. Also, defence supplies continue as before. Russia's friendship with India doesn't create any new enemies, except Pakistan's hostility—the importance of which is lessening with the retreat of US patronage. These are truths that Putin knew but Yeltsin had forgotten." Adds Nirmala Joshi, Director, Russian and Central Asian Area Studies programme at jnu, "Recently, when Putin was in Japan, he talked about Japan's place at the expanded Security Council but didn't talk of supporting India. It remains to be seen whether he'll pursue this support to the logical end."
Originally, the planned visit was shorter. When it was announced that Putin would be visiting India between October 2 and 5, it was let out that he'd extended his visit by a day "on New Delhi's request". The extra day was for the Mumbai leg, heavy on nuclear symbolism, that goes, in some ways, to the heart of Indo-Russian ties. Says a Western diplomat, "There is going to be dismay over Putin's trip to barc." Putin's barc visit, and proposed cooperation on nuclear energy, could turn out to be controversial. In a signed statement ahead of Putin's visit, Yevgeny Adamov, Russian minister for atomic energy, said: "We're sure that pressure and sanctions isn't an effective way to prevent proliferation.The most effective way is the division of weapon and energy technologies and control... The world community is well aware that the volume of the Indian nuclear power engineering market is estimated to be about $30 billion for the next 20 years.... Leading French and US companies are already exploring the possibility of carving a niche in the Indian market of nuclear materials and technologies."
It's pure market logic. The Russians clearly hope to be the first to stake out areas. The reasons for Putin's barc visit are also not hard to find. In March, even before he became president, he visited the nuclear research city of Snezhinsk and pledged to reinvigorate the nuclear industry. Shortly afterwards, in June, President Putin relaxed curbs on exporting sensitive nuclear equipment, reversing an eight-year-old Yeltsin decree. The Guardian of London quoted the new Putin decree thus: "The Russian government 'in exceptional circumstances' can decide to export nuclear materials to a country which has no nuclear weapons but which hasn't placed all its nuclear activity under iaea (International Atomic Energy Agency) safeguards." India fits this description to a T. In July, India and Russia also signed a three-year protocol in Moscow on expanding cooperation in nuclear sciences. The MoU signed during the current visit only further pushes the nuclear envelope.
The Koodankulam nuclear power plant has been held as an example of Indo-Russian nuclear cooperation. But certain facts need reiteration. The agreement to set up the plant was signed in '88. For five years, nothing happened. Then the two sides disagreed on the mode of repayment of the $2 billion credit Russia had offered India. The issue still hangs in balance. Foreign secretary Lalit Mansingh indicated the Detailed Project Report would be ready next year. But, despite 20 years having passed since Koodankulam was first proposed, it's not yet clear when the project will actually be completed. In contrast, comparable Russian projects in, say China, have surged ahead. Adamov explains the delay thus: "Since '92, Russia has been adhering to the principle of comprehensive iaea guarantees as a condition for new supplies to non-nuclear states. This is limiting our cooperation with India in the sphere of the peaceful use of nuclear power." It is pertinent to remember that Koodankulam came under the iaea after the US protested that the deal could fall foul of the London Nuclear Supplier Group guidelines. It's to be seen how Russia, under the new Putin decree, consolidates upon the MoU, which is only a statement of intent.
There's also hope that Moscow would employ the new Putin decree to ward off America's traditional interference in Indo-Russian nuclear matters. For instance, for two years US protested the sale of cryogenic engines with liquid oxygen propulsion systems for the launch of gslv, claiming it would be in contravention of the April 1987 Missile Technology Control Regime (mtcr). The then president, Boris Yeltsin, promised he wouldn't succumb to US pressure, but after the US slapped sanctions in May 1992, Moscow suspended the technology transfer contract and provided only the sale of the cryogenic engines. In exchange, Russia got bidding rights on over $950 million worth of future American space projects.
Keeping this in mind, is the 'new relationship' wrinkle-free? Brajesh Mishra informed the press that there was a "convergence of views on almost all subjects," but didn't elaborate on what the divergences were.Evidently, Russia can't ask India to engage the Pakistanis and yet itself follow a policy of continued isolation of Pakistan. Diplomatic sources say Putin hasn't given any dates for his Pakistan visit but has indicated that a visit would be conditional to progress on certain terms (read Taliban). This means Putin has agreed to a controlled thaw in relations with Islamabad. As Mishra said: "We've been assured that this policy on Pakistan won't be detrimental to India." The subtext is: Russia can't get an effective handle on the Taliban without engaging the middleman—Gen Pervez Musharraf—and India will have to reconcile itself to this.
Even the Strategic Partnership Declaration is a reheated one. Upgradation of ties to the level of strategic partnership was part of the agreed decisions during Gowda's '97 visit. Mishra was categorical that the strategic partnership is "not a security arrangement"—a reflection of both post-Cold War realities and the new bilateral relationship. Strategic Partnership thus means a broad range of bilateral engagement. But despite this, it's unclear what new elements this Declaration has that weren't there earlier.
Indo-Russian trade ties are also in poor shape. Putin put the annual trade turnover in the region of $1.6 billion. Vajpayee noted that "the level of bilateral trade does not correspond with the true potential." A pragmatic Putin only said that "this figure will increase by the end of the current year," and that "rapid progress would be made in energy, metallurgy, and space exploration."
So, outside the fuzzy paradigm of nuclear cooperation, just what do Indo-Russian ties mean? Arms sales. After 30 years of reliance on Soviet hardware, 70 per cent of Indian army armaments, 80 per cent of its air force armaments and 85 per cent of navy armaments were of Soviet origin in 1991. This pattern still persists. India buys more hardware from the Russian defence industry than Russia's own military. Indian defence contracts are estimated to have kept in operation about 800 Russian defence production facilities. Russian exports to China and India amount to about 40 per cent of the total revenue of Russia's defence industry. The signing of a 10-year Indo-Russian agreement on military technical cooperation, worth $15 billion, in the aftermath of the Pokhran tests, is an example of this trend.
This was reiterated during Putin's visit with the signing of arms deals worth $3 billion. This includes the purchase, refitting, arming of the 40,000-tonne aircraft carrier Admiral Gorshkov, 310 T-90S tanks equipped to fire missiles, as well as a deal for producing 140 SU-30 MKI aircraft. The tanks will counter Pakistan's Ukranian T-80 UDs which were critically dependent on Russian components. During Gowda's Moscow visit, Yeltsin had pledged that Russia wouldn't provide these components to Ukraine. And yet these tanks reached Islamabad. Some aspects of New Delhi's relationship with Moscow simply defy explanations.